

YALE MEDICAL LIBRARY





3 9002 08676 3209

# THE HSIANG-YA AGREEMENTS

---

RICHARD JAMES FORDE

1977



Permission for photocopying or microfilming of "

The Hsiang-ya Agreements

(TITLE OF THESIS)

for the purpose of individual scholarly consultation or reference is hereby granted by the author. This permission is not to be interpreted as affecting publication of this work or otherwise placing it in the public domain, and the author reserves all rights of ownership guaranteed under common law protection of unpublished manuscripts.

Richard J. Torde  
Signature of Author

April 11, 1972  
Date





THE HSIANG-YA AGREEMENTS: THE YALE FOREIGN  
MISSIONARY SOCIETY TRIES TO COOPERATE  
WITH THE HUNAN GENTRY IN MEDICAL  
EDUCATION (1914-1927)

A Thesis Submitted to the  
Yale University School of Medicine  
In Partial Fulfillment  
Of the Requirements for the Degree of  
  
Doctor of Medicine

Richard J. Forde

A. B., Brown University (Asian History), 1971  
A. M., Harvard University (Regional Studies East Asia), 1972

Advisers: Jonathan Spence, Ph.D., Department of History,  
Yale University; David Musto, M.D., Department of  
Psychiatry (Child Study Center), Yale University

March 1977



Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2017 with funding from  
Arcadia Fund

<https://archive.org/details/hsiangyaagreemen00ford>

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author's especial thanks for help with this work are due to many people: to Braxton McKee and Sandy Schreiber, who suggested where to begin; to David Musto, who helped narrow the topic, who provided the early bibliographic help, who suggested numerous paths along which to proceed, and who gave much encouragement during a period when it was not evident how this project would evolve; to Jonathan Spence, the principal adviser for the enterprise, without whose depth of knowledge the work would have foundered in its early stages, for his enormous reservoir of bibliographic material, for his critical suggestions, and not the least for his enthusiasm and encouragement; to Reginald Fitz, Vice President, and the staff of the Commonwealth Fund for providing easy access to the Fund's files on Yale-in-China; to George Pierson, Historian of the University, for his help with bibliographic materials relating to the history of Yale; to Jeffrey Kinkley, for reading the manuscript in its early stages and providing a Harvard perspective on Yale-in-China; to Susanne Forsström, for her suggestions about the manuscript in its early stages; to AnElissa Lucas of the East Asian Research Center at



Harvard, for her interest in the project and for bibliographic information; to Judith Schiff, Carol Bodak, and the staff of Historical Manuscripts and Archives at Sterling Memorial Library, for locating and giving permission to use vast quantities of material on Yale-in-China; to B. Preston Schoyer, for permission by the Yale-China Association to use materials in their archives; to John Whitehead, for permission to read his unpublished paper on "Yales of the West"; to Reuben Holden, William Reeves, and Professor Spence (again), whose works on Yale-in-China laid the foundation for the present study; and to the many others, at Yale and elsewhere, who gave advice and encouragement along the way.





## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. . . . .	ii
Part	
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
II. THE YALE BACKGROUND. . . . .	8
ORIGINS AND GOALS OF THE YALE FOREIGN MISSIONARY SOCIETY.	
THE EARLY YEARS OF MEDICAL WORK AND THE FIRST HSIANG-YA AGREEMENT.	
III. STANDARDS, FINANCES, AND THE FOUNDATIONS I . . .	65
IV. "TO DO OR DIE": HSIANG-YA IN CRISIS . . . . .	90
V. STANDARDS, FINANCES, AND THE FOUNDATIONS II. . .	109
HSIANG-YA AND THE CHINA EDUCATIONAL COMMISSION.	
VI. STANDARDS, FINANCES AND THE FOUNDATIONS III. . .	128
THE SECOND HSIANG-YA AGREEMENT.	
THE DAYTON REPORT.	
VII. THE LAST YEAR: REVOLUTION AND CLOSURE . . . . .	176
VIII. AFTERMATH. . . . .	204
. . . . .	
APPENDICES. . . . .	219
BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . .	248



PART I

INTRODUCTION



## PART I

### INTRODUCTION

This is the story of two agreements in which an American missionary society and members of the gentry class of a Chinese province contracted to conduct a jointly run medical school, two nursing schools, and a hospital. Each party to the agreements had its own goals in mind.

The missionary society would attempt to influence the younger Chinese generation to serve God and China and would try to create in China a Christian elite to act as stewards for a developing nation. America would save China not only from her pagan self but also strengthen her against the depredations of "the Powers"--England, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan, imperialist nations engaged in a dog-eat-dog competition to carve China into spheres of influence. Americans, supposedly above this battle, would train the Chinese to commerce and industry, Protestant morality, athletics, and hygiene. For its part in this crusade, the Yale Foreign Missionary Society would educate the sons and daughters of the Chinese literati in its middle school, college, nursing and medical schools.

The Hsiang-Ya Agreements had other meanings





entirely for the Chinese. The gentry of Hunan, who had taken a leading role in modernizing their province, could, through cooperation with the Yale Mission, stave off American missionary usurpation of what was essentially a provincial right: to establish and maintain a medical school providing for the needs of Hunan. Cooperation on the part of the gentry would serve as an extension of their traditional interests in education--now translated from maintaining a Confucian polity to providing educational opportunities incumbent upon a modernizing state. Gentry control of modern schools in Hunan fit into the new pattern of elitist control that emerged in Hunan in the late 1890s whereby the gentry concerned themselves less with maintaining their traditional moral influence in Chinese society and more with preserving and consolidating their political and economic power. Yet, the Hsiang-Ya cooperation allowed the gentry to fulfill their traditional benevolent role in society. Gentry response to public health issues and medical education was not unlike their response to provincial needs in time of flood, drought, and famine.

Armed with their separate intentions, the Yale Foreign Missionary Society and the gentry of Hunan could do little without sufficient funds. To finance medical training is without a doubt to underwrite the



most expensive type of professional education. That was as true in 1913 as it is today. For the Yale Foreign Missionary Society and for its partners in education the Hunan gentry, financial considerations would become of ever-increasing importance as medical work was expanded and filled out in an effort to realize plans to establish and maintain a first-rate medical center.

Of vital importance to the story of the Hsiang-Ya Agreements is an appreciation of the atmosphere in which this expensive endeavor was undertaken. The period 1900-1928, from the Boxer Rebellion until the reunification of China under the Nationalists, is perhaps the bleakest period in modern Chinese history. The period when the Hsiang-Ya Agreements were in effect (1914-1927) spans the decline of the early republic and the disintegration of central government administration, the rise of warlordism, and the partial reunification of the country under the Kuomintang. The inflationary effects of World War I coupled with China's national prostration would have serious consequences for the growing medical school. For as the school took shape under the first Hsiang-Ya Agreement, the Chinese were less and less able to support the enterprise. Although the first Hsiang-Ya Agreement was a document which, albeit unrealistically, looked forward to the growth of a first-rate medical



complex, the second agreement was clearly a contract made to be broken.

If political, military, and economic instability would work against Hsiang-Ya, Edward Hicks Hume most certainly provided the glue that held the enterprise together. Hume had the highest faith that the efficiency of modern western medicine would triumph over all difficulties. Essential to the study of Hsiang-Ya is a knowledge of Hume's character. Even in the face of China's protracted national emergency, Hume and his impatience to get on with building a Johns Hopkins in Changsha kept Hsiang-Ya alive through periods of intense duress as he struggled with a recalcitrant board of trustees at home. Hume's personal ambitions perhaps blinded him to the fact that times were not conducive to his vision for himself and for China. Expansion and getting on with the job in the face of ultimately insurmountable objects would, for Hume, hold sway over retrenchment and consolidation. Of all the Yale Mission, though, Hume stands out as the one who saw most clearly--at least at the end--the necessity for changing the basis of missionary activity in China.

The most remarkable feat of the Hsiang-Ya "experiment" is that the institution produced doctors who could compete with graduates of Peking Union, certainly





the best medical school in China and one of the outstanding medical schools in the world at the time. One would not have expected the actual achievements of Hsiang-Ya to be the results of an endeavor so beset by chronic fiscal uncertainty. Hsiang-Ya's ideals and standards attracted foundation money and were praised by sources not connected with the school.

The Northern Expedition spelled the end for Hsiang-Ya as it existed under the agreements. Attacked as the imperialist product of the unequal treaties, the institution was forced to close its doors in the wake of massive student agitation, to reopen only after reorganization as an exclusively Chinese institution with nominal support from its missionary sponsor.

\* \* \*

The present study examines a movement and its vicissitudes. It is not per se a history of the Hsiang-Ya hospital, medical, or nursing schools. Rather it is an attempt to untie the nexus of events and people surrounding the Hsiang-Ya experiment. The rise and fall of Hsiang-Ya as an institution is, as Jonathan Spence has noted, "a story with many muddles and byways." Hsiang-Ya was a hybrid institution, a product of two worlds, trapped in one of them, increasingly disowned in the other.



As the reader will note, the primary source materials on Yale-in-China lie within the Yale-in-China Archives, a vast and chaotically organized collection of what essentially constitutes the business files of the Yale Mission and the Yale Foreign Missionary Society. As such, the Archives provide a close view of Hsiang-Ya from the American side. To supplement the present study, further work on the Hsiang-Ya Agreements might include an examination of the gentry involved in Hsiang-Ya and local reaction in Changsha to the Yale Mission, as revealed in Chinese newspapers of the period. At present, it is almost always a Yale missionary who speaks for the Chinese. There are few documents in the sources thus far utilized that bear on the view of the agreements from the Chinese side. Also, Hsiang-Ya needs to be placed within the context of other medical missionary enterprises operating in China at the time. These and other questions will be taken up when the author is able to resume work on this curious Sino-American experiment in medical education.



PART II

THE YALE BACKGROUND

ORIGINS AND GOALS OF THE YALE FOREIGN  
MISSIONARY SOCIETY

THE EARLY YEARS OF MEDICAL WORK AND THE  
FIRST HSIANG-YA AGREEMENT





## PART II

### THE YALE BACKGROUND

#### ORIGINS AND GOALS OF THE YALE FOREIGN

#### MISSIONARY SOCIETY

#### THE EARLY YEARS OF MEDICAL WORK AND THE

#### FIRST HSIANG-YA AGREEMENT

So let us strive that ever we  
May let these words our watch-cry be,  
Wheree'er upon life's sea we sail:  
"For God, for Country, and for Yale!"  
From "Bright College Years"  
H. S. Durand, '81

Our young men are not going out of college,  
staled, in the name of discipline, by  
their carefully conned lessons, to be  
launched on the voyage of life as ships  
without wind; but they are to have great  
sentiments and mighty impulsions and  
souls alive through with fires of high  
devotion.<sup>1</sup>

Horace Bushnell, '827  
Commencement, 1865

The Yale Foreign Missionary Society had its beginnings in the intellectual atmosphere of Yale College in the late 1800s; its development can be directly traced to the "great sentiments and mighty impulsions" of the times which pointed out the way for the Yale men who would eventually guide the formation



of the Yale Mission and preside over its successes, crises, and failures.

Strenuosity, confidence-in-the-future, bulldog tenacity, earnestness, contagious energy, manliness, virile Christianity, reckless love of success--these terms recall the caricature of the Yale man of the 1890s. In rhetoric it was seemingly a simpler age than ours and seemingly a simpler Yale--an institution "God has called to light and lead a people,"<sup>2</sup> where "a Yale atheist, a Yale pessimist, or a Yale cynic is rarely found."<sup>3</sup> Yale was a place for work, for manly endeavor.<sup>4</sup> The "second" Timothy Dwight in the Phi Beta Kappa lecture for 1887 said:

If there is anything in life for which I feel that I have reason to be grateful, it is that I have full and pressing work for every day, and that I am obliged to meet appointments and duties; and I believe that every true Yalensian, whether in his undergraduate life or in the longer sphere of the world's activities, is, in his deepest thought of himself, grateful for the same thing.<sup>5</sup>

Zeal and strenuosity, be it in the classroom, on the playing field, or in religious activity, sparked the spirit of competition and pointed out the way to success in life. "[The College] made you a man and fitted you for public trust. . . . Yale made you succeed . . ."<sup>6</sup> Nor was College a time to compromise the existing order.



In his autobiography, Wilbur Cross, '85, tells of his experience at Yale College:

I questioned nothing. I took it for granted that God was in his heaven and all was right with the college world. . . . I accepted the college curriculum as it was, without wasting time over whether it might be better or worse. It was my job to saw wood so long as there was any wood to saw, whether soft or hard.<sup>7</sup>

Cross did what he had to do without making excuses; he was one of those who, "like the boy on the burning deck, knew precisely what they had to do, and did it."<sup>8</sup> Timothy Dwight identified the "genuine Yale man" by his "readiness to do what the summons of the hour may demand, whether it be pleasing or not . . ."<sup>9</sup>

This manly sense of duty, as I conceive, is the primary object of a true education. The cultivation of it is the prime object of our earthly life. The Yale Man, if worthy of his inheritance here as well as of his manhood, should have it. . . . [W]e are united in prizing the education which fits us for manly work in the world, and for the discharge of whatever obligations may rest upon us as manly men.<sup>10</sup>

Another primary object of the Yale education was devotion to manly Christianity--a religiosity that was frank, straightforward, dignified, and characterized by depth of thought and unfeigned earnestness on the part of the believer.<sup>11</sup> Dwight, in his message to the Phi Beta Kappans noted that



The spirit of this University has, from the beginning, been reverent towards the Christian faith; and while many may have gone through their career here without giving this faith an entrance into their hearts or a controlling power over them, it has always held a supreme position and has ever summoned all who come hither to yield themselves to its influence. The cultivated infidel . . . is no true son of our University and has not gained its inheritance.<sup>12</sup>

There was little opportunity in that far-off Yale College not to be exposed to religion and its associated activities. Notwithstanding the fact that both daily and Sunday chapel were required, there was also voluntary religious activity.<sup>13</sup> In 1879 the Yale Christian Union was founded, which paved the way for the idea of a union of Christian men at Yale. In 1881 the Y. C. U. was superseded by the organization of the Yale Y. M. C. A., which could enjoy the opportunities of affiliation with similar groups at other campuses. The Yale Y. M. C. A.--or simply Dwight Hall, as it was usually known--could boast by 1901, only twenty years after its founding, of being the largest college Christian organization in the country with approximately a thousand members.<sup>14</sup> At the turn of the century Dwight Hall was sponsoring a number of on- and off-campus religious activities, which included mid-week Bible classes, Sunday evening services in Dwight Hall, the





Oak Street Boys' Club and the Yale Mission for indigents and working men in "the Bowery of New Haven."<sup>15</sup>

Religious activity at Yale not only provided a means whereby students might express their sincere religious commitment through corporate worship, study, and local missionary work, but also was very much a part of the "hurly-burly of organized college activity."<sup>16</sup> In its religious activity in that age of good works, the college stressed involvement as much as commitment. Social pressures were brought to bear to get a man to do something and religious activity, in the same way as a team or paper, was a form of doing.<sup>17</sup>

In the hustle and bustle of college life, religious and otherwise, lay an emphasis on the corporate way of doing things. George Pierson, '26, writes of Yale in the 1890s that "individualism was not encouraged. . . . Harvard men might win the one-man competitions but the team contests went regularly and decisively to Yale."<sup>18</sup> Harvard's individualism and Yale's collectivism could be seen even in the approach of the two institutions to missionary work for Harvard planned

to place in the foreign field . . . twenty men, who shall be encouraged to go wherever there seems to be greatest need and the greatest opportunity.<sup>19</sup>



Yale, on the other hand, intended to establish and maintain a Yale Mission with its own plant, completely staffed and financed by Yale men. A. C. Williams, '98, one of the founders of the Yale Mission, said that Harvard's plans for a mission were "as characteristic of Harvard as our plan is of Yale concentration and 'team play.'"<sup>20</sup>

Cooperation and "team play" implied loyalty to Yale and one's fellows. Yale men had what Joseph C. Jackson, '857, called the "Yale Spirit":

It is a combination of various elements--Inspiration, or faith with enthusiasm, sacrifice, or self denial, fidelity and loyalty, cooperation and patriotism.<sup>21</sup>

This Yale Spirit would be strong enough to mobilize moral and financial support for a great foreign missionary endeavor.

No one who knows what this spirit means in the life of Yale undergraduates, or who is aware of what it has accomplished in athletics, in politics, in concerted movements for strengthening the college or improving its moral tone, will doubt its effectiveness when directed toward the support of a missionary society that bears the name of Yale.<sup>22</sup>

Loyalty to fellows, class and Yale extended to loyalty to one's country and concern that "a power without parallel may be wisely applied for the blessing of the world."<sup>23</sup> Aware of America's might and



responsibility, the Yale man carried with him a sense of stewardship that enabled him to reach out and help his "weaker and flagging brethren" not only at home--in such projects as the Dwight Hall-sponsored Yale Mission in New Haven--but also abroad--as in the Yale Mission in China.<sup>24</sup>

When John R. Mott, '99, spoke at the Yale Alumni Dinner in 1899, he addressed the Yale man's far-flung responsibilities:

We are living at a time when Yale and the other universities recognize their responsibility, not only to the nation but to the whole world and we are laboring to the end that the influence that goes out from this great republic shall be an influence that makes for righteousness and the highest type of civilization.<sup>25</sup>

But until the death of Horace Tracy Pitkin, '92, the martyr of Pao-ting Fu, who as a missionary to China "sealed his testimony with blood in the awful summer of 1900," Yale men had not, according to Harlan Beach, '78, "looked fairly in the face of their obligations to suffering humanity beyond the seas."<sup>26</sup> Beach's stirring call to action, "Who will follow in the steps of our glorious hero?" was not to wait long for reply.<sup>27</sup>

Pitkin was one of a number of Yale graduates doing mission work abroad under the auspices of one



of the various foreign missionary boards which operated out of the United States. He was one of several Yale men working in China during "the awful summer" of 1900 when the Boxer Rebellion reached its height. Pitkin worked for the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions at its mission in the south suburb of Pao-ting Fu. On the morning of July 1, 1900 the mission was attacked by Boxers and a throng of looting villagers. In attempting to defend the mission, two female charges, and himself, Pitkin was shot, killed, and then postumously beheaded.<sup>28</sup> He was Yale's only missionary martyr to the I-ho Ch'üan (the Boxers of Honesty and Concord), an anti-foreign, anti-Christian and largely pro-dynastic secret society determined to drive foreigners out of China. Believing in their own supernatural powers and personal immunity to foreign bullets, the Boxers were supported by the conservative faction at the Ch'ing court and by the Empress Dowager herself. Although they failed in their declared mission of "upholding the Ch'ing Dynasty and exterminating the foreigners" and in fact brought upon China a humiliating settlement at the hands of the Powers, the Boxers gave the lie to the assumption that China could not nor would not resist western imperialist encroachment.<sup>29</sup> It was into a China shamed by the Boxer





Protocol that Yale graduates desired "to see if possible that Pitkin's sacrifice was atoned for somehow by us as Yale men."<sup>30</sup>

\* \* \*

The Yale Foreign Missionary Society came into being in June, 1902, as a result of efforts by certain "energetically pious" Yale men who wondered if they could not somehow merge their loyalty to Yale and their enthusiasm for foreign missions.<sup>31</sup> Some of these men, such as A. C. Williams and Lawrence Thurston, had taken part in the Volunteer Band of the Class of 1898. This group, like other class Bands before them, was born of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions and the Northfield Conferences. The Band of '98 took an active interest in promoting foreign missions at Yale and was so enthusiastic that the members took their message on tour and visited a number of U. S. cities. On February 10, 1901, Warren Seabury and A. C. Williams presented their ideas for a Yale mission to Robert Speer, of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church (U. S. A.); their plan was "to take possession of some district of China or India in the name of the Lord."<sup>32</sup> Speer's response was so encouraging that it provided even more momentum to the project; shortly thereafter cooperation of the



American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions was obtained from James L. Barton, the Board's Secretary and Samuel Capen, the Board's President.<sup>33</sup>

Then Seabury, Williams, and Thurston went to work in New Haven. After they secured the support of several prominent Yale professors and administrators, Thurston and Williams each interviewed President Arthur Hadley. He suggested that at least \$20,000 be raised before anything serious be begun. Before financial solutions were in sight, however, the Yale Mission was organized on June 25, 1901.<sup>34</sup> The Mission, informally known as Yale-in-China, would be governed by a council of forty Yale graduates, half permanent and half elected. Permanent members were to include the President and Secretary of the University, a number of faculty members from various specified departments, the General Secretary of the Y. M. C. A., and representatives from the American Board, among others. The real work of control lay in the hands of the Executive Committee, later to be known as the Board of Trustees, composed of seven members who were to select candidates for the work and devise the policy as well as ways and means. At an annual meeting every June the council would pass upon the plans and operations of the Executive Committee.<sup>35</sup>



In 1902, when only \$17,000 had been raised, President Hadley gave permission to the Executive Committee to use the Yale name.<sup>36</sup> The Yale Foreign Missionary Society was organized on June 2, 1902, and formally incorporated under the laws of the State of Connecticut in May, 1903.<sup>37</sup> There was no formal connection between Yale University and the Yale Foreign Missionary Society but the enterprise was under the direction of Yale men (some in influential University positions), the University eventually provided rent-free quarters in the basement of White Hall and the Society did have a campus address and used the name of Yale University on its letterhead. In October, 1902, Lawrence Thurston and his wife Matilda (later to be known in her own right for educational work in the Far East) sailed for China to choose a location for the Yale Mission.

For various reasons China had been chosen over India as the field for missionary work. In 1901 Robert A. Hume, '68, of the American Board's Marathi Mission and President of the Ahmednagar Theological Seminary had learned of the plans for a Yale mission and had asked for help in Ahmednagar or other cities of western India. Hume wrote that



The Marathi Mission unanimously and enthusiastically offers . . . a [missionary] Band [from Yale] a most cordial welcome and urgent invitation to come to work with it, and assures the Band of a large and promising field for service.<sup>38</sup>

Hume knew whereof he spoke when he offered "a promising field for service" for in the decade from 1891 to 1901 the Christian community in the immediate vicinity of Ahmednagar had nearly tripled (from less than seven thousand to more than twenty thousand). Six percent of the population were members of the Marathi Mission.<sup>39</sup> Hume's work was with the educated class of Indians and this type of work did appeal to the organizers of the Yale Mission. But India it was not to be. For the organizers of the Yale Mission, the India field looked crowded. There was the Oxford Mission in Calcutta, the Cambridge Mission in Delhi, Hume and the Marathi Mission in the Bombay area, and the general leaven of British civilization throughout the country.<sup>40</sup> The type of work being done by these missions, with an emphasis on missionary work among the scholarly, would rob the Yale Mission of its uniqueness. And,

China, the only remaining people of learning in the East, has peculiar claims upon the Christian conscience in America. From the standpoint of the evangelist all non-Christian countries may appear to be on the same plane, but at the present moment China's need is comparably greater than that of the others,





to be saved not only from Paganism but from the European powers and from herself . . . [T]o establish a college there and train the natives to teach their own people promises the largest results, with the least risk of antagonizing the governing class.<sup>41</sup>

"Yale's perennial youth" would meet the challenge of China and the "flaunting defiance hurled by the Boxers against everything Christian, which seemed to need the attention every serious challenge ought to receive."<sup>42</sup> Thurston, acting with the confidence of the Executive Committee in New Haven, inspected a number of provincial capitals and chose to locate the work at Changsha, the capital of Hunan province, at the approximate geographic center of China Proper.<sup>43</sup>

At the time of Thurston's arrival in Changsha, Hunan had only been recently opened as a field for missionary endeavor. Both foreign missions and commercial interests had worked to open the province. As early as the late 1600s Franciscan priests established churches at Heng-chou and Hsiang-t'an.<sup>44</sup> Their work was later abandoned under imperial persecution. Again in the nineteenth century a Catholic mission was established at Heng-chou but resistance in northern Hunan prevented development of missionary enterprises there. Protestant attempts to evangelize the Hunanese began in 1874 but little headway was made at the time. After 1895, during the scramble for concessions in the wake of the Sino-



Japanese War, commercial interests, eager to tap Hunan's markets and resources, joined with the missionaries in trying to wrest a foothold in the province. At stake was the exploitation of crops such as rice, timber, and tea, and mineral wealth such as coal, iron, copper, antimony, and lead. The effects of the Boxer Rebellion seemed to exhaust organized Hunanese opposition and in 1901, having already been granted protection several years earlier by the authorities, foreign missionaries began an "extraordinary intrusion" into Hunan.<sup>45</sup> The British, however, had extracted an agreement from the Chinese as early as 1898 to open a treaty port in Hunan in their attempt to open Chinese inland waters to steam navigation. Changsha, the capital of Hunan, was officially designated a treaty port both by the Anglo-Chinese Commercial Treaty of 1902 and by the Sino-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1903.<sup>46</sup> The mere fact of Changsha's being officially "open," however, could not resolve the problems inherent in maintaining a missionary outpost in a province long regarded as conservative, anti-foreign, anti-modern, and anti-Christian. The very year in which Yale-in-China opened, William Martin, U. S. Consul General in Hankow could write of his consular district, of which Changsha was then a part, that it was "only a few minutes from peace to slaughter" regarding anti-foreign disturbances.<sup>47</sup>



"Everything may be as peaceful as a summer landscape and in half an hour, like a moving-tornado, the trouble comes upon you . . ."48

As the Yale Foreign Missionary Society prepared to move into Hunan, the Ch'ing Dynasty was on its last legs. From the time of the Opium War (1839-42) onwards, the Chinese had been forced by the European Powers in war after war to concede trading privileges, to exempt westerners from the vagaries of Chinese law, and to permit the presence of foreign missionaries on Chinese soil. The humiliating presence of the westerner was felt at first primarily in treaty ports, on the periphery of the empire; via trade routes, however, rising Chinese xenophobia grew as westerners penetrated interior areas such as Hunan.<sup>49</sup>

As the nineteenth century wore on, the forced western presence as a factor in the decline of the Ch'ing Dynasty found its twin in the spectre and reality of internal rebellion. From 1851-66 the Chinese Empire was racked by a rebellion that threatened not only to oust the Manchus but also to change the very structure of Chinese society. In presenting a challenge to Ch'ing power and authority, the Taiping Rebellion diverted energy away from the task of meeting the western incursion head on as the Manchus struggled to maintain their



position. Hunan suffered particularly at the hands of the Taiping rebels and their Christian-influenced ideology. In an effort to combat the rebels, Tseng Kuo-fan indoctrinated his Hunan Braves with propaganda that attempted to link the Taipings with the hated foreigners who had so humiliated China.<sup>50</sup> As Charlton Lewis has noted, "After 1860 Hunan emerged as an unrivaled center of anti-foreign propaganda, in part because the Hunanese transferred their fear from the Christianity-inspired rebels to the foreign missionaries."<sup>51</sup> In Hunan internal rebellion fed in a unique way the fires of xenophobia. Anti-Christian sentiment was expressed in such vitriolic attacks on Christianity as found in the infamous but deviously clever Death Blow to Corrupt Doctrines (Pi-hsieh chi-shih).<sup>52</sup> One western observer noted that

a State that has passed through such a life-and-death struggle may be pardoned a little coolness towards the propagation of the doctrines with which the movement was associated. . . . It is no Chimaera, therefore, that the Chinese dread in Christianity but a proved national peril . . . <sup>53</sup>

As missionaries spread to the interior of China during the latter half of the nineteenth century, Chinese reaction to an indigenous remolding of a western religion conditioned China's response to the westerner's representation of his own religion.

If war and internal rebellion served to weaken .





China directly, the missionary presence was a subtle threat to the power of the Chinese government and its huge bureaucracy. Missionaries were allowed to preach and spread their doctrines in China only by virtue of treaties imposed on China by western nations. Their presence in China came about on the coattails of war or the threat of war. To Chinese eyes the missionary represented the incarnation of China's humiliation--although he could be gracious, helpful, and acceptable, working with instead of doing for.

Seen from the west, China's four hundred millions seemed "ripe for the gospel and for all kinds of improvement."<sup>54</sup> As the original goal of mission work, the missionary would spread his doctrines, convert by the million, and promote the coming of the millenium. As missionaries met the frustrating reality that the Chinese were not convertible by the million and that their doctrines were seen as foreign and incompatible to the Chinese, they turned to educational work.<sup>55</sup> American missionaries realized the important role education had played and was playing in the conversion of European immigrants into Americans; consequently, they had great faith that the ability of education to change attitudes and ideas would prepare the way for an acceptance of Christian doctrines in China.<sup>56</sup> Writes Jessie Lutz:



Assuming that Christianity had contributed to prosperity and growing humanitarianism in the West, missionaries hoped to convince the Chinese that Christianity was fundamental to Western civilization and should be adopted along with the other sources of wealth and power.<sup>57</sup>

Moreover, missionaries were not inclined to question the supposed superiority of Western civilization nor to try to learn from the Chinese. Americans, missionaries and otherwise, observed Bertrand Russell, "will insist upon China becoming as like as possible to 'God's own country' . . ."<sup>58</sup> From the standpoint of the American missionary, according to Paul Varg, "China enjoyed the advantages of a lobby that was manned by Americans who did the work of God and at the same time worked for China."<sup>59</sup> If the American in China played the politics of international diplomacy with cards up his sleeve, surely the Lord had put them there.<sup>60</sup> It is, in fact, important to distinguish between American and European missionaries. According to Varg,

China it seemed offered the ideal place, to wield influence in behalf of righteousness without sacrificing virtue. To stand in opposition to the aggressiveness of the European Powers, to do so by persuasion rather than by joining hands with other Powers and to ask for no territory or sphere of influence [yet insisting on upholding treaties that so compromised Chinese sovereignty] added up to the kind of foreign policy Americans could support. And poor and helpless China aroused sympathy.<sup>61</sup>

As representatives of the forces of imperialism,



missionaries were resisted by local officials and by the Chinese gentry. Missionary power was, however, greater at bottom than that of the local officials.<sup>62</sup> The actual carrying out of missionary protection clauses in the unequal treaties lay in the hands of the local officials, who could rule effectively in their districts only with the consent of the more prominent gentry under their jurisdiction. In times of local distress, such as after mob violence against missionaries, officials would be in a terrible double bind situation. On the one hand to redress missionary grievances would bring opposition to the official from the group whose support he desperately needed; on the other, not to redress meant potential trouble with the imperial government and saber-rattling from the Power whose missionaries had been disturbed.<sup>63</sup> Nothing could be a greater indicator of dynastic decline than the ability of a foreign country to impose settlements that circumvented the systematic operation of the Chinese bureaucracy.<sup>64</sup> It was into a moribund China, beset on all fronts by affronts to the traditional Chinese view of China's rightful place in the world that the Yale Foreign Missionary Society chose to send its representatives. Thurston naively noted that

[i]f Hunan were chosen it is quite possible that the Mission would have uphill work for some



years especially if it undertook a general missionary work. . . . The Mission seeks the field of the greatest future importance.<sup>65</sup>

In the summer of 1903, the Yale Mission was enthusiastically welcomed into Hunan--not by the Hunanese, however, but by the missionary societies already there, who were willing to entrust the "higher education in the province of science, arts, and medicine" to the Yale group.<sup>66</sup> A location having been found and cooperation from other missionary stations in the field having been obtained, the Yale Foreign Missionary Society sent out its teachers--Brownell Gage, '98 (and his wife, Helen Howe Gage, M. D.), William J. Hail, '04 (B. D.), and Warren Seabury, '00. On November 16, 1906, the Yali Middle School opened and the work so long in preparation began.<sup>67</sup> But what was the nature of the work Yale was to do in China?

In undertaking to found a mission the Society had stated that it held as its

supreme desire to only add a new force to those already laboring for the promotion of Christianity in China, not to conflict with agencies now at work nor interfere with plans contemplated by others. It is a constructive not a destructive purpose that actuates.<sup>68</sup>

The Society eschewed narrowly evangelistic lines. Yale men were to make their contribution to the "whole vast desire of a backward people."<sup>69</sup> They, along with the





outspoken missionary, Griffith John, sensed the unarticulated wish on the part of the Chinese "for the Gospel and for all kinds of improvement." According to F. Wells Williams, the work of the Yale Mission would not be among the literati themselves, "bigoted beyond the faintest conception of the occident," but among their sons, "the only hope for the penetration of new ideas."<sup>70</sup> It was understood that "no mere accumulation of converts will be counted sufficient."<sup>71</sup> Yale, "particularly of the national institution of America," not to be "forever content with one country," was to create in China the type of institution which was Yale in America--a training ground in arts and sciences for the purpose of building a Christian elite to guide China's future.<sup>72</sup> Harlan Beach noted that:

There is no university in America which can so profitably be reproduced in the Middle Kingdom as Yale. Our ideals, our intellectual aims, our participation in the wider life of the nation, are precisely what that Empire needs; and as Yale has been in spirit Christian from the very outset, so this university would confer its greatest benefit along the line of Christian and intellectual cooperation with all that makes for the uplifting of a state. . . . I am convinced that a hundred years hence this new Yale of the Orient will have accomplished an even greater service among the most populous nation on the face of the globe.<sup>73</sup>

A Yale of the Orient! F. Wells Williams thought that Yale in China would be a "small leaven of virile many-



sided Christianity in the immense lump of Chinese paganism."<sup>74</sup> It was to be a Christian institution educating the Chinese to stewardship and public trust.

Even before a single missionary had been sent out, the plans for the enterprise had been writ en majuscule by Yale professors such as Beach and Williams. It was a project "idle to dream of fulfilling within a generation."<sup>75</sup> Within the proposed university there was to be a preparatory course of four to six years, a collegiate department of four years, a one-year normal course, a theological seminary, an institute of technology, a school of journalism, and a medical department to consist of hospital work and research into "pathologic conditions" in China.<sup>76</sup> The work was to be supported by Yale men. Williams wrote:

Has any church, society or denomination more loyalty than the members of a class at Yale? In time our missionary will go out every year (after a period of thorough preparation) from each graduated class. Will his classmates forget him or suffer his mission to fail for lack of support? Ask any Yale man.<sup>77</sup>

There is little doubt that the "Yale Spirit" would make this enterprise succeed--even at the risk of straining at the possible goals and exhausting the limits of confidence which "any Yale man" could put into the proposed institution.<sup>78</sup>

Less ambitious goals were sought by some.



Lawrence Thurston's sentiment appealed to Yale's tradition of excellence. He simply wrote, "What we do we must do well."<sup>79</sup> Thurston wished to apply western educational standards to the Yale Mission's work without regard to the magnitude of the Mission's operation. But the missionary spirit of the Band of 1898 was an important element in the Mission's activity, perhaps even at the expense of scholarly excellence. In 1909 Brownell Gage wrote about the type of men needed by the Mission:

Teaching power and personal magnetism, with the sine-qua-nons, spiritual earnestness and common sense, good health and humor, are far more important than very high scholarship.<sup>80</sup>

Gage probably meant that it did not matter if the Yale Mission's teachers had attained advanced degrees; his remarks point, though, to a trend towards emphasizing religion at the expense of academics and building a large institution on what would prove to be a narrow base in China.

At the beginning of the Yale Foreign Missionary Society's work in China, several interrelated issues stood out. William's, Thurston's, and Gage's remarks point up questions that were to be a source of concern to the Mission throughout its existence: the problems of expansion and size, the establishment and maintenance of academic excellence, and the integration of religious teaching into the program of instruction without sacrificing



educational standards. These were problems which concerned the Academic Department at first but which later involved the Medical Department as it grew out of Edward Hume's clinic.

\* \* \*

From early on in the movement to found a Yale Mission in China there was a desire for the Mission to include a doctor and for hospital work to be done. Whether the idea for medical missionary work originated with members of the Band of 1898 is a moot point; by the summer of 1902 medical work of some sort within a Christian context was definitely being planned. Anson Phelps Stokes wrote, "I believe that our great chance is going to be along medical and educational lines but the distinctly Christian character of the institution must of course be retained."<sup>81</sup> Insofar as medical work was concerned Stokes's seemingly simple statement about the nature of the work-to-be belies the enormous difficulties that medical work in China directed by a Christian missionary society was to face. Even at that early date, great effort had already been expended in the search for a doctor for the mission who would be able not only to do missionary work of a medical nature but also to care for the members of the mission itself since western-trained physicians in Hunan were rather scarce (approximately





one physician per million Hunanese).<sup>82</sup> After an extensive search a doctor had still not been found by the end of the summer of 1902. This situation was not to last long. The final choice of the mission doctor was to prove to be of momentous importance to the fate of the mission. In the choice of Edward Hicks Hume, '97, to fill this post, the mission was to find both its greatest asset and a considerable liability.

Hume's first contact with the Yale in China project probably came when he was asked to go to China with Thurston to choose a location for the Yale Mission in 1902. This opportunity Hume declined. He felt that his best chance for work lay in India, where he would be in the third generation of Humes doing mission work.

Hume was born in Ahmednagar in 1876 and spent his early life in Bombay. His father, Edward Sackett Hume, '870, was a missionary for the American Board as was his uncle, Robert A. Hume (see above). Hume grew up in the company of children of "high-caste Hindus";<sup>83</sup> his childhood playmates and schoolmates were Indian and he spoke fluent Marathi, even translating a children's book from English into Marathi at age 14. When he was 15, Hume left India to come to the United States to complete his education. After finishing high school in



Newton, Mass., he entered Yale, graduating in 1897. He was in the fourth graduating class at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. After he completed his studies there in 1901, William Osler nominated him for a fellowship in pathology at Liverpool, where he studied for a year, after which time he returned to Hopkins to complete his internship. Upon finishing at Hopkins, Hume secured a job with the U. S. Public Health Service in India. As he recalled,

One of my chief duties was to inspect freight steamers clearing for American ports, to make sure that adequate rat guards had been used and that every piece of freight had been disinfected according to regulations. In addition I was being trained in plague laboratory methods . . .<sup>84</sup>

Hume felt that his "certain opportunity" lay in India rather than in China.<sup>85</sup> "India was home and I had always intended to work there."<sup>86</sup> India ultimately lacked, though, an adequate stage for Hume's considerable talent and ambition. By the time he received an offer from Harlan Beach and the Y. F. M. S. to "launch a university medical school," he realized that such an opportunity would not come to him in India.<sup>87</sup>

[T]here were government medical colleges already established in the capital cities of the chief provinces. It was evident, moreover, that American societies were not prepared, at that time to share in establishing a university medical college under Christian auspices in India.<sup>88</sup>



Responding to Beach's "alluring words," Hume left his boyhood home to pursue his ambitions in China.<sup>89</sup> It was a bold step. He neither understood Mandarin nor had any appreciation of China's recent history and past tradition. To his basic ignorance of China, though, Hume brought the experience of having grown up in India and of having been on easy terms from birth with another of the great Asian civilizations. Perhaps his early acquaintance with India determined the ease with which he was to accept the Chinese.

As he and his wife and young son approached Changsha by river, an English-speaking Chinese passenger gave Hume a rudimentary education into China's recent past. Hume was sure that "our trustees in America believe that the men they are sending out will be welcomed in Changsha" but he was jolted by what he heard.<sup>90</sup> His informant's tale of China's humiliation at the hands of the western nations dashed any hope Hume might have had of being received into the City of the Long Sands "with open arms."<sup>91</sup>

Hume spent his first year in China down river from Changsha in Kuling learning Chinese. When he returned to Changsha in 1906, his first problem was to find a place for his clinic and someone who would rent or sell to foreigners. The first dispensary was a far



cry from the new and innovative Johns Hopkins Hospital of his medical student days in Baltimore.

In the same week that we were bargaining for the property for the academy, a Mr. Lo appeared . . . [H]e would like to have us see the Central Inn. There were outhouses at the back where pigs were fed and fattened till they were ready for the butcher. All these, he felt sure, could be removed easily. . . .<sup>92</sup>

It took us several weeks before that old inn could really be put into shape for use as a hospital. There was a well near the front and one in a rear courtyard, giving us all the water we needed for washing and scrubbing. Insect powder was used in abundance throughout all the rooms, and all the walls were whitewashed repeatedly. New roof gutters were put up to carry off the downpours of rain that fell from February to June; new doors and windows were installed, with glass panes to replace the paper that had always been used. New skylights were put into many corners which had been almost totally dark.<sup>93</sup>

The hospital would hold eighteen patients at a stretch. Donations for the building's refurbishing were solicited in New Haven.<sup>94</sup> It was a humble beginning for a medical enterprise to be conducted "on the standards of Johns Hopkins."<sup>95</sup>

When Hume opened the Yali I Yüan (Yale "Court of Medicine") in 1906, he worked alone, assisted at times by Helen Gage, M. D., who was an inducement for women and children to come to the clinic.<sup>96</sup> Hume wrote that the Yale Hospital, as it was also known, should have three objects:





To reveal the love of God. . . .

To develop the methods in use all over the world and to propagate the teachings of the best physicians from ancient times until now, improving and renewing the methods day by day. . . .

As the knowledge and ability of the people increases, a college already having been established, it is also proposed to establish a school of medicine . . .<sup>97</sup>

Working diligently but conservatively on West Archway Street, Hume struggled to bring the benefits of Western medicine to the Chinese. In 1908, he added a Chinese physician, Hou Kung-hsiao, to the staff. Hou had trained in the American Presbyterian Mission in Shantung. After his arrival, Hume noted a series of "unusually full days in the dispensary, the crowds of patients starting to pound on the front door soon after sunrise."<sup>98</sup> Even so, to prevent any anti-western outbursts from occurring at the dispensary in response to the strangeness of Hume's medicine to Chinese eyes, the Governor of Hunan had, from the beginning, stationed a small group of soldiers in a room across the street as a precaution.<sup>99</sup>

In the very beginning caution in therapy was the watch-word. Patients who appeared likely to die were sent home to expire.<sup>100</sup> In fact, in the first two years of operation, the Yali I Yuan had a mortality rate of zero. The price of an expensive coffin for a poor farm-boy saved the day after the first in-patient death. Then, after it had been demonstrated that Chinese patients



could die in a foreign hospital without setting off anti-western riots, the mortality rate at the hospital slowly began to rise and Hume was no longer afraid to bring surgery into his practice.<sup>101</sup> The good reputation which the hospital brought to itself as well as that which it lent to the academic department were to stand Yale-in-China in good stead during periods of violence and popular unrest.<sup>102</sup>

In 1910, the Yale Mission added Fuchun Yen [Yen Fu-ch'ing], M. D., to its hospital staff. In the course of his training Yen had received two medical educations. He had first studied in China at the western-sponsored St. John's Medical School. While doing medical work in South Africa among Chinese laboring in the diamond mines, he realized the inadequacy of his previous training and, with the encouragement of friends, came to the United States to study medicine at Yale. He completed a full course of study and graduated from the School of Medicine in 1909. Yen was invited by the Executive Committee of Yale-in-China to work at Changsha with Hume as an equal.<sup>103</sup> By acquiring Yen, the Mission was able to improve its reputation among the Chinese of Hunan. With a Chinese in the inner circle of the Mission, Western medicine could be more readily accepted by the Hunanese. Hume recalled that "our medical stock rose in the community



and our welcome to the homes and institutions of Changsha became a continuing reality."<sup>104</sup>

Despite the presence of a hospital, medical education itself developed slowly. Informal instruction was given to student assistants who "receive instruction on elementary subjects which will eventually lead to a study of medicine."<sup>105</sup> This probably enabled the doctors to test themselves and not much more. Formal instruction was initiated in 1908. Two students began to receive instruction by the Mission doctors in chemistry, anatomy, and physiology. Classes were discontinued when one student dropped out.<sup>106</sup>

The slow progress of the medical work points up the "gradual, upbuilding" nature of the Yale Mission's activities in medicine, "idle to dream of fulfilling within a generation."<sup>107</sup> From 1906, when Hume's dispensary opened, until 1913, when the first agreement between the Yale Mission and the Hunan gentry was signed, a sense of trust had slowly developed between the practitioners of western medicine and the people of Hunan. Capable Chinese worked alongside foreign doctors in the Yale Court of Medicine. With the arrival of Nina Gage, R. N., from Johns Hopkins Training School for Nurses, the Mission began to train Chinese as nurses. The Medical Department of the Yale Mission (as it was



known) in concert with the Chinese fought epidemics, undertook sanitation reform in Changsha and established a Red Cross hospital to care for wounded during the Revolution of 1911.<sup>108</sup> Education of doctors took a back seat. Two events were to change the situation and to encourage the rapid development of an ambitious medical school-hospital complex.

In the summer of 1909 Edward S. Harkness magnanimously offered to donate money to erect a hospital in Changsha. In October, 1909, he wrote to the Executive Secretary of the Y. F. M. S. in New Haven that:

I feel that the College [of Yale-in-China] must be in great need of an up to date Hospital building, and am anxious that the matter should progress as quickly as possible.<sup>109</sup>

But progress was slow. For one thing, the Executive Committee and the Mission could not really decide what to do about medical education. The Mission had received calls from the Wuhan cities to participate in medical education with missionary bodies there who were willing to give Yale-in-China the direction of any union institution to be organized. As late as the mid-teens, though, Hume could write that

There is no broad University foundation in that centre to which our medical work could be affiliated. . . . There has always been a strong centrifugal tendency in union movements started at Hankow.<sup>110</sup>





Members of the Mission also felt that the removal of medical work from Changsha would unfavorably affect the influence of the Academic Department "upon the community."<sup>111</sup> The promise of a hospital to the Mission, the lack of promise for development of medical work in Wuhan and "our own collegiate work and relations of friendship" increasingly tended to anchor Yale-in-China to Changsha.<sup>112</sup>

Hume discussed the matter of a hospital with Harkness during his first two-year furlough in the States (1911-13). The money, though given freely and at Harkness's own initiative, was not without strings. Harkness told Hume that

There are three conditions I should like to insist upon. The hospital is to be a center of medical education, for my primary concern is not for medical practice only. It is to be a center that the people of Changsha will regard as their own, to manage and to support. It is to be a project for whose current upkeep I am not to be approached.<sup>113</sup>

It was an incentive-motivated donation. Harkness was prepared to make a one-time gift to the Yale Mission for its hospital but would assume no responsibility for the fruits of his seed money; that was the responsibility of the Mission and the "people of Changsha."<sup>114</sup>

The other event that laid the ground for the rapid expansion of medical work was the initiative of the Hunan gentry, led by provincial officials, in



petitioning the Governor of Hunan, requesting him to enter into an agreement with the Yale Mission to start a joint medical school. Their motivation in seeking to cooperate with a Christian mission may be interpreted in several ways.

The Hunanese elite were historically opposed to any change that would affect the traditional social order even as they sought out measures by which Hunan might be strengthened against foreign encroachment.<sup>115</sup> The Yale Mission's success in its introduction of western medicine to Hunan threatened the old order. Hume and his colleagues were able to show the relative ineffectiveness of traditional Chinese medicine when held up against medicine based on Koch's Postulates. Surgery, virtually proscribed in the Chinese Classics, was an area where Hume clearly held an edge over traditional practitioners.<sup>116</sup>

As Hunan became more and more open to foreign influence, preserving the existing social order became less important for the gentry than national salvation for China.<sup>117</sup> This became especially true after the fall of the Ch'ing Dynasty in 1911, which encouraged the development of provincial independence and initiative. The Confucian old guard in Hunan came in time to depend less on their traditional moral influence and more on out-and-out political and economic power. The desire on the part of the Hunan gentry to cooperate with the Yale Mission in medical education was, in part



to be sure, a genuine effort to improve the health of Hunan Province and was, therefore, an expression of the traditional role of the gentry in Chinese history. It was also, however, a way of limiting foreign penetration through cooperation. By joining with the Americans, the gentry could participate in the assured success of the proposed medical college by making it theirs. Thus, gentry stock would accrue along with that of the foreigners. But the Americans would not, at least, gain at the expense of the local elite. What was true in the 1890s was true even to a far greater degree in the teens: As Lewis has written,

[The Hunan] gentry recognized now that more than propaganda and hostile mobs were necessary to keep foreigners out of Hunan. It was becoming clear that unless Hunanese pre-empted the instruments of foreign encroachment, the foreigners would overrun Hunan by default.<sup>118</sup>

To the extent that gentry cooperation with the Yale Foreign Missionary Society represented sincere motivation to improve conditions in Hunan and to meet foreigners halfway, it also represented a means of self-strengthening and resistance against foreign usurpation of what was essentially a provincial prerogative.

F. C. Yen was a powerful catalyst in the formation of the Hsiang-Ya Medical College; as Brownell Gage observed he was "wonderful in the consummate diplomacy.



and powerful influence of the friendship and confidence in him with which he has brought this government offer about."<sup>119</sup> In a lengthy address to the biennial convention of the China Medical Association, which will be quoted extensively below (rather than paraphrased), Yen detailed the beginnings of the cooperation, emphasizing the fact that "the cooperative agreement was developed at the initiative of the Chinese, but that the way was paved by a steadfast and definite policy on the part of Yale extending over seven years."<sup>120</sup> Brownell Gage cited the American recognition of the Republic of China as an immediate stimulus to the government offer.<sup>121</sup>

The original Hsiang-Ya Agreement of June-July, 1913, was signed by the Yale Mission, without prior approval of the Yale Foreign Missionary Society, and by the government of Hunan Province, without prior approval of Peking. W. J. Hail of the Academic Department was disturbed that the Mission would agree to cooperate in medical education rather than with other missionary societies:

If we can and should join hands with others to do the work, why not do so with the missionaries of other Protestant Missions whose interests and ideals and methods are similar to our own. There we could work out a school of truly Christian character with honest instruction and be untrammelled in any way.<sup>122</sup>

He feared to lose Yale-in-China's "distinctly Christian





character." He clearly felt that the initial contract had been "signed, sealed, and delivered" to the Mission by Yen and Hume and resented the fact of having "to court each passing group of officials to keep them from backing out on the whole scheme."<sup>123</sup> Hume, who as Physician-in-Charge of the Yale Hospital had worked out the details of the agreement with Yen, had actually been so bold as to forego sending the Executive Committee a copy of the agreement until October, 1913, several months after he had legally obligated the Mission to cooperative work, having preferred instead to send to New Haven "a description full enough to cover everything."<sup>124</sup> Problems on the American side were not the only obstacles to success. Yen described to the China Medical Association difficulties that arose between Hunan and Peking:

In the midst of progress there came a serious setback. A small group of Chinese, claiming to represent the western medical profession of the province, from motives of jealousy and self-interest, attempted to wreck the Hunan-Yale scheme. At a time when Hunan was suffering from the effects of her declaration of independence from the central government (August, 1913), it seemed easy to ruin the scheme. The governor [T'an Yen-k'ai] who had put the agreement through lost favor at Peking and was removed. This gave the opposition its opportunity at Peking, and a decision of the cabinet ordered the Hunan-Yale agreement to be canceled. For a time difficult problems confronted Yale.<sup>125</sup>

Yen might have seen "difficult problems" but the New Haven Executive breathed a sigh of relief: "The Committee



feels that we have really been saved by the Peking abrogation from entering on a program too heavy for us to carry."<sup>126</sup> The main interest of the Executive Committee was, of course, the Academic Department. Edward Hume knew that in New Haven he could find no "wise appreciation of medical educational questions."<sup>127</sup> Members of the Academic Department spoke out against the agreement:

The college and preparatory school are the portions of our work that are especially the fields of missionary work for us, and these will abide when medical education is done by the Government or by private universities run by Chinese. Hence we are jealous that the foundations of this work should not be endangered by a too ambitious attempt to sustain the entire burden of a first class medical school.<sup>128</sup>

After the abrogation of the original scheme of cooperation, Hume and Yen set to work to rework the agreement and gain Peking's approval for joint cooperation. The Executive Committee was asked for permission to "push Sianya" but the Committee found itself in a financial bind:<sup>129</sup>

[W]e cannot take on any immediate large increase in budget, without danger of bankruptcy or at least a scandal in China when it should become apparent that we were incapable of carrying out. You see, as things are now, we simply could not begin to supply the men that are called for under the agreement. And in such a case, for us to actually press for its renewal seems decidedly unwise. And yet,



the Committee felt strongly how keenly all the Mission feels about the opportunity offered us, and hates to continually throw a wet blanket . . .<sup>130</sup>

Yen told how he and Hume--even in the face of a wet blanket from Connecticut--had juggled with the various factions in an attempt to secure renewal.

After securing the approval of the new governor [T'ang Hsiang-ming], who quickly became a warm friend of the movement, representatives were sent to Peking to ascertain the nature of the opposition. They found that the objections, which were largely misrepresentations by the opposing party, were easily explained. Only one real issue was raised by the Peking government. Since the movement was the first of its kind, representing the cooperation of a private foreign body with a provincial government, Peking feared that it might later be used as a precedent by other foreign organizations whose motives might not be so sincere as those of Yale [i.e., the Japanese]. Consequently, the services of thirty leading Hunan officials resident in Peking were secured to organize an association known as the Hunan-Ru'chuen [sic] Educational Association, and an agreement similar to the original one was signed between it and Yale. The agreement met the formal approval and sanction of the cabinet, as well as of the Boards of Education, Finance, the Interior, and Foreign Affairs. The Ru'-chuen [sic] Educational Association thus acts as a technical intermediary between the government and Yale.<sup>131</sup>

The final version of the Hsiang-Ya Agreement was signed by the Mission and the Yü-Ch'ün Educational Association on July 21, 1914. It was subsequently ratified by the Yale-in-China Executive Committee on August 13.<sup>132</sup> To get this approved Hume had had to engage



in some eleventh-hour arm-twisting, calling for definitive action--and a fulfillment both of his ambitions and the call to service that brought him from India in 1905:

[Again and again there have come] repeated and hearty invitations from the entire medical body at the Wuhan center urging us to come there and be the coordinating force in developing the long hoped for Union School. We have, practically speaking, delayed undertakings at Wuhan on the part of others; have done nothing ourselves; and are still hesitating as to how much we should attempt from the Changsha center for Central China. This attitude, frankly described by outsiders as a "dog in the manger attitude," cannot continue. We must either deliver the goods or say no more about our part in medical education in Central China.<sup>133</sup>

Why, in the face of so many objections, the New Haven Executive Committee decided to ratify the Hsiang-Ya Agreement is complicated and there were many variables which entered into the final ratification. There is no doubt, though, that by 1914 Hume and Yen had become pillars of the institution of Yale-in-China and that approval of the agreement was a de facto move to keep the Mission from falling apart. Hume had, as Dickson Leavens, treasurer of the Yale Mission, observed, "devoted enthusiasm," "wonderful constructive ability," "cheerfulness," and "tact."<sup>134</sup> A. P. Stokes felt that he was "in many ways our finest man."<sup>135</sup> Yen was able to deal with the Chinese community on behalf of the Mission, being at one and the same time both the Mission's man and a certain point of identification within Yale-in-





China for the Hunanese. Loss of either of the two men would seriously have called into question the integrity of the institution and the support the Academic Department derived from the Medical Department. Neither Hume nor Yen wished to be associated with a non-teaching hospital.

The Committee wrote the Mission that it was delighted over the cooperation development; being particularly glad that the Mission had the wisdom and skill to pull the thing through the doubt stage . . .<sup>136</sup>

But, there was undoubtedly great cause for rejoicing that the agreement had been worked out so that Y. F. M. S. would incur no "immediate additional burden" of finance and there was, looming on the horizon, the prospect that the Rockefeller Foundation would aid in the development of the Hsiang-Ya Medical College.<sup>137</sup>

The Y. F. M. S. was not the only party to the contract that was hard-pressed for money. Even before the agreement had been signed, it was pointed out by Harry Pratt Judson of the Rockefeller Foundation's first China Medical Commission that the Hunan provincial government "explicitly admits its inability to provide the funds."<sup>138</sup>

[T]he annual contribution of the gentry is entirely contingent on the resources available in the hands of the provincial government. The government at present is greatly straitened for funds. Whether the funds will be paid promptly in the future, of course, cannot now be foreseen. . . .<sup>139</sup>



of Johns Hopkins" would be successful in direct proportion to the availability of funds, by the summer of 1914 each side had come too far to back down.

In the first article of the agreement the Mission and the Educational Association agreed to follow through on Edward Harkness's three conditions. The Chinese further agreed to erect a medical school building and a nursing school building at a total cost of \$156,000 silver or else find suitable accommodations in the city. The Educational Association would provide operating expenses for the two schools to a total of \$50,000 silver a year and pledged a one-time expense of \$50,000 for land. The Association would not provide for salaries of teachers who were graduates of western universities. The Yale Mission would undertake to erect a hospital at a cost of \$180,000 silver and provide salaries and expenses of teachers, physicians, and nurses who were graduates of western universities up to a total of fifteen. The hospital and medical school building were for the common use of both parties but all moveables were to remain the property of the original owner. During the interval preceding the completion of the medical school and hospital building the Yale Mission and the Educational Association would conduct jointly a two-year medical preparatory school, two



schools of nursing (male and female) and to carry on the Yale Hospital. Administration of the schools, as recounted by Yen, was a first in the annals of Sino-American relations:

Control is vested in a board of managers of twenty members, ten Chinese and ten from Yale. The board, when formed, is self-perpetuating, but undesirable members may be removed by a three-fourths vote of the board. In case of vacancy, the board has the right to elect new members, but such elections require a three-fourths vote of the members to become valid. Current business is in the hands of an executive committee, elected by and from the managers. The agreement provides for a probationary period of ten years, and is subject to indefinite continuation, if proved successful.<sup>140</sup>

Yen revealed to his Shanghai audience the Yale Mission's fear that certain problems might crop up:

One of these problems was connected with religious instruction, but the difficulty was easily met by a clause insisting on the importance to the society that physicians should be men of moral character, and providing that, while students were to have entire religious freedom, teachers were also to be free to give religious instruction. With a board whose Chinese representatives were chiefly non-medical men, it was feared that unreasonable interference on technical matters might impair the efficiency of the school; but it was soon found to be quite otherwise. The Chinese members voluntarily placed the entire responsibility in all technical matters in the hands of the Yale medical staff. Besides, the rules of the Hunan Yale Medical Association provide that professional management of the hospital and school shall be left with the two medical members [nota bene] on the committee.

The appointment and dismissal of teachers, it was feared, might become another serious



difficulty. The Chinese might introduce their own friends, regardless of qualifications. But this fear was removed by leaving nomination for appointments entirely in the hands of the two medical members of the executive committee, and making dismissal of teachers require a three-fourths vote of the board of managers, on the recommendation of the medical faculty.

The difficulty of the language to be used as a teaching medium was also readily solved. The opinion of the Chinese managers was asked, and their decision was unanimous that English should be employed. . . . Of course the pre-medical course, and perhaps part of the lower years of the medical course, would require more or less explanatory instruction in Chinese. . . .<sup>141</sup>

The details of cooperation looked good on paper but Hsiang-Ya was really controlled by the American side. The two medical members on the Executive Committee were Hume for the Americans and Yen for the Chinese but both were really Yale Mission men.<sup>142</sup> Thus the Mission held a majority of the Hsiang-Ya Board in its own hands and had ultimate control except in matters that required a three-fourths vote. Both sides were to provide money but administration was largely left with the members of the Mission.

Despite the great potential for service that the cooperation in medical education might realize, issues of financial uncertainty, ulterior motive, and mutual suspicion were present in sufficient amount to raise questions about the possibilities for success, the political situation in China notwithstanding. Hume was, however, characteristically sanguine. He wrote





home to the Executive Committee:

So step by step we shall be approaching those ideals which have, from the start, been constantly held up before all the Yale work at Changsha, whether in the Arts College or the Medical Department, namely, the ideal of training Chinese for the service of their own countrymen rather than of constantly introducing foreigners to do the work.<sup>143</sup>



## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Quoted in Lewis Sheldon Welch and Walter Camp, Yale: Her Campus, Classrooms, and Athletics, p. 16.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. xviii.

<sup>3</sup>Anson Phelps Stokes, quoted in ibid., p. 24.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. xvii.

<sup>5</sup>Timothy Dwight, "What a Yale Student Ought To Be," p. 16.

<sup>6</sup>George Pierson, Yale College: An Educational History 1871-1921, p. 4.

<sup>7</sup>Wilbur Cross, Connecticut Yankee: An Autobiography, pp. 62 and 65.

<sup>8</sup>Henry Seidel Canby, Alma Mater: The Gothic Age of the American College, p. 104.

<sup>9</sup>Timothy Dwight, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., pp. 14 and 16.

<sup>11</sup>Anson Phelps Stokes, "The Present Condition of Religious Life at Yale," in James B. Reynolds, ed., Two Centuries of Christian Activity at Yale, p. 120.

<sup>12</sup>Timothy Dwight, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>13</sup>William Adams Brown, A Teacher and His Times: A Story of Two Worlds, p. 66.

<sup>14</sup>Gen. Joshua L. Chamberlain, Universities and Their Sons: Yale University, p. 202; Brooks Kelley, Yale: A History, p. 303.

<sup>15</sup>W. S. Coffin, "Yale and the City of New Haven," in Reynolds, ed., op. cit., p. 264.

<sup>16</sup>Kelley, op. cit., p. 305.



<sup>17</sup>Henry Knox Sherrill, quoted in Gabriel, op. cit., p. 209.

<sup>18</sup>Pierson, op. cit., p. 19.

<sup>19</sup>"The Harvard Mission" (a prospectus), Yale-in-China Archives (YCA), p. 3.

<sup>20</sup>A. C. Williams, marginalia, Photograph Book, YCA.

<sup>21</sup>Joseph C. Jackson, quoted in Kelley, op. cit., p. 305.

<sup>22</sup>"The Yale Foreign Mission," YCA, p. 1.

<sup>23</sup>Welch and Camp, op. cit., p. xviii.

<sup>24</sup>Gabriel, op. cit., p. 202.

<sup>25</sup>John R. Mott, quoted in Harlan Beach, "Yale's Contribution to Foreign Missions," in Reynolds, ed., op. cit., p. 283.

<sup>26</sup>Beach, op. cit., p. 307.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 307.

<sup>28</sup>For a complete account of Pitkin's death, see Isaac C. Ketler, The Tragedy of Paotingfu, pp. 389 ff. There is a plaque to Pitkin's memory in Memorial Hall at Yale University. For a list of Yale missionaries working in the field at the time of Yale-in-China's founding, see "Roll of Yale Men on the Foreign Mission Field" in Reynolds, op. cit., pp. 321-327.

<sup>29</sup>Marilyn B. Young, The Rhetoric of Empire, p. 143. For accounts of the Boxer Rebellion, see Schurmann and Schell, Imperial China; Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power 1895-1912; Franke, A Century of Chinese Revolution; and Young, op. cit. The Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 would encourage the Chinese that westerners could in fact be resisted by the modernizing cultures of East Asia.

<sup>30</sup>A. C. Williams to E. B. Reed, April 3, 1903, YCA, quoted in Spence, The China Helpers, p. 161.

<sup>31</sup>Henry Seidel Canby, Alma Mater: The Gothic Age of the American College, p. 77.



I have liberally used Reuben Holden's Yale in China: The Mainland 1901-1951 in writing the sections on the history of the organization of Yale-in-China. See chapters 1 and 2 in Holden for additional details on the founding of the Yale Mission.

<sup>32</sup>Holden, op. cit., p. 13.

<sup>33</sup>A. C. Williams to Anson Phelps Stokes, April 12, 1901, YCA. See also A. P. Stokes to Alfred Ripley, June 12, 1901, YCA. The American Board agreed to support the Yale Mission in the event of trouble with the Chinese government or people and placed at the Mission's disposal its agencies for purchase and distribution of supplies. A. B. C. F. M. support kept the Yale Mission from seeming to be a rival organization that might harm the work of the Board. The Yale Mission included three representatives of the Board on the council of forty and submitted a private report every year.

<sup>34</sup>Holden, op. cit., p. 21.

<sup>35</sup>"The Yale Foreign Mission," YCA, pp. 4-5. Members of the Executive Committee included Yale professors and administrators and graduates who were particularly interested in or knowledgeable about foreign mission work. For instance, Roland Bainton has written of Harlan Beach that[w]hen he came to Yale in 1906 he was easily the best-informed man in the world with regard to global Christianity." (Bainton, Yale and the Ministry, p. 248.) F. Wells Williams was professor of "oriental" history. Both of these men advocated a vigorous Christian colonization of East Asia. Other members of the E. C. lent their interest rather than a fund of knowledge.

<sup>36</sup>Holden, op. cit., p. 21.

<sup>37</sup>Frederick Wells Williams, "For a Yale in China" (FYC), p. 387.

<sup>38</sup>Robert A. Hume to Ernest Hume, May 17, 1901, YCA. Also, R. A. Hume and L. S. Gates to "Theological Students from Yale University . . .," May 15, 1901, YCA.

<sup>39</sup>Henry P. Wright, compiler, History of the Class of 1868: 1864-1914, p. 162. See also Dumas Malone, ed., Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. IX, pp. 365-366.





<sup>40</sup>Hume and Gates, op. cit.

<sup>41</sup>"The Yale Foreign Mission," YCA, pp. 2-3.

<sup>42</sup>Williams, "Yale's Foreign Mission" (YFM), p. 429.

<sup>43</sup>Williams, FYC, p. 387. Much was subsequently made of the Yale Mission's being at the geographic center of China. This was probably to make up for the fact that Changsha could not claim the importance of Canton, Shanghai, Nanking, or the Wuhan cities. As a result of this isolation in a provincial center, it was hard for the leaders of the Yale Mission to think about cooperating in education with other schools due to the fact of a large, immoveable plant at Changsha. The desire to hit Hunan with the first wave of western missionaries and the feeling that Yale must not be cramped by close association with any other institutions were to eventually cause problems both in the Academic and Medical Departments which led to more realistic evaluation of Yale's potential role in China.

<sup>44</sup>Charlton Lewis, "The Opening of Hunan: Reform and Revolution in a Chinese Province 1895-1907," p. 111. This section is drawn from Chapter IV, "The Opening of Hunan, 1899-1907."

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 118.

<sup>46</sup>Nelson T. Johnson, Chief, Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, to Paul Reinsch, U. S. Ambassador to China, February 5, 1917, Department of State, Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1910-1929, 893.201 cha (note irregular numbering of this item). The author is indebted to Jonathan Spence for pointing out the value of materials in the State Department files.

<sup>47</sup>William Martin, U. S. Consul General at Hankow, to Robert Bacon, Assistant Secretary of State, March 7, 1906, U. S. Department of State, Consular Despatches: Hankow, 1861-1906.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Lewis, op. cit., p. 15.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 16.



<sup>52</sup>Cohen, China and Christianity, p. 48.

<sup>53</sup>Alexander Michie, China and Christianity, pp. 93-4, p. 98.

<sup>54</sup>Griffith John, quoted in Alfred W. Wingate, A Short Report on the Province of Hunan, p. 97.

<sup>55</sup>Jessie Lutz, China and the Christian Colleges, p. 12.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., p. 99.

<sup>58</sup>Bertrand Russell, The Problem of China, p. 190.

<sup>59</sup>Varg, The Making of a Myth: The United States and China 1897-1912, p. 17.

<sup>60</sup>Bertrand Russell, op. cit., pp. 167-8.

<sup>61</sup>Varg, op. cit., p. 19.

<sup>62</sup>Cohen, op. cit., p. 112.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 102.

<sup>64</sup>Young, op. cit., pp. 91-2.

<sup>65</sup>Holden, op. cit., pp. 30-1.

<sup>66</sup>"The Yale Foreign Mission," p. 6.

<sup>67</sup>Yali is the disyllabic compound which was chosen to transliterate the name Yale. Ya means elegant and li means ceremony. The choice is somewhat happier than the name for Yale the author learned when he took Chinese, Yeh-lu, where Yeh is an interrogative particle and lu can mean stupid.

雅礼 = Yali; 耶魯 = Yehlu.

<sup>68</sup>"The Yale Foreign Mission," p. 8.

<sup>69</sup>Williams, FYC, p. 388.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p. 387.

<sup>71</sup>Williams, YFM, p. 429.



<sup>72</sup>Welch and Camp, Yale: Her Campus, Classrooms, and Athletics, p. xviii; Williams, YFM, p. 429.

<sup>73</sup>Harlan P. Beach, quoted in Williams, FYC, p. 388.

<sup>74</sup>Williams, YFM, p. 429. For an account of the rise of "little Yales" or "Yales of the West" in the United States, see John Whitehead, "'A Steady Hand at the Helm': A Plan and Purpose for the American College 1828-70." This work traces the marked influence of Yale College on the development of numerous institutions in the mid-western and western United States.

<sup>75</sup>Williams, FYC, p. 388. It is perhaps ironic that those who authored such high-flown plans would never experience the difficulties of working in Changsha.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., p. 387.

<sup>77</sup>Williams, YFM, p. 429.

<sup>78</sup>Canby, op. cit., p. 43.

<sup>79</sup>Lawrence Thurston to A. P. Stokes, July 4, 1903, YCA.

<sup>80</sup>Brownell Gage, "Estimate of Men Needed by the Yale Colleges in China (1909)," YCA.

<sup>81</sup>A. P. Stokes to Lawrie, November 5, 1902, YCA. Several years before the Y. F. M. S. began its work in Hunan, the Cumberland Presbyterian Mission in Chang-teh built the province's first hospital qua hospital. See O. T. Logan, "First Hospital for Hunan." There were probably dispensaries in Hunan even then which used existing structures. Yale-in-China was thus no pioneer in hospital work. By 1910 there were fourteen "fully equipped" (sic) hospitals and many more dispensaries in Hunan (Lewis, op. cit., p. 122).

<sup>82</sup>Hume, "Medical Missionary Work in China," p. 292.

<sup>83</sup>Hume to Reed, December 17, 1904, YCA. The material in Hume's life is drawn from several sources: Hume, Doctors East Doctors West; Lotta Carswell Hume, Drama at the Doctor's Gate; Parker and Newton, eds., The Yale Class Book '97.

<sup>84</sup>Hume, Doctors East Doctors West, p. 20. Hume's account in Doctors East Doctors West seems to be accurate except for dating (cf. below Part VI, note 114) and for an occasional interpretation (cf. below, note 120). This memoir was a product of Hume's old age and he did not have archival materials at his disposal to refresh his memory of the events of his early career.



<sup>85</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 29.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., pp. 40-1.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., pp. 41-2.

<sup>94</sup>Hume, "Opening of the Yale Mission Hospital," pp. 183-4.

<sup>95</sup>Hume to Stokes, January 27, 1907, quoted in Reeves, "Sino-American Cooperation in Medicine: The Origins of Hsiang-Ya (1902-1914)," p. 139. This is an invaluable account of the early years of Yale-in-China medical work.

<sup>96</sup>Hume, "Opening of the Yale Mission Hospital," p. 184. At the time the Yali I Yuan opened, Chinese women would not submit to examination by a male doctor.

<sup>97</sup>Hume, "Objects of the Yale Hospital, Changsha, Hunan," YCA. This memorandum was intended for circulation to Yale-in-China's constituency.

<sup>98</sup>Hume, Doctors East Doctors West, pp. 51-2. See also Reeves, op. cit., p. 141.

<sup>99</sup>Hume, op. cit., p. 87.

<sup>100</sup>Ibid., p. 58 ff.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid., p. 85 ff.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid., p. 141 ff.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid., p. 144 ff. The use of western-trained





Chinese physicians was not the only innovation of the Yale Mission in medical work. The Medical Department of Yale-in-China introduced the profession of nursing to the Chinese. In Hume's growing clinic good nursing was an essential commodity; until the Mission opened its School of Nursing, patients appear to have been cared for by all-purpose attendants and by their families. There were many difficulties encountered by the Chinese in understanding the concept of what a nurse is. It was difficult, for instance, to understand bringing in an outsider to care for one's relatives. It would also prove difficult to ask nurses, who would be of the educated class, to attend to patients in the lower classes. Also, as a profession in which women figure prominently, nursing would serve to take Chinese women out of their traditional sequestered environment and put them on a more equal basis with men. A female nurse would not be able to conserve a four-inch lotus blossom foot. For Yale to introduce professionalism to the Chinese woman was a revolutionary step. Nina Gage, sister of Brownell Gage of the Academic Department, would become Supervising Nurse in the Yale Hospital in April, 1910, and would later serve as Dean of the Hsiang-Ya School of Nursing. See Hume, Doctors East Doctors West, p. 167 ff., for details. Also, Annual Report of the Medical Department of the Yale Mission (1909), YCA.

<sup>105</sup>Annual Report of the Medical Department of the Yale Mission (for the year ended March 31, 1911), YCA.

<sup>106</sup>Reeves, op. cit., p. 146.

<sup>107</sup>Amos Wilder to Dickson Leaven, November 19, 1919, Dickson H. Leaven Papers (DHLP).

<sup>108</sup>(Hume), "A Report to the China Medical Commission of the Rockefeller Foundation," YCA.

<sup>109</sup>Harkness to Edward B. Reed, Oct. 15, 1909, YCA.

<sup>110</sup>(Hume), op. cit. See also, F. Wells Williams to Brownell Gage, October 28, 1911, YCA.

<sup>111</sup>William H. Sallmon, Executive Secretary and Treasurer, to the Mission, January 9, 1912, YCA.

<sup>112</sup>(Hume), op. cit.

<sup>113</sup>Hume, Doctors East Doctors West, p. 177.



114 Harkness had little understanding of the difficulties inherent to the type of bequest he made. With perhaps more enthusiasm than thought, he donated a large plant which both the Mission and the Chinese would find hard to vitalize. The form his donation to the Y. F. M. S. took presented the Mission with an equipped building, yet with no endowment nor even operating expenses to maintain it. As will be shown later, Harkness's munificence caused embarrassment to the Mission in its search for Commonwealth Fund appropriations and he later had to bail out the hospital on more than one occasion. It is no wonder that one finds the treasurer of the Yale Mission referring to the hospital on at least one occasion in 1927 as a "white elephant."

115 Charlton Lewis, "The Hunanese Elite and the Reform Movement 1895-1898," p. 40.

116 For instance, see the Hsiao Ching (Classic of Filial Piety) for such Pauline precautions as "Shen shou chih yü fu mu"--As for the body, it is received from the parents."

117 Lewis, op. cit., p. 40.

118 Lewis, "The Opening of Hunan," p. 50.

119 Brownell Gage to "Bill" (?Sallmon), July 2, 1913, YCA.

120 F. C. Yen, "An Example of Cooperation with the Chinese in Medical Education," p. 1385. Hume would take the credit for the initiative for himself. As he recalled in 1946, when he was in his late sixties, "I wrote at once to Dr. Yen [from America after seeing Harkness] and urged him to take the matter [of cooperation in medical education] up with Governor T'an [Yen-k'ai] and with members of the local gentry who were, by now, such strong friends of ours. 'Do see,' I wrote him, 'whether we can make it [the medical school] a co-operative enterprise from the beginning.'" See Hume, op. cit., p. 177.

121 Gage to "Bill," July 2, 1913, YCA.

122 W. J. Hail to "Bill," September 6, 1913, YCA.

123 Hail to "Bill," November 11, 1913, YCA.



- 124 Gage to "Bill," November 14, 1913, YCA.
- 125 Yen, "An Example of Cooperation," p. 1386.
- 126 (?Sallmon) to Gage, February 18, 1914, YCA.
- 127 Hume to Theodore Janeway, April 1, 1915, YCA.
- 128 W. J. Hail and Dickson Leavens to Executive Committee, May 19, 1913, YCA.
- 129 Gage to "Bill," January 6, 1914, YCA.
- 130 (?Sallmon) to Gage, March 6, 1914, YCA.
- 131 Yen, op. cit., p. 1386. The standard romanizations for the characters 育 and 孺 are yü and ch'ün rather than those given in Yen's article. Yen's spellings probably reflect Hunanese variant pronunciations of Mandarin. There is a great deal of inconsistency in the Yale-in-China Archives with regard to romanization of even the most commonly used Chinese terms such as yü-ch'ün and Hsiang-Ya. The term yü-ch'ün means fostering society, an expression which the gentry would quite naturally appropriate.
- 132 E. B. Reed, handwritten "Minutes of the Executive Committee," August 13, 1914. See Appendix I for organizational structure under terms of the first agreement.
- 133 Hume to Executive Committee, July 1, 1914, YCA.
- 134 Leavens to Amos Wilder, November 22, 1918, DHLP.
- 135 A. P. Stokes to Roger S. Greene, October 12, 1927, YCA.
- 136 (?Sallmon) to Gage, June 9, 1914, YCA.
- 137 Gage to E. B. Reed, April 20, 1914, YCA.
- 138 Harry Pratt Judson to A. P. Stokes, June 14, 1914, YCA.
- 139 Ibid.
- 140 Yen, op. cit., p. 1386.



141 Ibid.

142 Other members of the Hsiang-Ya Executive Committee were drawn from the Hsiang-Ya Joint Board and were either gentry or Yale Mission members.

143 Hume to My Dear Friends, November 25, 1914, YCA. This is a letter to the Executive Committee in New Haven.





PART III

STANDARDS, FINANCES, AND THE FOUNDATIONS I



### PART III

#### STANDARDS, FINANCES, AND THE FOUNDATIONS I

The fact that Edward Hume wanted to base the Hsiang-Ya College of Medicine on the "standards of Johns Hopkins" was not solely related to his having been in the School of Medicine's fourth graduating class in 1901. From its inception in 1893, the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine had become the paragon of medical education in the United States. Abraham Flexner in his famous report to the Carnegie Foundation clearly regarded Johns Hopkins as the standard to which all other medical schools in the United States had to be compared:

This was the first medical school in America of genuine university type, with something approaching adequate endowment, well-equipped laboratories conducted by modern teachers, devoting themselves unreservedly to medical investigation and instruction, and with its own hospital, in which the training of physicians and the healing of the sick harmoniously combine to the infinite advantage of both. The influence of this new foundation can hardly be overstated. It has finally cleared up the problem of standards and ideals . . .<sup>1</sup>

The School of Medicine was firmly anchored within the University itself. Instruction in medicine was under the control of the University but all that pertained to clinical matters was under the control of the Johns Hopkins



Hospital.<sup>2</sup> By 1910 neither Harvard nor Yale absolutely required a bachelor's degree for admission and entrance requirements fell far short of those at Johns Hopkins in 1893.<sup>3</sup> Standards at Harvard and Yale were exemplary, however, when compared to those of some of the other university- and non-university-based colleges of medicine, where entrance requirements might be only nominal (e.g., "Accept students and try them out."<sup>4</sup>). Johns Hopkins required not only a bachelor's degree but also pre-medical courses in biology, chemistry, physics, and a knowledge of French and German. Hopkins graduates would be firmly grounded in the basic medical sciences and have sufficient knowledge of important foreign languages to be able to keep up with scientific and medical progress. Their preparation enabled them to practice medicine on a firm, scientific basis. Blessed with the best that medical education in the United States had to offer at the time, Hopkins graduates fanned out after graduation like missionaries of a new order and "the Hopkins outlook was widely disseminated."<sup>5</sup> Sir William Osler said of Hopkins that it was "not simply a seed farm but a veritable nursery from which the whole country has been furnished with cuttings, grafts, slips, and seedlings."<sup>6</sup> Mr. Hopkins's philanthropy in Baltimore was to be felt in Changsha if Edward Hume had his way.



With the advent of Johns Hopkins, the reorganization of some of the older medical schools and the closure of many proprietary medical schools (characterized by Flexner as "woe-begone," "wretched," and "inexpressibly bad"<sup>7</sup>) after 1910, the United States moved away from its enormous over-production of incompetent doctors. In his report Flexner issued a warning to U.S. colleges which might equally well apply to missionary societies undertaking medical work:

It is important that our universities realize that medical education is a serious and costly venture; and that they should reject or terminate all connection with a medical school unless prepared to foot its bills and to pitch its instruction on a university plane.<sup>8</sup>

While the United States was suffering from high output of poorly trained physicians, China was suffering from a lack of physicians trained in western medicine, either native or foreign, to take care of her enormous population. There were, however, a number of medical schools in China but by the teens medical education for the Chinese, who would eventually have to bear the burden for China's health care, was still in its infancy. There were Chinese government and private medical schools, missionary medical schools, medical schools for women, and non-missionary medical schools under foreign control.<sup>9</sup> Generally speaking, it was evident to the first China





Medical Commission, sent by the Rockefeller Foundation to investigate medical conditions in China, that

there is no medical school now in China which is adequately equipped and no school which is adequately manned. Some of the schools, however, have really high standards and sound ideas, and the advanced men on other faculties have the right policies in mind.<sup>10</sup>

The Commission, composed of Harry Pratt Judson, President of the University of Chicago, Roger Sherman Greene, U.S. Consul-General at Hankow, Francis Weld Peabody, of Harvard University and the Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, and George Baldwin, who served as secretary, toured China in 1914, visiting the various medical schools and hospitals. At the conclusion of its mission the commissioners felt that China would prove to be a fruitful field for the development of medical work by the foundation and made a number of recommendations to the trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation. These were accepted and the China Medical Board was set up in November, 1914, to implement them.<sup>11</sup> Members of the Board felt that the Rockefeller Foundation might find it desirable in a general sense

To assist Missionary Societies to strengthen their medical schools and hospitals by providing equipment and other facilities, and by making annual grants, as may be found expedient, for the support of physicians and nurses, selected by the respective Missionary Boards, subject only to the Foundation's approval of the professional qualifications of the appointees.

With the consent of the Missionary Boards, to reorganize and expand existing medical schools, with



their hospitals, and to support these, wholly, or in part, from its own funds.

To aid other medical schools that are not strictly missionary.

To establish, equip and support new medical schools and hospitals. . . .<sup>12</sup>

The Commission also recommended

[t]hat medical instruction in which the Foundation is concerned should be on the highest practicable standard. Such standard at the present time seems to include as a requirement for admission to a medical school the training of a middle school (roughly equivalent to an American High School) supplemented by two years of pre-medical work devoted to instruction primarily in English, Chinese, physics, chemistry, and biology.<sup>13</sup>

The China Medical Board was thus charged with a multi-faceted program of systematic work for the improvement of medical conditions in China. A resident director in China would administer the "affairs of the Foundation in connection with the institutions aided."<sup>14</sup> Roger S. Greene, who would become a staunch supporter of Hsiang-Ya, would fill this post. Among the most important concrete manifestations of the Board's general recommendations for work in China was the purchase of Union Medical College in Peking and its reorganization under the China Medical Board as Peking Union Medical College and, for the present study, the decision to aid the Hunan-Yale Medical School in Changsha.

Greene and Peabody visited Changsha from May 28 through June 2, 1914; Judson, chairman of the Commission,



arrived on June 11 and stayed two days.<sup>14</sup> Both Greene and Peabody had a favorable, "wait and see" attitude and the entire Commission officially admired the conception of the work at Changsha and the Hsiang-Ya Agreement.<sup>15</sup>

The plans at Changsha are excellent, with a proper conception of what a high grade of medical work implies. The management has been exceptionally skillful and the interest of the Hunanese has been wisely fostered. There should be developed a strong and useful medical school, though in the opinion of the Commission it will be essentially a provincial institution.<sup>16</sup>

But Judson, privately, had his doubts about the venture:

So far as I can see there is nothing which constitutes a lien on the government income in any way. It is hoped that there will be no serious difficulty. If there should be a failure to meet the obligations, it of course would be extremely embarrassing to the administration of the medical school.<sup>17</sup>

The Commission considered Changsha as a site for its own school but Judson felt that

Hankow affords a larger field for the development of medical education than does Changsha . . . I believe, however, that the work will be primarily and largely provincial in character, although of course it will draw students from contiguous provinces to some extent. This is not saying that such work is not highly desirable and indeed I feel sure that an excellent medical school can be established and maintained at Changsha.<sup>18</sup>

The Commission's enthusiasm for the "standards of Hsiang-Ya" was tempered by ambivalence over the ways and means to quality medical education, given the path the Yale Mission had chosen to take.

In August, 1915, the second China Medical Commission



sailed for China composed of Wallace Buttrick, Director of the China Medical Board, William H. Welch, pathologist, of the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, and Simon Flexner and Frederick L. Gates, both of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research. The task of the second commission was to study the situation in China, to establish priorities, and to determine the best means for implementing the program projected by the commission of 1914.<sup>19</sup>

"The first commission had caught the vision of what might be. It fell to the second commission to give that vision form and substance."<sup>20</sup> Changsha was visited by the commission in October. Hume had written earlier to Welch, '870, his former teacher of pathology of Hopkins, promising him a "festive occasion if only he would come and lay the cornerstone" of the Hsiang-Ya Hospital.<sup>21</sup> The commissioners were "royally welcomed by citizens and officials" of Changsha and on October 18 Welch did the honors.<sup>22</sup> The commissioners were

much pleased with the progress that has been made in organizing the medical school as well as with the remarkable evidences of public-spirited cooperation on the part of the gentry of the province.<sup>23</sup>

The judgment of the first commission enabled the Yale Foreign Missionary Society to petition the China Medical Board successfully for grants to support its part of the Hsiang-Ya Agreement. From the first intimation that the Y. F. M. S. could look forward to Rockefeller money, the





New Haven Executive Committee intended to involve the China Medical Board in long range support of the medical work in Changsha. The original request from the Y. F. M. S. to the C. M. B., made in 1914, would have involved the Board over a period of twelve years (1915-1927) for a total of six "medical men" at \$2,700 per man per annum (three for the ten-year period 1915-1925; two for the ten-year period 1916-1926; and one for the ten-year period 1917-1927).<sup>24</sup> The Executive Committee further petitioned for an appropriation of \$25,000 "for land and a laboratory for research into Oriental diseases" and a ten-year allowance of \$1,000 per annum for maintenance and incidental expenses in connection with the laboratory.<sup>25</sup> The C. M. B. essentially gave the Y. F. M. S. all that it wanted except that the grants for instructors were to run only for five years instead of the requested ten. On May 1, 1915, the C. M. B. voted to contribute to the Y. F. M. S. \$16,200 per year for a period of five years to pay the cost of six instructors for its medical school at Changsha. Part of this sum might be used to maintain an instructor in the preparatory department (pre-medical).<sup>26</sup> In separate action on October 14, 1916, the Board voted \$25,000 for the building and \$5,000 for the equipping of a laboratory. In its original vote the Board retained the right to approve the professional qualifications of appointees.<sup>27</sup> Despite this one



condition, Edward Hume realized that in making its grants the C. M. B. was in no way assuming responsibility for Hunan-Yale. In anticipating that the Board would quickly forego the limitations imposed by its original action to aid the Hsiang-Ya enterprise, Hume wrote in December, 1915, that

[t]here is much to be said on both sides of this proposition [that the C. M. B. should assume responsibility for the use of its grant money]. On the one hand, it does leave us freer to develop our programme without being obliged to have it censored by the China Medical Board, while at the same time it allows the China Medical Board to be freer to observe the development of an independent school, and to compare its progress with that of a controlled school such as will be developed at Peking and Shanghai.<sup>28</sup>

Hume realized the precariousness of the financial situation and the need for support from the C. M. B.

[W]hile Central China needs our school, its continuance at present depends upon the stability of the annual grants from the local government. If these grants continue long enough to enable us to produce some results, the situation is not serious, but a change in the form of government or other occurrence might affect the government's attitude toward schools conducted entirely or in part by westerners, and we might have to face a cessation of the aforesaid government grants.<sup>29</sup>

He wished the China Medical Board to serve as an "insurance organization insuring us against breakdown during continuance of good management."<sup>30</sup>

There is little question that Hume was out to impress the Board with what could be done in the provinces. Both of the China Medical Commissions had been impressed



with the ideals of the Hunan-Yale cooperation. Hume felt he had the opportunity to enlist Board support early before the Board became so involved in its own undertakings. For Hume knew that

[t]hese are golden days. The C. M. B. has not yet started its work in Peking, and may not for a year. No time has been set for the opening of the work of that Board in Shanghai. There is no other school teaching medicine in English through the entire central, northern, and southern part of China . . . Within the year we shall be 8 hours from Hankow [by rail]; and thenceforward students can and will come easily; provided we give them something to come to.<sup>31</sup>

But, on February 2, 1916, the China Medical Board withdrew all limitations on the use of its funds.<sup>32</sup> Even before the first meeting of the Trustees of Peking Union Medical College on January 24, the Board felt that it had assumed too much responsibility for Hsiang-Ya not only by dictating how the grant should be used but also by mandating Board approval of Hsiang-Ya appointees.<sup>33</sup> With the enormous task of reorganizing Union Medical College the Board could not further presume to take over a provincial medical school, the desires of Edward Hume and the New Haven Executive Committee notwithstanding. That Hume felt the necessity of continued and long-term Board support and Board responsibility for its grants shows how strongly he sensed the weaknesses of the financial arrangements under the first Hsiang-Ya Agreement. He even went so



far as to suggest that the Executive Committee "conditionally" accept the fact of the Board's withdrawing responsibility for the distribution of its grant and planned to keep individual Board members actively involved with Hsiang-Ya by approaching them from time to time about Hsiang-Ya appointees.<sup>34</sup> Although it was unlikely that the Board would cut off funds suddenly upon the expiration of grants in 1920, Roger Greene, Resident Director of the China Medical Board in Peking, cautioned Hume to develop other sources of revenue.<sup>35</sup>

[I]t is beginning to look as if you would have to look to the China Medical Board for all increases beyond the amounts already undertaken by the Yale Mission and by the Hunan gentry. The fact that you have been approached by Brown University is an encouraging sign. Such outside interests ought to be developed at once, because my experience leads me to fear that once we have assumed a larger part of the support of such an institution as yours, it will be extremely difficult to get any outside subscriptions.<sup>36</sup>

Despite what Greene might say, however, he was an ardent supporter of Hunan-Yale. The China Medical Board would not quickly disown an organization whose ideals so closely paralleled its own in such fundamental matters as the question of standards and the assumption that the Chinese would eventually take over what had been started by others.<sup>37</sup>

\* \* \*

In order to foster the high standards necessary to





encourage support of the C. M. B., Hume invited a number of pre-eminent U. S. physicians to form the Medical Advisory Board of the Hunan-Yale College of Medicine. Among those Hume secured for the Medical Advisory Board were William Welch, George Blumer (also on the Executive Committee), Harvey Cushing, and Theodore Janeway.<sup>38</sup> The members were to meet once a year to make recommendations to the New Haven Executive Committee in matters of general policy and development of the medical work. The Medical Advisory Board would also give critical advice in the making of all medical appointments. Its decisions would not be binding on the Executive Committee, however. The Medical Advisory Board was devised by Hume as a counterweight to the New Haven Executive, which had "frankly stated" that its main interest was in the academic department.<sup>39</sup> Hume hoped that the prestige of this committee would help Hsiang-Ya receive the attention he thought it deserved in New Haven and back him up as he tried to move the medical school and hospital away from their missionary origins.

Hume was determined to build up a first-class medical school. To do this he realized that there would be little chance for securing qualified personnel unless competitive salaries were offered--and that meant that the \$2,700 missionary salary would have to become a base-line figure if Hsiang-Ya were to compete for doctors along with



Peking Union.<sup>40</sup> Hume also feared that quality might be sacrificed in order to maintain the religious nature of the work. In a letter to Frederick Wells Williams, Chairman of the Executive Committee, Hume pointed out that

these science men are apt to be a bit shy religiously, at least in conversation about things . . . I do urge you all to be watchful that . . . we do not lose good men because of the religious manner of approach.<sup>41</sup>

Hume urged the Medical Advisory Board to exercise caution:

If all the members of the board remain on the alert, and do not let themselves be prevented by any idea that our work requires a man of a peculiar religious make-up, we shall be able to find the necessary candidates. It is not necessary that a man should have been a student volunteer in his early days. All that seems essential is that a man have a Christian character and principles, and rank high professionally.<sup>42</sup>

Religiosity could not replace medical ability: Changsha was not a place for mediocre talent. Hume wrote,

[W]e need not have it said often . . . 'He is an ideal man for Changsha; I do not think he is especially brilliant professionally, or among the leaders; but . . .'<sup>43</sup> [ellipsis Hume's]

Hume thus looked to the Medical Advisory Board not only to screen candidates and to promote high standards but also to begin to help revise the fundamental conceptions of the work as essentially and irrevocably religious in nature.

Welch, who was also on the Board of Trustees of Peking Union, felt that Hsiang-Ya might do well to concentrate less on being a "University medical school" and



more on service to China. He wrote that

[it is] necessary to copy the medical school of the Rockefeller Foundation at Peking. That institution was designed to lay emphasis on the training of productive teachers and leaders; there [is] a field for a school of somewhat different type but still of very high standard. Such a school should lay emphasis on the training of practitioners.<sup>44</sup>

The Medical Advisory Board believed, though, that in spite of difficulty and uncertainty medical education at Changsha could and should be continued "if properly funded" and, like Roger Greene, wished to "look for more widespread support and to secure a permanent endowment."<sup>45</sup>

\* \* \*

The work of the Hunan-Yale College of Medicine began smoothly. Instead of starting off with a full-scale program, one class was admitted at a time in a manner reminiscent of the way in which Johns Hopkins began.<sup>46</sup> A two-year pre-medical program preceded the five-year medical school (four years of medical school plus one year of internship) so that it was fully seven years before Hunan-Yale could graduate physicians. Pre-medical work began in the fall of 1914 with a class of nine students, admitted for two years of college study which emphasized work in physics, chemistry, and biology. The decision that medical work was to be done in English necessitated continuous language training during the first four years of the seven-year program.<sup>47</sup>



At first pre-medicine was housed in a large Chinese residence and compound valued at \$20,000 gold and located within Changsha. This was the first relocation site of the hospital. There was room for a hospital of fifty beds not including space to set up the beginnings of the medical college and a training school for female nurses. This new hospital was exclusively for the use of women. Male in-patients were quartered at the Changsha Red Cross Hospital (a product of the Revolution of 1911) where the school for male nurses was located (cf. Part II at note 108).<sup>48</sup>

The Hunan government fulfilled part of its bargain in providing quarters for the pre-medical school; teachers of pre-medicine were provided by the Yale Mission. This was the way that the Mission was able to avoid any "immediate additional burden" of finance in the earliest years of Hsiang-Ya cooperation since the teachers were those from the regular staff. This situation was not entirely satisfactory because Yali faculty time was largely taken up with Hsiang-Ya rather than Yali. Brownell Gage, Dean of the College Department at growing Yali, felt that the Hsiang-Ya courses were "not very well adapted to the needs of the college department" and wanted to bring about a "closer relationship between the medical preparatory school and Yali College."<sup>49</sup> Students at Yali who wished to elect time in science courses at Hsiang-Ya had to trek





three-quarters of a mile across Changsha. As early as 1916 there was talk of Yali's taking over the medical preparatory school. It was argued that this be done largely in the name of efficiency: it was pointless to have reduplication of science courses at Yali and at Hsiang-Ya.<sup>50</sup> In addition there was no provision in the Hsiang-Ya Agreement for the joint running of the pre-medical school for longer than two years; government funds were intended for the medical school proper.<sup>51</sup> The Yale Mission had both the nucleus of a faculty and the facilities for teaching English.<sup>52</sup> Then, too, as it was noted in the application to the C. M. B. for money for a science laboratory and for science instructors, "Yale is more secure as a trustee of building or salary funds than the Hunan Yale Association."<sup>53</sup> Although the association might be made up of "earnest and sincere gentlemen," still it was "subject to Chinese law and is less permanent in character than a body of trustees incorporated under the laws of the United States."<sup>54</sup>

The expense of pre-medical teaching "added heavily to the budget" over the long run but the Yale Mission did benefit from its association and involvement with the natural sciences.<sup>55</sup> In 1917 the China Medical Board made a \$6,200 grant to be paid over a period of three years towards the support of an instructor in the pre-medical



school.<sup>56</sup> At the same time the Board made an additional grant of \$9,000 towards a total of \$16,125 for an extension of the medical school budget. By the time the Yale Mission took over the pre-medical school work of Hsiang-Ya in 1920, it could be said that the association "has enabled us to offer superior science instruction to our other students" and resulted in the acquisition of a science laboratory and equipment from the C. M. B. for the use both of Yali and Hsiang-Ya.<sup>57</sup>

The China Medical Board was always generous with the Yale Mission; getting funds from the provincial government was another story. As time went on and as the scope of medical activity increased--each year from 1914 until 1920 another class was added--failure to secure adequate funds from the government for the college of medicine developed into a chronic problem.

From the beginning of cooperation through 1917 semi-annual payments of \$25,000 were made on time by the government in March and September in accordance with the responsibility of the Educational Association as laid down in the Hsiang-Ya Agreement. This money was to be used for the annual running expenses of the schools of medicine and nursing, the annual sum not to exceed \$50,000 silver per year. Although payments were made on time, payment itself was made in paper money which was acceptable



almost everywhere (not at the post office, however) but at a discount of 2-5% compared to silver.<sup>58</sup> Before World War I, the gold dollar had been exchangeable for silver at a rate of two-to-one but war conditions led to increases in the price of silver. This situation interfered with payments from the United States in gold-backed currency.<sup>59</sup> In the fall of 1917, the paper dollar with which the Chinese were making payment also began to depreciate and the \$25,000 payment due in September plus \$30,000 that was received towards the building fund was exchanged at a loss of 10-15%. According to the terms of the Hsiang-Ya Agreement payments were to be made in silver.<sup>60</sup> Another payment was due in March, 1918. At the time payment was due, the provincial government had again changed hands and Changsha had been captured by Northerners. Payment was received but it was delayed until May, \$12,500 being received in silver and \$12,500 in paper exchangeable at a rate of \$.30 on the dollar. The payment due in September, 1918, was extremely difficult to obtain and necessitated great effort on the part of Yen, Hume, and two influential Chinese members on the Board of Managers. In an incredible move, one member of the Board, manager of Wah Chang Mining and Smelting (antimony), arranged it so that government taxes would be paid directly to Hsiang-Ya. By this method \$8,000 silver



was obtained. The same man also arranged temporary loans. Although the government made it understood that the several thousands remaining to be paid would come through "in some form," the combined Hsiang-Ya Board ended up having to borrow \$7,500 from the \$27,000 building fund grant received in September, 1917.<sup>61</sup> The hospital and medical school squeezed by with the help of surpluses from previous government grants but things looked black for the longer term.

By the spring of 1919, the situation was so grim that Hume felt obliged to undertake the extraordinary. In a move that was as egregiously uncharacteristic of the Yale Mission's usual attitude towards the Chinese as it was indicative of the gravity of the situation, Hail and Hume decided to show the flag. With U. S. Consul M. F. Perkins in tow, they paid a call on Chang Ching-yao, Governor of Hunan, "to induce him to pay us the sum of \$30,000 Mex. which he owes us."<sup>62</sup> The effect of this move on the procurement of government funds is unclear but Governor Chang did, however, pledge \$1,800 silver to the hospital from his own pocket.<sup>63</sup> In mid-May Yen travelled to Peking; along with several Hunanese residents in the capital, he interviewed Hunan-born philanthropist Hsiung Hsi-ling in Tientsin and put forward a request for \$20,000 silver for Hsiang-Ya.<sup>64</sup> Hsiung, now retired from politics, was able to arrange for a loan of \$15,000 for the medical





school. The loan came through none too quickly for on May 31 the general treasurer of the Hsiang-Ya Medical Association reported that "[h]ospital stock of ward and surgical supplies have been allowed to become low. . . . [A]n important drug order has been held up for about three months awaiting assurance of funds."<sup>65</sup> The Board of Managers had had to consider shutting down the work. Hsiung's action apparently kept Hsiang-Ya going at a critical time. The loan assuaged Yen's fear that the hospital might have to close at least for the time being. In view of the fact that a group from the China Medical Board was to visit Hsiang-Ya on an inspection tour during the summer of 1919, Yen felt that the hospital had to be kept open if C. M. B. interest in the enterprise were to continue. The crisis was over for the time being--insofar as funds were concerned--but the Mission had had to pull out all stops in what were obviously makeshift manoeuvres.<sup>66</sup> In the summer of 1919 Hume returned to New Haven to take part in discussions about continuance of Y. F. M. S. involvement in medical education in China.



## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Abraham Flexner, Medical Education in the United States and Canada, p. 12.

<sup>2</sup>John C. French, A History of the University Founded by Johns Hopkins, p. 106.

<sup>3</sup>Flexner, op. cit., pp. 199, 240.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 304.

<sup>5</sup>Daniel Coit Gilman, The Launching of a University, p. 124.

<sup>6</sup>French, op. cit., p. 426.

<sup>7</sup>Flexner, op. cit., pp. 227, 284.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>9</sup>China Medical Commission of the Rockefeller Foundation, Medicine in China, p. 9 ff., p. 17 ff., p. 34 ff., p. 38 ff.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>11</sup>Bowers, Western Medicine in a Chinese Palace, p. 40.

<sup>12</sup>China Medical Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, First Annual Report (Dec. 11, 1914 - Dec. 31, 1915), p. 6.

<sup>13</sup>China Medical Commission, op. cit., p. 91.

<sup>14</sup>Hume to Executive Committee, July 1, 1914, Yale-in-China Archives (YCA).

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>China Medical Commission, op. cit., p. 32.

<sup>17</sup>Judson to A. P. Stokes, June 14, 1914, YCA.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.



<sup>19</sup>Bowers, op. cit., p. 48.

<sup>20</sup>Mary E. Ferguson, China Medical Board and Peking Union Medical College, p. 24.

<sup>21</sup>Hume, Doctors East Doctors West, p. 198.

<sup>22</sup>Hume, "Development of the Hunan-Yale College of Medicine, Changsha," p. 325.

<sup>23</sup>China Medical Board, op. cit., p. 18.

<sup>24</sup>Amos Wilder to Roger Greene, Dec. 8, 1914, YCA.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Eben Sage to Wilder, Nov. 3, 1915, YCA.

<sup>27</sup>China Medical Board, Second Annual Report (1916), p. 17.

<sup>28</sup>Hume to Theodore Janeway, Dec. 14, 1915, YCA.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>Hume, "Suggested Docket, Winter Meeting of the Medical Advisory Board, 1917" (?late 1916), YCA.

<sup>32</sup>Wallace Buttrick to Wilder, Feb. 2, 1916, YCA.

<sup>33</sup>Ferguson, op. cit., p. 25.  
Hume to Janeway, Dec. 14, 1915, YCA.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>"Conference of Members of the Y. F. M. S. Board of Trustees with Dr. Geo E. Vincent, New Haven, Oct. 24, 1919," YCA.

<sup>36</sup>Greene to Hume, December 23, 1915, YCA.

<sup>37</sup>The Rockefeller Foundation and the Y. F. M. S. also shared views about what they were doing for China. Both groups were in fact undertaking a sort of "Christian ideological colonialism" (the term is Boris Astrachan's) of China. Cf. above, Part 1, for Yale-in-China's goals; cf. China Medical Board, First Annual Report (1915), p. 7 for secondary religious goals of the foundation's work in China.



<sup>38</sup>Welch, Blumer and Cushing live on today in eponymic form, i.e., Welch's bacillus. Blumer's shelf, and Cushing's disease. Janeway (not the Janeway of the J. lesion) was a professor at Johns Hopkins and the first U.S. physician to give up a private practice to become associated exclusively with a hospital.

<sup>39</sup>Hume to Janeway, April 1, 1915, YCA.

<sup>40</sup>Hume to Janeway, Dec. 14, 1915, YCA.

<sup>41</sup>Hume to Williams, Oct. 1, 1916, YCA.

<sup>42</sup>Hume to Janeway, June 18, 1916, YCA.

<sup>43</sup>Hume to Williams, Oct. 1, 1916, YCA.

<sup>44</sup>"[Minutes of the] Medical Advisory Board of Yale in China, Special Meeting, Dec. 2, 1919," YCA.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

Medical Advisory Board, "Minutes of the Second Annual Meeting, April 20, 1917," YCA.

<sup>46</sup>A number of the worst class of medical schools in the United States described by Flexner in his report would spring up full-grown, graduating students in their first year of operation.

<sup>47</sup>Yen, "The Hsiang-Ya Medical College," pp. 750-51.

A source of English teachers for Yale-in-China was each year's graduating class at Yale, where recommended seniors would be sent out on one-year appointments as "Yali Bachelors."

<sup>48</sup>Hume, "The Hunan-Yale College of Medicine, Changsha, Hunan," YCA.

<sup>49</sup>Gage, "Report of the Dean of The College Department, April 1st, 1916," YCA.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid.

<sup>51</sup>Yen, "Memorandum to Accompany Application for Grant. . . ," undated (? 1915), YCA.

<sup>52</sup>"Reasons for asking the China Medical Board to provide a Science Laboratory (Physics, Chemistry, and Biology) and Science Instructors for the Preparatory Department of the College of Yale in China," undated (?1915), YCA.





<sup>53</sup>Ibid.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid.

<sup>55</sup>"Report of the Dean of the College," undated (1920-21), YCA.

<sup>56</sup>The Rockefeller Foundation, Annual Report (1917), p. 322. Money from the previous grant had been used to support an instructor in the pre-medical school. After receiving the 1917 grant, the Mission was able to support one and one-half instructors with C. M. B. funds in pre-medicine. (Note that after the first few numbers, annual reports of the China Medical Board were contained within the annual report of the entire Rockefeller Foundation.)

<sup>57</sup>"Report of the Dean of the College," n.d. (probably 1920-21), YCA.

<sup>58</sup>Dickson Leavens to Wilder, Jan. 28, 1919, DHLP.

<sup>59</sup>(?Amos Wilder), "The Dreadful Silver Exchange," p. 1. As Executive Secretary of the Y. F. M. S., Wilder wrote much of the Yali Quarterly, from which the cited article is taken.

<sup>60</sup>The first Hsiang-Ya Agreement specified that grants from the Association be paid in "Mexican," i.e., silver.

<sup>61</sup>Leavens to Wilder, Jan. 28, 1919, DHLP.

<sup>62</sup>(?Amos Wilder), "Dr. Yen Does Peking Business," p. 4. This article is an extract from the June, 1919, minutes of the Governing Board of the Yale Mission.

<sup>63</sup>A. S. Crawford, J. R. B. Branch, and F. C. Yen to Hume, November 27, 1919, YCA.

<sup>64</sup>Yen to Hume, May 21, 1919, YCA.

<sup>65</sup>"Hunan-Yale Medical Association. General Treasurer's Statement, May 31, 1919," YCA.

<sup>66</sup>On his trip to China in 1920, A. P. Stokes noted that during the winter of 1919 "the wards had been often very cold owing to the inability to provide adequate coal because of the high cost under war-time conditions." So the crisis was far from over after the spring of 1919.



PART IV

"TO DO OR DIE": HSIANG-YA IN CRISIS



## PART IV

### "TO DO OR DIE": HSIANG-YA IN CRISIS

By the time Hume sailed for the United States, both the Y. F. M. S. and the Hsiang-Ya Board of Managers had gone into debt to support the medical work in Changsha, the Y. F. M. S. approximately \$10,000 gold for all Yale-in-China activities, and the Board of Managers over \$20,000 silver. As we have seen, extraordinary measures had been taken to secure funds in China.

Abetting and compounding Hsiang-Ya's financial problems were the dramatic effects of World War I on the price of silver and the difficulties that Hsiang-Ya had in securing provincial funds from the fall of 1917 on.<sup>1</sup> The latter problem was the result of official indifference to Hsiang-Ya (such as Chang Ching-yao's) and true provincial impoverishment. The chaotic political situation in 1919 had a telling effect on the development of Hsiang-Ya as a truly Sino-American institution. A review of its antecedents will provide a framework for understanding Hume's concern for Hsiang-Ya's survival.

The Revolution of 1911 and the toppling of the Ch'ing Dynasty failed to bring anything more than a token



republicanism in China. Although Yüan Shih-k'ai, first President of the Republic of China, seemed for a while to be "man of the hour--one whose career had specially fitted him for the responsibility of steering China through the transition from a monarchy to a republic," by the time of his death in 1916 the so-called Republic of China was nothing more than a fiction.<sup>2</sup> For Yüan had dissolved the Kuomintang and suspended parliament and the provincial assemblies. Promulgation of the Constitutional Compact in 1914 made Yüan a "minor Mussolini in a period when no Mussolini had yet emerged for precedent."<sup>3</sup> As Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig have noted, "He muzzled the press, encouraged local 'self-government' by gentry and elders, and revived the censorate and the state cult of Confucius. . . . By the end of 1915 he was president for life, emperor in all but name."<sup>4</sup> With his subordinates as provincial military governors who commanded most of the armies in the provinces, Yüan emerged as a strong man who offered no institutional alternative to "Son-of-Heaven autocracy."<sup>5</sup> However, as Sharman has pointed out, "Under his presidential administration China was not allowed to disintegrate; but centralization was preserved only at the cost of continual repression of republican ideals."<sup>6</sup>





Upon Yüan's death centrifugal forces set to work in China as his former cronies vied among themselves for hegemony. These centrifugal tendencies were exacerbated by the fact that China's provinces are distinct geographic and cultural regions as well as administrative areas.<sup>7</sup> The years 1916-1928--the "warlord period"--were marked by "incessant struggles among military men for regional and national dominance."<sup>8</sup> Petty warlords might control two or three districts or a few villages; major warlords, areas as large or larger than the chief states of Western Europe.<sup>9</sup> As Sheridan has pointed out, their wars and political manoeuvres were not genuine expressions of national or social movements but rather the work of military men in search of wealth and power; their "personal preferences, aspirations, policies, and whims were little hampered by ideological or social restraints."<sup>10</sup>

As Yale-in-China tried to operate in this atmosphere of constant warfare, it is no surprise that the confiscatory taxation to support armies and personal fortunes, the forced plating of opium (rather than food crops), and the widespread banditry and depredations of the military which so characterize this period should hamper efforts to build Hsiang-Ya into a strong institution which could continually rely on Chinese support. What is surprising is Edward Hume's inability to face the situation with a mind set on



consolidation rather than on expansion.

In midsummer of 1919 Hume sailed for America, returning for a two-year furlough. He would confer with the Board of Trustees in New Haven in an attempt to come to a decision about continuing the now debt-ridden medical work.<sup>11</sup> Before he left, Hume wrote to Dean Henry Houghton at Peking Union:

It seems as if this must be the darkest moment before the dawn. I go home . . . to do or die. Either new methods of raising budget and men must be found or we shall have to limit the work.<sup>12</sup>

Hume's return to the United States exacerbated an already difficult situation at Changsha. Before he left he had tried to find enough teachers for the medical school to take care of Hunan-Yale's "great emergency."<sup>13</sup> He asked help not only from other missions but also from Peking Union in securing the services of internists and surgeons for the 1919-20 academic year. Henry Houghton at Peking Union, who had been approached by others with Hume's type of problem, had "not the ghost of an idea where you can turn" and informally offered Hume a place in internal medicine at the proposed Shanghai Medical School of the China Medical Board in case Hsiang-Ya should fall utterly.<sup>14</sup>

Hume's return to the States and the resignation of Douglas T. Davidson, M.D., after three years of work at



Hsiang-Ya created the rather difficult situation of leaving no one in internal medicine for the medical school and hospital.<sup>15</sup> In April, 1919, both the hospital pathologist S. J. Shen and one of the surgeons, Albert Crawford, were ill and it was not clear whether they would be well by fall in time to teach.<sup>16</sup> For the 1919-20 school year, as the medical school added the fourth-year class, at least three doctors were needed to teach a number of important subjects: gross anatomy, pharmacology, physiology, physiological chemistry, clinical medicine, children's diseases, physical diagnosis, laboratory diagnosis, and wards and clinics.<sup>17</sup> In addition, another pathologist/bacteriologist was needed for the hospital. Unless teachers could be found, it would mean a great deal of doubling up and overtime work by doctors not necessarily skilled in the subjects they would have to teach, if both the hospital and the medical school were to get by. Although the medical work was provided for by the start of the fall semester, it was not an auspicious tide which launched Hume on his return to New Haven. He was officially returning to the States to help solve the urgent problem of personnel that was impeding the work at Changsha but, "with Hume here" rather than in the field, the Trustees would be able to deal more effectively with him as a part of the very problem he was returning home to solve.<sup>18</sup>



Within the Yale-in-China Archives there is very little information of a personal nature about any of the principal figures in the Yale Mission. Inferences about character must be in large part derived from the tone of mostly official business correspondence, given the course of events and the personal ambitions and biases of the writers. There is, however, a small block of personal, somewhat gossipy correspondence in the Dickson H. Leavens Papers between Leavens, who served as mission treasurer, and Amos Wilder, Executive Secretary of the Board of Trustees of the Y. F. M. S. In the following section, Wilder's impressions of Hume will be cited as possibly indicative of general opinion of Hume in the New Haven office. While there is little question that Wilder would agree with Trustee Stokes in calling Hume "in many ways our strongest man," there is also little doubt that he would agree that Hume was "our most difficult problem."<sup>19</sup>

One of the things the Board of Trustees worried about was Hume's ability to influence the voting of the entire Governing Board of the Yale Mission in its decision-making. In 1918 Wilder wrote to Leavens, suggesting a secret plan by which the Trustees might get a better idea of what was going on inside the inner circles:

If a majority vote carries it, pleasantly ask to have it noted that 'Leavens dissents' or 'Leavens refrains from voting,' thus the Trustees know what





is going on at the Mission. I still think that that tremendous fellow Dr. Hume may unduly and unconsciously carry all things . . .<sup>20</sup>

[H]ereafter a formal unanimous resolution by the Gov. Board is to mean that Leavens . . . and all solemnly approve and earnestly urge on the Trustees to take the action. It is serious remissness of duty for you fellows to approve things that you don't approve. You can at least ask the Secretary to note 'refrained from voting'; this will mean, not necessarily that you disapprove but that the issue, unlike some, is not one that you can back unreservedly on the facts at hand.<sup>21</sup>

With Leavens and others as a check on unanimous votes, Wilder felt that the Trustees could procede with more confidence in making the right decisions at a distance of 8,000 miles.

In his correspondence relating to Hume, Wilder mixes a curious respect for the "dear doctor" with a wariness born of having sat around in the New Haven office waiting for five-dollar contributions to roll in.<sup>22</sup> He was truly frightened by Hume's tendency to extravagance.

Especially you must look out for that great man Dr. Hume; I tell you again he is a great man; but unless the conservatives check him up, we shall have a great Yali crash on our hands that will convulse the whole alumni body . . . [T]he doctor's father has such a history in India: he too, was an unusual man but he thought only in large figures; he started enormous projects that seriously embarrassed the American Board; the Board refused to allow him to return to India; and as my informant tells me, he doesn't know whether his bills are paid yet. The Hume chapter in India was notable in its time. We have all the factors for a repetition . . .

When Dr. Hume and men of his type want anything, they get a catalogue of the best firm in



America and order it. If this means cabling, they cable. They get the best. That is the way Johns Hopkins and other institutions endowed for millions do; that is the way the Hume type does . . .<sup>23</sup>

While he is a very great asset to us in promotion and one whose unselfish spirit and great abilities I defer to, I feel that the financial men of our Trustees must supplement and especially check his outgo and large policies involving expense or the Society will find itself in a serious situation. This is my impression from noting his method: detail in uncongenial; when he wants money he must have it quickly and "the accounting can be cared for later," etc.--he is a big man and must have people about him to care for these things.<sup>24</sup>

While Wilder admired Hume, his admiration was somewhat tempered:

The funny little secretive trait in the Doctor amuses me: an oriental touch that is uncanny almost, I respect and revere; but I would not leave my private papers where that all-seeing silent eye could absorb them; it is all made weird by the fact that the man is wholly disinterested--his career is dedicated not to himself. . . . We will put him in a book some day. Meanwhile he will save Yali, but we will watch him . . .<sup>25</sup>

Wilder's comments about Hume's tendency to extravagance seem somewhat hyperbolic. Yet the draft budget Hume proposed in July, 1919, was quite out of reach of resources available at the time. Hume thought that setting a large budget

should make possible in the surest way of appealing to those who are in a position to give financial aid. To make out a small budget, in every way seen to be inadequate, is a revelation of narrowness of vision and the existence of a low standard in the institution.<sup>26</sup>

Hume was not prepared to skimp in his plans. Over a period



of five years he wanted to build a faculty of seven full professors,\* nineteen associate professors,\*\* and numerous assistants in each department. There was to be a graded salary scale. The total proposed budget, which included salaries for the medical school, nursing schools and for administration, plus running expenses for the schools and the hospital, came to a grand total of \$281,500 silver. Estimated receipts from the medical and nursing school and income from the hospital would reduce this total to about \$250,000 needed to be raised in Changsha, New Haven, and other places every year. To avoid the necessity of depending upon annual fund-raising and the anxiety attendant upon not being able to meet budget requirements, Hume proposed a \$5,000,000 endowment for Hsiang-Ya. "[F]ive sources might be thoroughly investigated and a fraction [i.e., \$1,000,000] of the required total sought from each."<sup>27</sup> These five sources would include American and Chinese citizens, Edward S. Harkness, other foreign missions, the China Medical Board, and Hunan province. Of the last, Hume wrote that

---

\*in anatomy, pathology, physiology, preventive medicine, medicine, parasitology, surgery, and obstetrics/gynecology.

\*\*in histology/embryology, pathology, physiology, pharmacology, physiological chemistry, medicine, dermatology, laboratory diagnosis, nervous diseases, parasitology, pediatrics, surgery, ear/nose/throat, ophthalmology, surgical pathology, urology, radiology, orthopedics, and obstetrics/gynecology.



[i]f a way can be found to make stable and permanent the present promised grant of \$50,000 per year, the first million of an endowment is thereby, ipso facto, guaranteed.<sup>28</sup>

Of course, making the grant from Hunan stable was tantamount to stabilizing political conditions throughout China. The enormousness of the span of Hume's vision becomes evident when compared with, for instance, the budget proposed for 1917-18, when the total for the entire medical program was \$62,845.<sup>29</sup>

Dickson Leavens was continually exposed to Hume in the field. He concurred, however, with Wilder about the necessity of checking Hume's "dream of millions that do not exist."<sup>30</sup>

I try constantly to check too sanguine financial plans of his, and then feel mean for doing it, when I see his wonderful constructive ability, his tact in settling the countless little situations that arise daily in a hospital with doctors, patients, nurses, servants, etc.; his devoted enthusiasm, his cheerfulness, and all his fine qualities; and compare my own shortcomings, and my work, which is largely recording rather than constructive. However, it's got to be done, and I am the goat. I shudder to think what this institution would do without Hume; and if only we can keep his extravagance curbed, it should go on to success.<sup>31</sup>

In October, 1919, after Hume had returned to the States, the Trustees sat down with George Vincent, '85, President of the China Medical Board in an attempt to deal with their increasing financial distress in connection with medical work. In June, 1919, Vincent had gone to China,





primarily to make an assessment of the Rockefeller Foundation's program at Peking; he had, however, visited a number of other cities, including Changsha, where, along with Roger Greene, he had inspected the Hsiang-Ya facilities in July and August. He thought that the "development of the institution is solely a question of support."<sup>32</sup> He was impressed with the students he met, with the "enthusiasm and loyalty" of the teaching staff, and with the educational requirements of the medical school.<sup>33</sup> He said that there was no better hospital building in China except for that at Peking Union. He found, however, that

conditions aside from the building seemed to be of a provisional character.

(a) The medical, surgical and the nursing staff was entirely inadequate.

(b) The equipment was distinctly insufficient.<sup>34</sup>

In addition, he felt that a hospital of 250 to 400 beds (as opposed to the 120 then available) would be needed for a "really sufficient clinical provision."<sup>35</sup> The central question remained: "[C]an funds and men be secured and can a permanent provision for such supply be made?"<sup>36</sup>

Vincent's trip to New Haven presented the Trustees with what they hoped would be an opportunity to rid themselves entirely of the medical work and its attendant problems; this would leave the Academic Department free for development. But, according to Hume, the Trustees felt "strongly that this medical child of their adoption



must not be thrown out into a cold world but that they must find suitable guardians who will take the entire financial and administrative control of the growing institution."<sup>37</sup> The Trustees were willing to relinquish both administrative and financial control of the medical school to the China Medical Board.<sup>38</sup> This option was presented to Vincent but the location of Yale-in-China worked against the Trustees and their plan. Vincent replied that "[s]hould the Board decide to develop a third center, which seemed unlikely, Canton would probably be that center. From the standpoint of the Board it was necessary to choose the great cities of China. . . . Peking provided for North China, Shanghai for the Yangtze valley; if the South needed provision, a school should be developed at Canton."<sup>39</sup> Vincent said that it was

not inconsistent for the China Medical Board to choose only two centers (for its own work) and at the same time to approve developments at Changsha.<sup>40</sup>

The Board would not, however, rescue Yale-in-China as it had the Harvard Medical School of China by buying it out and planning for future development on the same site.<sup>41</sup> The Trustees were assured that the C. M. B. money would not be suddenly terminated in 1920 upon expiration of the grants and that, while the Board would not initiate a scheme to raise an endowment for Hsiang-Ya, "it might



consider sharing in the financial responsibility."<sup>42</sup> The China Medical Board could not give the Yale Foreign Missionary Society the "freedom of responsibility" it was looking for.<sup>43</sup> The C. M. B. would not assume the work nor was there much possibility that other universities would aid Yale-in-China. Thurston's curse of Changsha had come home to roost. At Vincent's departure the Trustees greeted bleak prospects. Amos Wilder asked, "Will Dr. Hume prove a master hand to guide us in financial hopes this year--all are leaning on him."<sup>44</sup>

Within three weeks after Vincent's visit, Hume, along with members of the Board of Trustees, had formulated a plan for a financial campaign whose "aim is to secure a stable financial organization for the entire Yale-in-China work."<sup>45</sup> The plan did not include

any proposal for method of meeting the increasing expense of carrying on the Medical College contemplated in Hsiang-Ya agreement. Your committee is of the opinion that medical teaching--as distinct from the other objects contemplated by the agreement, namely, Hospital and Dispensary, Nurses' Training School and Laboratory provided for the College of Arts by the China Medical Board--must be separately financed by a few interested foundations and individuals and by Chinese support if it is to be continued. The entrance of the Rockefeller Foundation into the field of medical education in China has greatly modified the situation. [We should now determine] how the work at Changsha can best be made a part of a comprehensive scheme for medical education in China so as to make its equipment of the largest service.<sup>46</sup>

In the absence of firm plans for change, the medical work



went on much as before. A large financial campaign would be undertaken to finance Hume's vision but he would have to pound the pavement himself to find the money to realize it. Wilder commented on the situation to Leavens:

The Medical School issue is perplexing. Stokes seeks to clear the decks . . . by resting all hopes of its continuance on private foundation and other private gifts; indeed Hume would I think accept this--how to put it up to the SiangYa Chinese is embarrassing them. Hume hopes to get some large gifts and do the Medical School in a large way . . . .

It is possible that Dr. Hume may uncover huge grants from Mr. Harkness or other centers and do things in a big way. It is more possible that he will, without confessing any change of plan, get a goodly five-year appropriation from C. M. B. (nominally for Hospital staff, etc.) and then keep on much as before. . . .<sup>47</sup>

By the time Hume returned to Changsha in midsummer, 1921, after an absence of two years spent largely in fund-raising in the States, he would have enough of "grim soliciting" on behalf of Yale-in-China to last him a lifetime.<sup>48</sup>





## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Cf. "Standards, Finances, and the Foundations I" at note 58 and "Standards, Finances, and the Foundations II" at note 6.

<sup>2</sup>Lyon Sharman, Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning, p. 139.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 203.

<sup>4</sup>Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation, p. 646.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Sharman, op. cit., p. 203.

<sup>7</sup>Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig write of the provinces at this period in history that "[t]hey had grown steadily more independent of Peking, in a process under way since the 1850's. There were also the ineradicable climatic, economic, and historical differences that produced a divergence of interest and outlook between South China and North China, such as had plagued every dynasty." Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, op. cit., p. 651.

<sup>8</sup>Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, p. 9.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>11</sup>"For a number of years the primary long-range administrative group in the United States was an Executive Committee. With the growth of the school this Committee was discontinued and its functions absorbed by a Board of Trustees. This change, occurring about the time Yali moved to its new campus, established a home office organization capable of dealing with almost any situation which might arise. To handle immediate affairs in the United States an Executive Secretary was named, with power to conduct all day-by-day business as well as to put into effect the decisions of the Trustees." See Holden, Yale-in-China: the Mainland, p. 97.



<sup>12</sup>Hume to Henry Houghton, April 18, 1919, Yale-in-China Archives.

<sup>13</sup>Hume to W. L. Berst, April 18, 1919, YCA.

<sup>14</sup>Houghton to Hume, Febraury 10, 1919, YCA.

<sup>15</sup>Hume to W. L. Berst, April 18, 1919, YCA.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid; Shen succumbed to paratyphoid before the start of the 1919-20 academic year [(?Amos Wilder), "The late Dr. Shen, Yali's Pathologist," p. 3].

<sup>17</sup>"Hunan Yale College of Medicine and Hospital, 1919-20," YCA.

<sup>18</sup>Wilder to Leavens, October 15, 1919, Dickson H. Leavens Papers (DHLP).

<sup>19</sup>A. P. Stokes to Roger S. Greene, October 12, 1927, YCA. The source of the Wilder-Leavens connection is not entirely obvious. It is plausible that the two men met during one of Leavens's visits to the New Haven office while on furlough. In this correspondence, some of which is marked "Confidential," Wilder brings to light numerous tensions between the Yale-in-China Trustees and the staff in the field. As Executive Secretary, Wilder was in a good position to know about and comment on these. Wilder's relation to Leavens is in the model father-son or older brother-younger brother.

<sup>20</sup>Wilder to Leavens, April 16, 1918, DHLP.

<sup>21</sup>Wilder to Leavens, August 12, 1918, DHLP.

<sup>22</sup>Wilder to Leavens, September 4, 1919, DHLP.

<sup>23</sup>Wilder to Leavens, Oct. 3, 1918, DHLP.

<sup>24</sup>Wilder to Leavens, June 8, 1920, DHLP.

<sup>25</sup>Wilder to Leavens, fragment of undated letter, received by Leavens April 9, 1920, DHLP.

<sup>26</sup>Hume, "Draft of Budget estimated as necessary for College, Hospital and Nursing School within the next five years. July 1919," YCA.



<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>"The Hunan-Yale College of Medicine. Summary of proposed budget--year beginning July 1, 1917 and Ending June 30, 1918," YCA.

<sup>30</sup>Wilder to Leavens, April 7, 1920, DHLP. The phrase is actually used for Leavens. Wilder was worried about the consequences of his friend's being constantly exposed to Hume: "[Y]our letters of late show how little even you can get our viewpoint. It illustrates the old truth that to segregate even a good man in mid-China where but one set of talk hammers him, robs him of a judicial bearing . . ."

<sup>31</sup>Leavens to Wilder, November 22, 1918, DHLP.

<sup>32</sup>"Conference of Members of the Y. F. M. S. Board of Trustees, With Dr. Geo. E. Vincent, New Haven, Oct. 24, 1919," p. 2, YCA.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Hume to William Welch, Oct. 16, 1919, YCA.

<sup>38</sup>"Questions for Discussion with Dr. Vincent, Oct. 24, 1919," YCA.

<sup>39</sup>"Conference of Members. . . ," p. 2.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>41</sup>Bowers, Western Medicine in a Chinese Palace, p. 57. Ferguson, China Medical Board and Peking Union Medical College, p. 28.

<sup>42</sup>"Conference of Members. . . ," p. 3.

<sup>43</sup>Wilder to Leavens, Oct. 15, 1919, DHLP.

<sup>44</sup>Wilder to Leavens, Nov. 19, 1919, DHLP.



<sup>45</sup>Hume, Stokes, and R. H. Gory, "Report of a special committee appointed by the Trustees of Y. F. M. S. to prepare a plan for a financial campaign. Nov. 12, 1919," YCA.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>Wilder to Leavens, Nov. 19, 1919, DHLP. It is important to note that the C. M. B. gave its grants without stipulation about how the money should be used. When Wilder wrote that grants were "nominally for Hospital staff," he was merely pointing out that the Board would not make specific grants for teachers because the Board intended to get involved in teaching only in Peking and Shanghai. There was no limitation on the duties "Hospital staff" might perform.

<sup>48</sup>Wilder to Leavens, Sept. 4, 1919, DHLP.





PART V

STANDARDS, FINANCES, AND THE FOUNDATIONS II

HSIANG-YA AND THE CHINA

EDUCATIONAL COMMISSION



## PART V

### STANDARDS, FINANCES, AND THE FOUNDATIONS II

#### HSIANG-YA AND THE CHINA

#### EDUCATIONAL COMMISSION

Hume's years in China provided him with knowledge of the missionary field which would enable him to be a valuable promoter and spokesman for all aspects of Yale-in-China. After his return to the States in late summer, 1919, it seems that Hume served in an interim capacity as Secretary and Treasurer for the Society between the terms of Amos Wilder (1914-20) and Harold Vreeland (1921-24); from 1921 until 1924 he was General Secretary.<sup>1</sup> In these capacities, and later as President of the Colleges of Yale-in-China, Hume travelled back and forth between the United States and China a number of times trying to serve as administrator and doctor in the field and as a much-needed fund-raiser in the U.S. From 1919 until his final departure from Changsha in December, 1925, Hume was in the United States on Society business for a total of over four years.<sup>2</sup>

After finishing the report on methods of financing Yale-in-China, Hume set about trying to realize the scheme. In the early part of 1920, he started on a long fund-raising



campaign which took him to such cities as Detroit, Chicago, Evanston, Cleveland, Buffalo, New York, Boston, and Washington.<sup>3</sup> Hume found that "by writing in advance a few men will usually arrange to meet at luncheon, where I outline China's present situation and America's relation to it, and ask this temporary committee to plan a Yale luncheon or Yale dinner, or illustrated lectures at clubs in the various cities. To such lectures Yale men can usually be invited even if not members."<sup>4</sup> Thus, amidst large quantities of rubber chicken, "Yali Committees" were set up in a number of cities to raise money during annual campaigns of the Yale Foreign Missionary Society.

While Hume was out campaigning, trying to refloat his foundered hopes for Hsiang-Ya, the Finance Committee of the Y.F.M.S., fully conscious of Yale-in-China's indebtedness and of the fact that the Society had been unable to balance its budget since 1915, made the difficult decision to cut salaries.<sup>5</sup> For some time the Society had tried to deal with the inflation that had driven up the cost of silver by guaranteeing the "traditional" two-to-one exchange rate. Thus, no matter what the price of silver relative to gold, the Trustees essentially guaranteed that Yale Mission faculty would receive a fixed salary in silver. Even with this method, though, Leavens wrote the home office in June, 1920, that "all [faculty] overdraw [on



their salaries] part of the time, some all the time."<sup>6</sup> As silver became more and more expensive--even more so than gold--the Society was forced to borrow money to pay salaries in the field as it attempted to guarantee on its own the two-to-one exchange. In a group as increasingly money-minded as the Trustees of the Y.F.M.S., this situation could not continue. In order to "pay our bills and spend not a cent more than we can raise," it was proposed to guarantee only three-quarters of the salary at a rate of two-to-one and to pay one quarter in gold.<sup>7</sup> Situations such as this--where "we have advanced our expenses when prudence should have told us not to do it"--drove the Trustees to mount increasingly aggressive financial campaigns from 1919 onward.<sup>8</sup>

In its search for funds for the medical college, the Society went back, of course, to the China Medical Board, with whose members there had been continuous formal and informal contact throughout the years of the C.M.B. grants. Hume had even delayed his 1919 departure from China in order to conduct Vincent and Greene through the plant at Changsha as they toured central China. Though the Board might not act as the Y.F.M.S. would want, nevertheless relations between the two groups were quite cordial. The C.M.B. had even seen fit to come to Hsiang-Ya's rescue during the time of the "dreadful silver exchange" by making





loss of exchange appropriations in 1919 and 1920.<sup>9</sup> Needless to say, the Rockefeller Foundation could do this in a way the Trustees could not.

On December 5, 1919, the Y.F.M.S., anticipating the termination of C.M.B. funds at the end of the 1919-20 fiscal year, requested another five-year grant.<sup>10</sup> This time the Society received exactly the amounts it asked for; the China Medical Board again declined to specify how the money should be used. In its primary request, the Society asked for specific amounts to fund two teachers in pre-medicine and a number of hospital staff. A secondary request for support of the budget of the pre-medical course and for salaries for three nurses was made at the same time. Exchange adjustments on both grants would be necessary. The C.M.B. informed the Society that the primary grant would be made in silver rather than gold and appropriated \$50,000 gold per year for five years for the purchase of \$41,605 silver. A sum of \$6,645 per year in gold would be allocated to cover the secondary request.<sup>11</sup> Assured of Rockefeller money for the next five years, the Y.F.M.S. looked for other large sources of support. Hume wrote to Yen that "the continued support of CMB for another five years [in the face of continued but flagging support from Hunan] will leave no other alternatives except to forge ahead and see to the ultimate success of the Medical Department."<sup>12</sup>



Hume and the Trustees were able to play on Edward Harkness's interests in medical education and hospital work in securing help from a new source: the Commonwealth Fund. This foundation was incorporated on October 17, 1918, under the laws of the State of New York following a gift of \$10,000,000 by Mrs. Stephen V. Harkness (mother of E. S. H.), who mundanely enjoined the Fund to use the money "to do something for the welfare of mankind."<sup>13</sup>

Edward Harkness played a prominent role in the Commonwealth Fund's activities and his interests paralleled those of the Fund. In June, 1920, the Fund voted \$30,000 a year for five years to Yale-in-China for the "express purpose of extending the work of the medical school."<sup>14</sup> No portion of the grant was to be used for any items on the present budget. Thus rather than consolidate, Hsiang-Ya was bid to expand by the Commonwealth Fund's action. A special grant of \$25,000 to be matched dollar for dollar was made for an out-patient block to relieve the burden of poor clinic facilities in the hospital basement. It was stipulated that matching dollars were to be "raised locally," that is, in China from Chinese sources.<sup>16</sup> The Commonwealth Fund, by making grants to Yale-in-China, enabled Harkness to apply brakes to his beneficence through the process of grant application and review, a more objective method than had heretofore been used in the



distribution of Harkness money to Yale-in-China.

Despite progress in seeking outside support, there were areas where little progress was being made. Hume considered that the New Haven Trustees still lacked a "definite group of men understanding medical education as members of the Board itself or as members of an active sub-committee on which the Board can constantly rely . . . [O]ur society must respond by selection of a group to which the policy and personnel of our Changsha medical school may be turned over as a serious responsibility."<sup>17</sup> Hume commented to his mentor Welch in a somewhat discouraged tone that "[y]ou will agree with me that the time has come when the whole enterprise should be taken out of the hands of two men like Dr. Yen and myself, so far as letting its future progress and present stability depend largely on the energy and enthusiasm of 2 individuals."<sup>18</sup> Hume was all too well aware of his and Yen's responsibility for progress thus far.

Securing a five-year grant from the Commonwealth Fund was, of course, a great boon to medical work. This new source of income was compromised, though, by conditions in China. By 1922, one year after the advent of Chao Heng-t'i as Governor of Hunan, the financial situation regarding provincial funds had reached desperate proportions; by March the local government was behind approximately \$146,000.<sup>19</sup> That amount was so great that "if we did not



receive another cent, from now until June 30, 1924, we should be able to run along at a splendid rate."<sup>20</sup> Building fund money was advanced to the general fund and the business manager had such a small working balance on hand at the end of January, 1922, that it looked as if "either a part or all of our institution must close its doors."<sup>21</sup> The College of Medicine was unable to file orders for microscopes and other equipment needed for the fall term. Hume wrote to Yen that "unless some great friend of ours becomes Governor shortly in Hunan, we shall not be able to secure through the ordinary channels more than \$20,000 a year for the next ten years."<sup>22</sup> He was beginning to feel that Stokes had been right in 1920 after his trip to China when he had advocated a "hospital with educational features" instead of a full-blown medical school. Stokes had recommended "maintaining the nursing school, graduate instruction for interns and a school for technicians . . . as well as making the institution a field for a great campaign of public health instruction."<sup>23</sup> In this way it was believed that the spirit of Hunan-Yale might be preserved without the financial problems. Among the Chinese, though, one of Hsiang-Ya's supporters went so far as to suggest that the Yale Mission, in view of the situation in China, should be entirely free to make "other connections" because he saw no financial hope within Hunan for the next several





years.<sup>24</sup> Hume realized, though, that the agreement ran until 1924 and that "[n]o Yale man ever defaults."<sup>25</sup>

By 1922 Hume was clearly flagging in his efforts to keep Hsiang-Ya afloat. He was tired of "dashing about over the country to pick up a thousand dollars or a few thousand dollars when we ought to be attending to our teaching tasks, and to the work of the Hospital."<sup>26</sup> He wanted a definite answer from the Yü-ch'un Educational Association to the question, "Have you not reached a stage when you must acknowledge that you cannot keep up the contract?"<sup>27</sup> This was a question solely of finance; the spirit and the will to cooperate in medical education never flagged.

Finance was not Hsiang-Ya's only problem. The directions of Christian education in China were rapidly being revised as Chinese nationalism grew and as indigenous Chinese educational institutions promising "great things for the future" began to compete with foreign-dominated enterprises such as Yali and Hsiang-Ya.<sup>28</sup> In 1921 a committee of American, British, and Chinese educators made a study of Christian efforts to educate the Chinese. The report of the China Educational Commission came as a great blow to Hume. Even though he tried to deal with the situation in an objective manner--laying out in numerous, obsessively detailed letters the plight of medical education



at Changsha and the place of Hsiang-Ya within the scope of China's needs--he nonetheless wrote bitterly to Yen: "After living for and sweating for Siang-ya these years, it is enough to tear out your soul and mine to face these facts [i.e., financial problems and the report of the China Educational Commission] in this brutal [i.e., objective] way, but we have got to do it."<sup>29</sup>

The Commission's report caused Hume to become an even more ardent advocate of ideas on medical education he had espoused several years before the first Hsiang-Ya Agreement was signed.

Union in education, especially in medical education, had been a factor in Hume's thinking since the time when Yale-in-China had been invited to lead union medical movements in Wuhan before the first Hsiang-Ya Agreement was negotiated. It is a tribute to Hume's foresight and ambition that he realized the advantages to be gained from co-operation in medical education among a number of missions. In his thinking, Hume was alone; by their chronic non-action the Executive Committee and, later, the Board of Trustees guarded the integrity of Yale-in-China as a purely Yale venture.<sup>30</sup>

The immediate stimulus to co-operation was the chronic, unremitting (but curiously stable) problem with medical school finance. In the record there are a number



of abortive attempts to interest other major U.S. universities in Yali and Hsiang-Ya. As early as 1915 Hume wrote, "I think we shall shortly be able to announce that there has been established [at Hsiang-Ya] a Johns Hopkins fellowship in pathology."<sup>31</sup> Nothing ever came of this. Similar attempts in the late teens and early twenties to interest such universities as Brown, Harvard, M.I.T., Cornell, Stanford, and the University of California never bore fruit.<sup>32</sup> For example, Harvard elements by 1921 had still not recovered from the C.M.B. conference at Hot Springs, Va., in the spring of 1920 when the Shanghai project was abandoned and were unwilling to consider co-operation in medicine until the fate of the defunct Harvard Medical School of China was sealed.<sup>33</sup> Whether Yale-in-China would want the cooperating institutions to participate in medicine or to start, say, a school of agriculture or engineering in a joint universities project, in the end, "[f]or them to come to Changsha means, as they see it, merely boosting a Yale enterprise."<sup>34</sup> Cooperation meant, of course, that other institutions should join Yale-in-China at Changsha rather than that Yale-in-China should move from Changsha, as had been proposed in 1911.<sup>35</sup> The report of the China Educational Commission worked to change Hume's mind about the situation in Changsha.



The Commission was the product of a desire on the part of the China Christian Educational Association and the China Continuation Committee "to inquire sympathetically and carefully into the entire educational situation in China and the relation which the educational work carried on in China by Foreign Mission Boards and by other Christian forces, either Chinese or foreign, should bear to it, and upon the basis of these studies to suggest the part which the Mission Boards at work in China might well take in the education of the Chinese people."<sup>36</sup> The Yale Foreign Missionary Society was one of the boards supporting the Commission.<sup>37</sup>

On October 22, 1921, a group of members of the Commission visited Changsha to inspect Yali and Hsiang-Ya; notable members of this group were Leighton Stuart, President of Peking University, and Mary Wooley, President of Mount Holyoke.<sup>38</sup> At the end of December the Commission "sent out a call for a conference in Shanghai," which Hume attended.<sup>39</sup> At the time, the Commission recommended that Yali unite with a number of other institutions to form a union university and that the medical faculty of this union enterprise be located at Changsha.<sup>40</sup> Hume came away from the conference feeling "that there were certain problems to be discussed" but that the Hsiang-Ya cooperation would now be definitely strengthened.<sup>41</sup> During the early





part of January, 1922, the Commission changed its mind and in its final recommendations concluded that "those of us who were attempting medical education had not sufficiently counted the cost and had not prepared for ourselves an adequate foundation."<sup>42</sup> The Commission wanted Yale-in-China in its medical work to maintain a "first-class hospital with educational features" within the context of a Hunan-Yale cooperative effort and suggested that the Yale Mission might transfer its medical faculty to Shanghai to help in founding an East China Union Medical School.<sup>43</sup> This suggestion is reminiscent of Anson Phelps Stokes's position after his visit to Yale-in-China in 1920. For Hsiang-Ya to cooperate in this manner would help, it was believed, to obtain the desired end of "a few schools adequately staffed and maintained."<sup>44</sup> At the time the Commission's recommendations were made, Hsiang-Ya was doing rather well, as Hume pointed out, reaping the benefits of grant money from the C.M.B. and the Commonwealth Fund--there was a staff of eighteen teachers in the medical school, six western-trained nurses and three administrators but still no one specializing in anatomy or physiology.<sup>45</sup> The China Education Commission made its recommendations somewhat reluctantly. One of the commissioners wrote of the plan to Hume that "[i]t has taken us a long time to arrive at this point of even suggesting



this plan. But the logic of events seems to be driving us to it."<sup>46</sup> Hume, however, was prepared to put aside sentiment and, in view of his long interest in union movements in education, basically accepted the Commission's report. He did, however, favor cooperation in medical education at Hankow rather than at Shanghai. "If Changsha cannot make good on the funds, then we ought not to stand in the way of developing a strong school elsewhere. . . . If we cannot get funds for medical education, then I think we ought to launch out on some such program [e.g., nursing education, public health education] with the idea that it would be temporary and that after ten or twenty years, medical education might once more be resumed in Changsha. We ought to continue to call this the Hunan-Yale movement, but ought to make the movement carry a smaller burden of finance, both for the Yale people and for the Hunan Association."<sup>47</sup> Narrowing the scope of the work in Changsha would enable Yale-in-China to increase the quality of its teaching programs. Echoing the words of Thurston written nearly twenty years earlier, Hume wrote that "[t]here are difficult times ahead politically and financially in China and I think the solution [of the China Educational Commission] is a good one which will make it easy to do well the task which we undertake."<sup>48</sup>

The plan outlined by the Commission did not meet



with the approval of the Trustees.<sup>49</sup> They feared that Shanghai would be a poor place to enlist Chinese support for a cooperative endeavor and, besides, Shanghai would be a moral threat to the character of the Hsiang-Ya students. Also, if Hsiang-Ya moved to Shanghai, it was likely that pro-Japanese elements in Changsha would establish a low-grade medical school and defeat the ideals of Hunan-Yale. Moving to Shanghai would waste the beginnings made in Changsha and lead to deterioration of the hospital, which could not be moved and which would still have to be kept up and supplied with nurses if continued. "Yali, because of its unity and the spirit of its staff," could operate "just as good a medical school in Changsha as could be done in Shanghai at half the cost."<sup>50</sup> In the absence of plans for change, the medical school continued as before. Hume predicted that "now with the report of the Education Commission before them, individuals and public foundations are going to say to us 'You should not stand in the way of the development of a strong collegiate union school in some more strategic center.'"<sup>51</sup>



## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Holden, Yale-in-China: The Mainland, Appendix B, pp. 286-92. On October 3, 1924, Hume was inaugurated as President of the Colleges of Yale-in-China.

<sup>2</sup>Hume was in Changsha during the following periods of time: 9/06-5/3/11; 6/8/13-6/24/19; 6/17/21-4/23/22; 10/20/23-12/17/23; 9/8/24-12/20/25. See Staff Files in the Yale-in-China Archives. Also, infra., extensive note on Hume's departure from Changsha at Part VI, note 114.

<sup>3</sup>Hume, "Note book of trips, 1920," YCA. In addition to Hume's itinerary there are notes for the speeches he would give at campaign stops.

<sup>4</sup>Hume to F. Wells Williams, Oct. 12, 1920, YCA.

<sup>5</sup>Williston Walker and E. B. Reed, "Report of Finance Committee" (Feb. 22, 1920), YCA. Indebtedness in 1915 was \$3,800.

<sup>6</sup>Leavens, "Statements of Amounts 'Lost by Exchange'" (June, 1920), YCA. Elsewhere, Leavens wrote about the reasons for the increase in price of silver. "[A]fter the war was well started, the demand for silver for coinage increased enormously and with it the price. Gold largely went out of circulation; much paper currency was issued, but a large amount of hard money was necessary for daily use and the mints of the world have been busy for the last three years turning out silver coins. The high wages went chiefly into the hands of those who were accustomed to carry actual cash instead of using bank credit, and the average purseful was increased. Then as the currency became inflated, prices rose, and this necessitated a greater supply of currency, which still further inflated prices, and so continued the vicious circle. . . . Finally, in 1918 a price was fixed by the British and American authorities, but like most fixed prices, this had little effect, for by 1918 there was practically no silver to be had in the market, outside of what was contracted for by governments" (Leavens, "The War and Silver," pp. 5-6).

<sup>7</sup>Walker and Reed, op. cit.





<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>The Rockefeller Foundation, Annual Report (1919), p. 287; Annual Report (1920), p. 334.

<sup>10</sup>"Report to CMB for Supplementary Grant for the Period January-June 1920" (Dec. 5, 1919), YCA.

<sup>11</sup>Edwin Embree to Amos Wilder, May 10, 1920, YCA; the Rockefeller Foundation, Annual Report (1921), p. 284.

<sup>12</sup>Hume to Yen, April 3, 1920, YCA.

<sup>13</sup>James W. Wooster, Jr., Edward S. Harkness (1874-1940), p. 43. The Commonwealth Fund, The Commonwealth Fund: Historical Sketch (1918-1962), p. 53.

<sup>14</sup>The Commonwealth Fund, "Excerpts from Minutes of Meetings of the Board of Directors," June 26, 1920, The Commonwealth Fund Archives (CFA). The Commonwealth Fund, Third Annual Report (1920-21), pp. 22-23.

<sup>15</sup>Cf. Part VI at note 25 and ff.

<sup>16</sup>The Commonwealth Fund, "Excerpts . . ." CFA.

<sup>17</sup>Hume to F. C. Yen, July 26, 1920, YCA.

<sup>18</sup>Hume to Welch, May 11, 1920, YCA.

<sup>19</sup>Hume to W. W. Yen, March 2, 1922, YCA.

<sup>20</sup>Hume to F. C. Yen, March 25, 1922, YCA.

<sup>21</sup>H. J. Dunham, "Notes on Business Manager's Report of Jan. 31, 1922," YCA.

<sup>22</sup>Hume to Yen, July 6, 1922, YCA.

<sup>23</sup>Hume to Yen, March 2, 1922, YCA; Hume to Yen, March 16, 1922, YCA.

<sup>24</sup>Hume to Yen, April 10, 1922, YCA.

<sup>25</sup>Hume, "The Inaugural Address," p. 6.

<sup>26</sup>Hume to Yen, February 25, 1922, YCA.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.



<sup>28</sup>China Educational Commission, Christian Education in China, p. 13.

<sup>29</sup>Hume to Yen, March 2, 1922, YCA.

<sup>30</sup>It is true that Hamilton College supplied a teacher in the Academic Department and that the Wesleyan Mission provided one of its doctors for service in the hospital and medical school. This is as far as cooperation got before the Northern March brought a temporary end and a complete reorganization to Yale-in-China.

<sup>31</sup>Hume to Richard Strong, M.D., July 22, 1915, YCA. Strong was a member of the Medical Advisory Board of Yale-in-China.

<sup>32</sup>For further information about various attempts at cooperation, see the following relevant folders in the Yale-in-China Archives: Cornell Cooperation, 1919-21; Brown in China, 1921; Tech-Harvard Cooperation, 1920-23. Hume visited Stanford and the University of California on his way back to China in 1921. The interested reader will have to hunt down these references on his own as the author cannot vouch for their location in the reorganized YCA.

<sup>33</sup>Edward Moore to Hume, March, 25, 1921, YCA.

<sup>34</sup>Hume to Gage and Yen, January 20, 1923, YCA.

<sup>35</sup>Cf. Part II at note 133.

<sup>36</sup>China Educational Commission, Christian Education in China, p. 8.

<sup>37</sup>The Trustees were to have good reason to feel that the Commission had bitten the hand that fed it.

<sup>38</sup>China Educational Commission, op. cit., p. 4.

<sup>39</sup>Hume to Yen, February 25, 1922, YCA.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>China Educational Commission, op. cit., p. 191.



<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

<sup>45</sup>Hume to Yen, February 25, 1922, YCA.

<sup>46</sup>E. D. Burton to Hume, January 26, 1922, quoted in part in "The Yale in China Situation in Light of the Report of the China Educational Commission 1922," YCA.

<sup>47</sup>Hume to Yen, February 25, 1922, YCA.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Barry C. Smith, "Hunan Yale College of Medicine: Interview with Professor Williams, Dr. Dayton, Mr. Bevis and Miss Dowd, January 6, 1925," January 7, 1925, CFA. D. H. Leavens, 'Report of Governing Board of Yale Mission on "The Attitude of the Trustees towards the Recommendations of the China Educational Commission," pp. 14-16, quoted in Holden, Yale-in-China: The Mainland, p. 135.

<sup>50</sup>Holden, op. cit., p. 135.

<sup>51</sup>Hume to Yen, March 2, 1922, YCA.



PART VI

STANDARDS, FINANCES, AND THE FOUNDATIONS III

THE SECOND HSIANG-YA AGREEMENT

THE DAYTON REPORT





## PART VI

### STANDARDS, FINANCES, AND THE FOUNDATIONS III

#### THE SECOND HSIANG-YA AGREEMENT

#### THE DAYTON REPORT

In the last years of searching for sources of money before the institution of Yale-in-China was toppled by revolution, Hume and the Trustees investigated many possible leads. The problem which underlay the necessity for constant fund-raising was the lack of any endowment; almost every cent went to operating expenses and, after 1915, there was an increasing burden of debt-maintenance. There was nothing for the Yale Foreign Missionary Society to fall back on in case Yale-in-China's yearly contributors should happen to feel poor. Not having an endowment imparted a sort of seriousness and desperation to financial matters: budgets had to be met, funds had to be raised, and no stone was left unturned.

In late 1920 the Y. F. M. S. received a gift of \$5,000 to underwrite the salary of a field secretary.<sup>1</sup> This money was used to hire the Rev. George W. Judson, '84 of the First Parish Congregational Church of Saco, Conn. Judson accepted the position, betraying a rather fundamental misunderstanding (soon corrected, however) of the relationship between the Yale Mission and Yale University; this misconception was one which he himself



would work to correct as he canvassed the alumni. On November 12, 1922, Judson tendered his resignation to his congregation by stating that "[w]ithout application on my part and wholly unsought or thought of I have been offered by Yale University [sic], my Alma Mater, the position of Field Secretary of her 'Yale-in-China' work . . . ." <sup>2</sup> As Judson assumed his door-to-door canvass among Yale graduates in New England, he was to find that a number of them thought that the Yale Mission was supported--or ought to be--by the University itself. He reported that:

[s]ome think that the Alumni Fund gives an appropriation to Yali. Others feel that it should or that the corporation of Yale should finance Yali. They cannot see why Yale in China should be listed in the Triennial Catalogue and not be supported directly by Yale. <sup>3</sup>

Others were unable to respond because of other calls,

especially local for churches, YMCA, Salvation Army, Hospitals, Community Chests, etc. One half of refusals based on this reason. . . . A proportion far larger than you would think feel themselves absolutely unable to respond to your appeal. Examples given are lawyers, unestablished physicians, and ministers. . . . A very small proportion of Yale Grads. in my opinion are utterly callous, selfish and brutal in response to our appeal. I would not dare give the names of some who--wealthy and prosperous--have said, "We don't give a ----" for Yale in China. <sup>4</sup>

Although Judson could easily explain the relation of the Yale Mission to Yale University,



it was somewhat harder for him to deal with the change in attitude towards mission work that the alumni body had undergone since Yale-in-China had come into being.

[There are r]efusals [to give] based on disinclination to give to or approve educational or Mission expenditures in Foreign fields. It is enough to support such work at home. . . . A considerable number object to helping the Chinese to help themselves. To help them to knowledge and skill in Industry, Science, is to strengthen those who are our natural foes and will ultimately use their knowledge and power in the coming contest of Oriental and Occidental civilizations. If these objectors had their say we would get out of China, bag and baggage, Colleges, Schools, Missions and Traders and all the rest.<sup>5</sup>

Some potential contributors felt that "Yali's work can never make a dent on China's life."<sup>6</sup> While it was certainly possible to solicit funds from Yale graduates for Yale-in-China, Judson found that F. Wells Williams's "any Yale man" no longer existed.<sup>7</sup> Through Judson's person-to-person, grass roots approach to the Society's fund-raising--as opposed to solicitation at Yale Clubs and alumni dinners--the Trustees became aware of objections made to the very conception of its work "for China" and had to take account of its own growth and development in response to changing times.<sup>8</sup> Judson's work made concrete the limitations on alumni support, whether for Yali or Hsiang-Ya, which the Trustees would have to work around.



Other methods of raising money were contemplated. The Society bought Liberty Bonds, French Government Bonds, and United Illuminating Company stock, hunted wills, and courted codicils.<sup>9</sup> An appeal to the Inter-church World Movement was denied; Yale-in-China was an independent agency not organically related to any church. Brownell Gage filled out a campaign survey form for the movement indicating not only that Hunan was providing \$50,000 per year for Hsiang-Ya but also that in Hunan there was "[o]penhearted hospitality to Western education, medicine, and the Gospel."<sup>10</sup> This might be called obfuscation in the search for funds; this practice will be seen again.

In a dramatic effort at increasing income, the Trustees hired the New York firm of Tamblyn and Brown to "handle publicity and direct money-raising activities" from late summer, 1923, until Yale University commencement, 1924."<sup>11</sup> The goal of the campaign was to raise \$110,000. Tamblyn and Brown worked exclusively behind the scene, advising the most effective way to derive maximum income from the available sources. For a part of this campaign Hume was in the United States working for the Society. The goal of \$110,000 was not reached but almost \$90,000 was secured, of which \$16,000 was in the form of special gifts; thus \$74,000 was left





as the total of repeatable contributions.<sup>12</sup> Campaign charges cost the Society \$12,000. Although Tambllyn and Brown brought to the Society a total of 1319 new subscribers, Hume felt that "we cannot expect to dispense with the active guidance and experienced cooperation given by Tambllyn and Brown and reap the same harvest without them."<sup>13</sup> Yale-in-China had reached the "point of saturation."<sup>14</sup> "Present methods," wrote Hume, "will bring us a total of not over \$75,000 as an upper limit, year by year."<sup>15</sup> The budget for the year, though, was "well over the figure the Yale family will contribute without allowing a dollar for growth."<sup>16</sup>

In February, 1924, the Trustees had killed again any plans for union work.<sup>17</sup> Hume knew, though, that "[l]imited resources compel limited work and do not permit including middle school, junior college, senior college, and also a share in hospital work."<sup>18</sup> But the Trustees thought otherwise; in a grand gesture of passivity they voted that the mission "report if anything develops [in the way of union movements]."<sup>19</sup> They did not, to Hume's regret, "vote instructions bidding us seek the most effective method of cooperation."<sup>20</sup> In an era when Christian educators had seen the need to "consolidate their positions" in an attempt to meet the challenge of burgeoning secular Chinese educational



movements; the Trustees chose to punt.<sup>21</sup> Both Yali and Hsiang-Ya would get along but neither could "take the place of leadership it ought to take."<sup>22</sup>

Hume was absent from Changsha from December, 1923, until September, 1924. During his absence the first Hsiang-Ya Agreement expired. Prior to Hume's return to China, Yen began working to renegotiate the contract. By June 5, 1924, shortly before expiration took place, Yen could report that progress had been made and that both the Peking and Changsha governments had approved the renewal. Most importantly, Yen had secured a promise from Peking to contribute \$30,000 a year to Hsiang-Ya from the national treasury. He realized obtaining funds from the central government might prove as elusive as obtaining funds from Hunan and, for security, wanted the central government to designate a portion of the national customs revenue for Hsiang-Ya, in the same manner that Hunan had designated a portion of the provincial salt revenue for the medical school.<sup>23</sup>

The Trustees were reluctant to think about negotiating a second agreement for the period 1924-1934 when it was unclear whether the China Medical Board and the Commonwealth Fund would renew their grants after 1925. The China Medical Board again, however, showed its interest in Hsiang-Ya by responding to an appeal for



emergency funding while negotiations were in progress and appropriated \$40,000 silver for the year 1924-1925.<sup>24</sup> The situation regarding continuation of Commonwealth Fund grants was more precarious.

During the winter of 1924-25 the Commonwealth Fund, in consultation with the China Medical Board and the Yale Foreign Missionary Society, reviewed its involvement with Hunan-Yale. Roger Greene, writing to Barry Smith, Yale '99, Director of the Fund, indicated that the C. M. B. would discontinue its involvement with Hsiang-Ya unless the Chinese agreed to increase their share in the support of the institution.<sup>25</sup> Standards were not an issue for the C. M. B.; Greene praised the "excellent work" Hsiang-Ya had done and cited favorable outside opinion about the institution.<sup>26</sup> In reviewing the Fund's involvement with Hunan-Yale, Smith requested from Palmer Bevis, Executive Secretary of the Y. F. M. S., a copy of the proposed new Hsiang-Ya Agreement and other materials which might be relevant to renewal of Commonwealth Fund grants. In his reply to Smith, Bevis included a draft of the agreement, the latest treasurer's report, and some Yale-in-China internal correspondence, all of which worked to create a most prejudicial effect on the Fund's future actions with regard to Hsiang-Ya.<sup>27</sup> After sizing up the material, Smith wrote to Edward S.



Harkness that:

[e]ither the Board of Trustees of Yale-in-China have been attacked by a most unusual epidemic of frankness or they are completely out of sympathy with . . . Dr. Hume or the new executive secretary in New Haven, Mr. Bevis, is possessed of more enthusiasm than judgment.<sup>28</sup>

Bevis's indiscretion and later conferences between Smith and members of the Board of Trustees revealed much that the Y. F. M. S. would have preferred to hide.

Although the new agreement would nominally turn control over to the Chinese, Smith found that "Chinese control of the institution is desired not because of its merit, but because it is the only way to keep the institution alive."<sup>29</sup> He was frankly irked that Hume emphasized that control of Hsiang-Ya was to be yielded to the Chinese when in actuality the Yale Mission would have a great deal of indirect influence through provision of a number of salaries and through the proposed medical school-hospital liaison committee.<sup>30</sup> "[I]n form the control is Chinese, in actuality it is American."<sup>31</sup> Smith thought that there was a good deal of wavering within the Y. F. M. S. with regard to this matter and pointed a finger at the China Medical Board:

Unfortunately, the China Medical Board has brought a good deal of pressure to bear to get this policy carried out at an early date and to secure a greater degree of Chinese support.<sup>32</sup>

Correspondence which the Fund received from a number of





physicians at Hsiang-Ya only tended to indicate long-term involvement with Yale-in-China as the attempt was made to integrate the Chinese into full control:

[U]nder the present political conditions . . . the possibility of fulfillment of the plan of the new Agreement is doubtful, and . . . the possibility of a purely Chinese Medical School is more than ten years distant.<sup>33</sup>

For the Commonwealth Fund, conditions in China and the poor long-term outlook for Hunan--attested to by none other than Hume himself--could only indicate a bottomless sink for money which might bear greater fruit elsewhere.<sup>34</sup>

Smith was especially disturbed by the fact that under the proposed new agreement the Hunan-Yale Educational Association was "to furnish \$80,000 [silver] a year increasing to \$140,000 in 1929 and \$200,000 in 1934."<sup>35</sup> "It is perfectly clear that this agreement will not be lived up to," Smith commented, and that Hume "hopes to get the [Yale-in-China] board of Trustees and the Commonwealth Fund so involved in the continuance of the Medical College that they will be unable to get out and will have to carry it."<sup>36</sup> In trying to secure continued Fund support, Hume had written to Smith in the fall of 1924 about the constancy of the Chinese. Hume's bold and outrageous claim that the Hunanese had paid \$50,000 silver per year for the first five years of the contract period did not impress Barry Smith.<sup>37</sup> It was statements



such as Hume's and the inconsistency with which plans were formulated that moved the Commonwealth Fund to suspend support. Smith wanted nothing to do with an institution "which has no sound fiscal policy" and sharply criticized Hume:<sup>38</sup>

The attempt is frankly to secure support from the Yale alumni and from the Commonwealth Fund on the basis of promised Chinese support which Dr. Hume knows perfectly well will not be forthcoming. It would seem to me that if it is desirable to maintain this College, we might as well face the fact frankly that a much greater degree of American support will be necessary for many years and not try to kid ourselves that Chinese support will be forthcoming and then either be in the position of having to put up a good deal more than the agreement contemplates, or else see a distinctly second-rate institution operated.<sup>39</sup>

Smith understood that the real problem facing Yale-in-China was the fact that enthusiasm for retaining an interest in medical work tended to override financial considerations. He felt that the Board of Trustees of Yale-in-China was "so desirous of continuing a piece of work desirable in itself, that they are unable to face the real facts in the situation."<sup>40</sup>

The most disturbing matter to arise from the material Bevis sent to Smith lay in the treasurer's report, where it was revealed that the Y. F. M. S. had misused Commonwealth Fund grants. On June 26, 1920, the Fund's Board of Directors had voted that:

\$30,000 be appropriated to Yale-in-China for the express purpose of extending the work of



the medical school, that no portion of this amount be used for any items of the present budget and that a similar appropriation, upon the same condition, be made for each of the four succeeding years.<sup>41</sup>

The Y. F. M. S. had, however, adhered neither to the letter nor to the intent of the Fund's vote. Although the \$150,000 grant was designated entirely for the extension of the medical school, by the 1922-23 fiscal year the money was being used to support not only the medical school but also the hospital, the nursing schools, the pre-medical work and, last but not least, the home administration of Yale-in-China.<sup>42</sup> Hospital costs included salaries for administrative officers and upkeep. Hume rationalized by saying that:

[w]hile it might seem somewhat strange to appoint nurses when the grant was made for the extension of the medical school, it is reasonable to say that our medical and surgical wards would not be up to standard without efficient nursing supervision. And that, therefore, the employment of nurses under this fund is a reasonable thing and does help in extending medical education.<sup>43</sup>

The Trustees argued with Smith that the hospital, medical school, and nursing schools were inextricably bound up with one another; doctors on the hospital staff served as members of the medical school faculty and vice versa. Also, the Commonwealth Fund had allowed a small percentage of its grants to be used for administrative costs in the medical school.<sup>44</sup> Smith felt that there had been a "good deal of high financing" using Commonwealth



Fund money and finally got A. P. Stokes, A. B. Dayton, and Ledyard Cogswell, all Trustees, to admit that "on strict interpretation there was no justification for the expending of funds for the school of nursing or for administrative expenses of the hospital."<sup>45</sup> Although Commonwealth Fund money did not come directly from Edward S. Harkness, it is highly likely that Harkness would have especially objected to the manner in which the violation in use of the Fund's grant had occurred. When he donated the hospital to the Yale Mission, he had stated quite simply, "[the hospital] is to be a project for whose current upkeep I am not to be approached."<sup>46</sup> Abuses in expending the Commonwealth Fund grant can be taken to be abuses of Harkness' beneficence but Harkness was a tolerant man, as will soon be pointed out.

On March 30, 1925, the Y. F. M. S. again applied to the Commonwealth Fund for an appropriation. The Trustees of Yale-in-China asked for \$40,000 silver for one year for salaries, allowances and travelling expenses of doctors on the present staff.<sup>47</sup> In preparing the application, Bevis very disingenuously sent Smith a vague formulation of how the grant would be used even though the Y. F. M. S. had been instructed that in making any subsequent request it be specific in designating the departments in which it was proposed to use Commonwealth





Fund money, the exact amount requested for each department, and whether or not flexibility in using the grant would be desired.<sup>48</sup> Although Smith had promised the Trustees a "sympathetic interpretation" to any appeal for future grants, he realized that the Commonwealth Fund would, in approving the application, be embarking upon at least a ten- or fifteen-year undertaking and that "something has been undertaken in Hunan which Yale can scarcely see through to a finish without very generous and continued outside assistance."<sup>49</sup> It was the Fund's "definite policy" not to continue appropriations to the current budget of any organization indefinitely.<sup>50</sup> After careful study of the situation, Smith stated his recommendations to the Board of Directors:

But for one fact, the Director from his study of the situation would recommend that the appeal be passed without appropriation. He hesitates to take this position because of the very evident feeling on the part of the China Medical Board that the institution is worth continuing. It therefore seems to the Director that the soundest policy is to grant the assistance asked in the present crisis but to inform the trustees that no further support will be given. Such action will insure the continuance of the institution for a year which will give ample time to the board of trustees to secure other and more permanent sources of support.<sup>51</sup>

The Fund would thus pay Hunan-Yale severance for one year and then completely withdraw further aid. On April 22, 1925, the Fund's Board of Directors voted \$22,850 gold (= approximately \$40,000 silver) to Yale-in-China for



one year to allow Hsiang-Ya to continue during renegotiation of the agreement and cancelled, at the request of the Y. F. M. S., the \$25,000 gold appropriation for the out-patient block which the Chinese had not been able to match.<sup>52</sup> In a move which shows the strength of feeling that Hunan-Yale had generated in New York, the Board of Directors voted that "the board of trustees [of Yale-in-China] be notified that the Commonwealth Fund is not prepared to consider further appropriations."<sup>53</sup>

But the Y. F. M. S. was not to be outdone. After the Fund put Hunan-Yale into its future "turndown" pile, the Trustees applied directly to Harkness himself. They persuaded him to provide \$15,000 in 1926 and \$10,000 in 1927 for the support of the hospital. Harkness essentially gave this money on terms that he not be bothered again and applied the condition that his contributions were available if "remaining amounts of the budget were raised and on the future condition that his contributions were to cease after the second year."<sup>54</sup> Thus Harkness extricated himself from Yale-in-China, just as the Fund had done, by promising one final, last contribution to end it all.

Although Commonwealth Fund money dried up in 1926, there was, however, by the time of the renewal of the Hsiang-Ya Agreement a new source of financial aid on the horizon--the China Foundation for Education and



Culture.

At the Washington Conference of 1921-22, the United States had declared its intention to remit its portion of the Boxer Indemnity, paid by the Chinese in partial reparation for damages incurred by western nations during the Boxer Rebellion. These funds, which had long been used to provide scholarships for Chinese studying in the United States, would be made available for use in education and cultural matters. Although Hume was very enthusiastic about getting these funds for Hsiang-Ya, he felt at the same time that it might be "exceedingly risky for the representatives of Christian colleges in China to receive indemnity money."<sup>55</sup> U. S. action to remit the indemnity resulted in the establishment of the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture, to which Hsiang-Ya would apply under the second Hsiang-Ya Agreement. A number of eminent men sat on the board of the China Foundation: Chao Yuen-ren, Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei, Sao-ke Alfred Sze, and a great friend of Hsiang-Ya, Roger Sherman Greene, who promised the Yale Mission, even before the first meeting of the foundation's directors, that the China Foundation would look favorably on Hsiang-Ya's application.<sup>56</sup>

With the promise of money from the China Foundation and continued interest on the part of the China



Medical Board, the Yale Mission went ahead with plans to renew the cooperative agreement. The final contract, arrived at after protracted negotiation, was a strangely optimistic document whose authors and signers seem not to have taken into account the difficulties that had arisen during the first ten years of Hunan-Yale cooperation.

In the second Hsiang-Ya Agreement a number of important changes in administration were made. The medical college and post-graduate department were put entirely under a Chinese board. Although he had looked forward to the day when the Chinese would assume the work, it was hard for Hume to face Chinese control at the time in question. He wrote to F. Wells Williams that "[I am] somewhat concerned when I think of turning over the Medical College to a Chinese board of directors."<sup>57</sup>

"It is only because F. C. Yen is sure to be head of that institution for years to come that I feel impelled to give in to the new plan for medical education."<sup>58</sup> Despite the transfer of administrative power, financial control would continue to be derived largely from foreign sources. Hume commented on the situation to Stokes:

The Chinese will find it hard, for a very long time, to carry the burden of the great plants and of the heavy overload which we have brought into being. But it is because we propose to trust them that they will grow in interest, in financial independence, in ultimate power to administer well and to guide with wisdom.<sup>59</sup>

Turning over the medical school was, in Hume's opinion,





premature; Yale-in-China's tutelage of the Chinese was incomplete. Just as the goals of the medical work lay in introducing the principles, standards, and methods of modern medical education and in training a reasonable number of leaders among the Chinese to carry on the work with a spirit of humanitarianism and public-mindedness, so one of the goals of the cooperation lay in tutoring the Chinese in the administration of a modern medical school. That this tutelage had a tendency to become patronizing is borne out by A. B. Dayton's account of a meeting of the Hsiang-Ya Board:

The meetings of the Hsiang-Ya Board were most interesting affairs. Faithfully the three or four Chinese members would meet with the Mission members around Dr. Yen's table and discuss the problems of support and administration. Undoubtedly it has seemed a waste of time to argue about a certain point when it could have been settled by an arrangement in which the Chinese were not consulted. But if there is anything that is building for the permanency of Yale in China it is not so much brick and stone walls as it is the spirit of cooperation with the Chinese and the gradual inculcation in them of public-spiritedness in the sense of public responsibility.<sup>60</sup>

Attitudes reminiscent of that of Amos Wilder several years before must have been in the Trustees' minds as they contemplated the new Hsiang-Ya Agreement:

[I]t is well that there are Trustees in U. S. A. to check the tendency to turn things over to the Orientals to run; to avoid a struggle becoming a landslide. Thirty years hence we will talk of letting the Chinese run Yali, but for the present we have a stiff task that only positive Americans can under-take.<sup>61</sup>



On the one hand there was an uncompleted tutelage; on the other, a program of medical education which current resources could hardly sustain.

While eventual Chinese control of Hsiang-Ya had always been in the Trustees' long-term plan, the Board must have appreciated the opportunity, tutelage completed or not, that renewal of the agreement presented for them to begin to relieve themselves of the onus of medical education. Yet, the matter is not so simply put for there was Yali to consider. Before the agreement was signed, Edwin Harvey, Secretary of the Yale Mission, wrote to Williams that:

[w]e here hope that ways and means may be found for continuing the [medical] school. Its discontinuance would be a severe blow to the prestige and influence of Yali proper.<sup>62</sup>

Yen pointed out the profound differences that existed between the Hunanese appreciation of Yali and Hsiang-Ya. The Chinese saw Yali as "entirely foreign in spirit and control."<sup>63</sup> The medical college was "the one unit of our work which has bridged the gap between Americans and Chinese in the educational field here."<sup>64</sup> Though the standards of Johns Hopkins had not been attained, still, the Hsiang-Ya Medical School was a valued institution in Hunan and the Trustees had to take into account the effect that discontinuing the school would have on the Academic Department, one of whose attractions was the premedical



course it offered.

In revising the Hsiang-Ya Agreement, the Mission put in several escape clauses. Either party might withdraw from the agreement after giving one year's notice if "the educational standards of the Medical College are shown to be endangered by continued reduction in staff or resources."<sup>65</sup> The Mission might also withdraw if it became possible for the Educational Association to "secure a competent Chinese faculty and the assurance of funds sufficient for the independent maintenance of a Medical College of Grade A."<sup>66</sup>

In matters of teaching the Educational Association agreed to appoint to its faculty "such medical teachers as are approved by the Joint Administrative Committee [a liaison group, cf. above at note 30] whether their salaries are provided by the H. Y. E. A. or the Y. M."<sup>67</sup> For its part the Mission placed its clinical staff "at the disposal of the Medical College as teachers of clinical subjects."<sup>68</sup> All teachers engaged would be individuals of "strong moral character."<sup>69</sup>

As in the earlier agreement, the Mission strongly desired to guard its own property and equipment.<sup>70</sup>

The most disquieting aspect of the second Hsiang-Ya Agreement is the enormous load the Hunanese agreed to take. It was both to avoid losing face and C. M. B.



support that the Educational Association decided to agree to such unrealistic increases in its fiscal responsibility as it prepared to take over a medical college with the pretensions of Hsiang-Ya. In essence the Educational Association contracted to assume "all the expenses of the Medical College and its Postgraduate Department, including salaries of staff, scientific equipment, maintenance of plant, and endowment funds."<sup>71</sup> From "all possible sources," the Association agreed to contribute \$80,000 silver in 1924 (retroactively), to increase this to \$115,000 in 1929, and to \$150,000 annually by 1934.<sup>72</sup> Of these amounts \$30,000 silver per year would come from the Peking government, although the central government was not to be a signatory to the agreement and thus not legally bound to honor the agreement. In addition the Association undertook the liability of making good on unfulfilled financial obligations incurred under the terms of the 1914 agreement.<sup>73</sup> (See Appendix II for organizational structure under terms of the second agreement.)

The negotiations did not proceed without discord. Several Chinese doctors who had studied medicine in Japan waged an extensive campaign of opposition, enlisting the Medical and Pharmaceutical Association of Hunan and a number of other public organizations in an attempt to





foil renewal and get the government subsidy for their own schemes.<sup>74</sup> But the agreement had the reluctant consent of Governor Chao Heng-t'i and would be passed by the provincial assembly. Yen considered that anti-Hsiang-Ya public opinion created by Hsiang-Ya's opponents would take considerable effort to rectify.<sup>75</sup>

Things were not completely placid between the Yale Mission and the Hunan gentry for there were problems over a few items in the agreement. For instance, the Chinese wanted full control of the medical college but insisted that their share in the finances be "at most" \$80,000 silver per year and that the Mission's be "at least" \$100,000 silver.<sup>76</sup> This tactic was a face-saving device, given the depleted state of the provincial treasury. Also, the Chinese felt that too many "down river" students were enrolled at Hsiang-Ya and that the medical college, as the de facto provincial medical school, should give native students a break.<sup>77</sup> The Governing Board could not agree, though, to the proposed rule whereby 5/8's of the student body would come from Hunan.

The Yale Mission committed itself to the enterprise for \$50,000 gold per year of which \$40,000 would pay for salaries of hospital and nursing staff as well as maintenance on the hospital and schools of nursing;



\$10,000 would be contributed annually for the salaries of professors in the medical college.<sup>78</sup> This amount was fully two-thirds of the "saturation point" total that Hume projected the Yale Mission would be able to raise yearly from contributions in the United States.

When Hume returned to China in August, 1924, he held a "clear statement from the Trustees that they would have to make the Arts College their main unit, centering upon it alone if it should become necessary to choose between Arts and Medicine."<sup>79</sup> He was "agreeably surprised to find the way in which, apparently, the difficulties had been swept away and the path opened for signing a new Hunan-Yale agreement with the Yuchun Association."<sup>80</sup> Despite his earlier feelings, Hume, called from India to this work in 1905, could not bear to abandon the fruit of so many years of work and urged approval of the new agreement:

The trustees will appreciate my deep desire that the Medical College should be saved. It means too much to be dropped. It is the one institution in China, under Western influence, that has a higher rating than any other medical college in China under Chinese government registration. It gives us a real Christian opportunity that is not lost by the new plan. It makes a sound use of the fine hospital. I hope the trustees will express their approval promptly.<sup>81</sup>

To Yen, renewal of the Hsiang-Ya Agreement meant the continuation of a valuable experiment and he pushed for at least a five-year extension of the contract "to fully



test out the possibilities we have in mind."<sup>82</sup>

Despite Hume's inability to contemplate actually forsaking his twenty-odd years of work in China, he realized, after returning to Changsha in 1924 and examining conditions in China, that "the situation was far more unstable and ominous of evil than I was told [before I sailed]."<sup>83</sup> Shortly before the second agreement was signed, Hume wrote to Williams:

I got back from Peking this afternoon, after passing through Honan, filled with troops, some victorious, others defeated and wondering just how and where to begin their career as bandits. In other places trains were being filled with new recruits and shipped off to the front somewhere. It was not encouraging.<sup>84</sup>

Indeed it was not. The situation in Hunan was in no way conducive to the Yale Mission's entering into another agreement with the Hunan gentry. Excerpts from a consular report filed in March, 1924, will illustrate the gravity of the political, economic, and military situation in Hunan on the eve of the signing of the second Hsiang-Ya Agreement.

HUNAN is an autonomous province functioning with a provincial constitution and is nominally independent of the Central Government [in Peking] . . .

Organization of the Provincial Government:

If military politics and the general corrupt official practices which prevail could be discounted, it might very reasonably be asserted that Hunan possesses a progressive and praiseworthy governmental system. The constitution promulgated January 1, 1922, was the first



provincial constitution in China, and was modeled after the California State Constitution. . . . Unfortunately it has little practical value, and does not prevent innumerable malpractices of the most disgraceful character. Its provisions are openly and constantly violated, especially in the matter of misappropriation of taxes and in the elections which are ludicrous farces. So it is that actually the province functions at the dictates of the military who wield power over both the higher officials, and the local officials in the districts under their control. The Governor derives his power and maintains it purely in accordance with his success in receiving the support of his generals. . . .

Much of the otherwise possible value of the provincial assembly is destroyed by the constant military disturbances which often prevent its members from attending sessions, and by the continual intrigue which divides the province into at least two factions with the result that many members are persona non grata at Changsha. . . . Its extreme jealousy of its rights and its frequent childish squabbling over minor technical prerogatives which it considers above criticism from other officials consume most of its energy.

Finance: With reference to finances, the government remains in its usual state of near insolvency and, next to maintaining itself in control of the province, finds financial problems the most difficult of any. The enormous sums consumed in military operations and allocated or misappropriated for the support of armies are mainly responsible for this present, past and probably future stringency, together with the always prevalent corruption in the handling of government funds in all branches of the provincial administration. Educational activities . . . and the overtaxed poor are generally the chief sufferers. A definite portion of the government's income is allocated by the constitution for education, but is largely diverted to other uses. . . .

#### Military Disturbances and Brigandage:

Military disturbances in Hunan are of such a continual character as to be a constant menace to personal security, business, agriculture, industry and both the private pursuits of the





people and the functions of the provincial government generally. This situation has existed since the institution of the Republic and there are no evidences of a possible alleviation until complete unification of the North and South is accomplished. . . .

During September, October and November, 1923, practically all trade in the province was brought to a standstill and industry and agriculture suffered in almost equal amounts. The inhabitants were the victims of a series of exorbitant military taxes at the hands of each faction in turn, in addition to suffering the usual abuses of pillage, rape and fire. In general, military disturbances appear to institute a vicious circle of taxation, consuming all available funds so that further requisitions are necessary for attempts at rehabilitation.

A very noticeable increase in bandit activities invariably follows the quarrels of the military, due principally to a generally loosening of the bonds of order, desertions of soldiers and the press of poverty upon a people who are often forced to outlawry in order to keep alive. . . .

This condition on a lesser scale is common even in times of so-called peace for a number of reasons. For one, the provincial armies are rarely ever employed for the suppression of bandits . . . due to the fact that the various troop contingents are the political tools of their commanders rather than government forces. Their leaders are reluctant to expose them to the rigors of guerrilla warfare with bandits and consequently strive to conserve them for factional disputes. . . .85

Given the situation in Vice Consul Meinhardt's report, where would government funds come from to finance a second Hsiang-Ya Agreement? Was there any guarantee that the hospital would not be destroyed at a moment's notice? Where might friends in high places be secured?

Hume was without question depressed about the implications of the continuing convulsion of Chinese



society for Yale-in-China and for his own career. In a letter to A. B. Dayton, which eventually found its way to Barry Smith's desk, one of the doctors at Hsiang-Ya described the change that took place in Hume after he returned to China:

[N]othing has happened since last Fall when we sent home the new draft that is half so significant as the change in attitude which has come over Dr. Hume. You know his natural hopeful and stimulating attitude toward the work and its future. I wonder if it would startle you too if you talked with him now and found him painting the future of the medical enterprise in the blackest terms possible, surely blacker than they could be if the worst turns out instead of the best, and with discouragement in every attitude and phrase. . . . My conversations with Dr. Hume himself brought me no new information excepting that he had changed his viewpoint as completely as if he had faced absolutely about. . . .

I say this because I feel that in your interpretations of the situation here you ought to know this most significant of all events. This is the same man who started this medical work and who has kept us all buoyed up these years, the same who voted for--or rather supported--the new Agreement as sent home last Fall. Anyone else who held less of our confidence and trust would be ridiculed for his position. We have to regard Dr. Hume now very seriously and still continue to wonder what in the world has happened.<sup>86</sup>

What had happened was that Hume now saw the spectre of a wasted twenty years looming before him. There was no bucking the tide of warlordism. As A. B. Dayton reported (cf. below), Hume tended to lose himself in his work during this period, probably in an effort to fight the depths of his depression. It was hard to face the



fact that his vision of himself as father of a Johns Hopkins of China was coming apart. Warlordism did not abet the fulfillment of his career.

Even in the face of failing leadership in the field, the Trustees refused to give up medical work. Yet the facts remained that the Hunanese could not suddenly increase their contribution from \$30,000 silver a year (which was \$20,000 below the contracted obligation) to \$80,000 a year, even if Peking's contribution could be obtained with regularity.<sup>87</sup> Financial problems notwithstanding, the "quality of members available for a Chinese board [of managers for the hospital and medical school]" was called into question.<sup>88</sup> Hume, speaking not for himself, wrote to the Trustees that if "in spite of these issues, the trustees feel impelled to approach the foundations for the funds . . . the Governing Board will be pleased . . ."<sup>89</sup> For reasons which were probably his own, (cf. above at note 15) Hume added, "I could not conscientiously go either to Barry Smith or to Harkness with the request."<sup>90</sup>

On May 8, 1925, Hume signed the second Hsiang-Ya Agreement for the Trustees, reserving, as he had been instructed, the right, "if circumstances make it necessary, to withdraw from the agreement at the expiry of two years, namely, on June 30<sup>th</sup>, 1926."<sup>91</sup>



The second Hsiang-Ya Agreement was a contract made to be broken. At the time of the signing, neither side could provide the finances for it. The Yale Mission and the Trustees were aware enough of the situation, which had been endlessly discussed from 1913 on. The Hunanese realized their own inability to pay.<sup>92</sup> The China Medical Board could and would pay, however, and appropriated \$40,000 silver for Hsiang-Ya during 1925-1926 and pledged \$13,806 to the Yale Mission to aid the pre-medical work.<sup>93</sup> After the agreement was signed, the C. M. B. directed its funds to the Hsiang-Ya Board of Managers rather than to the Yale Foreign Missionary Society. This meant, of course, that the Y. F. M. S. would have to raise its funds for Hsiang-Ya from other sources. The China Medical Board felt that in giving funds to Hsiang-Ya it was not giving to a losing cause. With one of the best medical schools in the world for its constant comparison, the Board could say of Hsiang-Ya that:

creditable results can be obtained with a small teaching staff and limited resources when classes are also small and practically all the energies of the faculty are devoted to their teaching or to clinical work in the school hospital.<sup>94</sup>

Hsiang-Ya graduates were providing good service in mission hospitals and in graduate work in the United States. At Peking Union there was a resident in medicine from





Hsiang-Ya who was in charge of Chinese and foreign interns.<sup>95</sup> In fact, in 1926, there were more Hsiang-Ya graduates doing work at Peking Union than there were at Hsiang-Ya.<sup>96</sup> "Their records have been good and their spirit has been one of service to the community rather than of personal gain."<sup>97</sup> Despite its shortcomings, Hsiang-Ya had produced results that even the Rockefeller Foundation could applaud.

The signing of the second Hsiang-Ya Agreement hardly laid to rest any doubts about continuation. In August, 1925, the Trustees sent one of their own, Arthur Bliss Dayton, M.D., along with the Executive Secretary, Palmer Bevis, to study the situation in Changsha. In November, Dayton, who had worked at Hsiang-Ya as superintendent of the hospital in 1922-1923, presented his findings in a long and detailed report.<sup>98</sup>

Dayton's plan was one which Hume would undoubtedly have characterized as an attempt to determine "how we can guard the thing we have in the place where it is now."<sup>99</sup> Dayton called for a definite commitment to medical work and elimination of the middle school, the funds released being applied to the College of Arts and Sciences. Yali, like Hsiang-Ya, would come under Chinese control and have a Chinese president. Using \$55,000 gold as the amount of money the Y. F. M. S. could reasonably expect from



annual contributions--as opposed to Hume's estimate of \$75,000--Dayton projected that the Society would need to raise \$32,500 gold in new money to finance his \$87,500 per year scheme. Of this total the medical work would cost \$40,000 per year.<sup>100</sup>

Hume's plan, worked out in conjunction with Roger Greene, was presented to the Trustees at the same time as Dayton's. Hume, beset with doubts about continuation of the medical school, had made an about-face. It was his last chance to save the work of twenty years. Realizing the inadequacies of the second Hsiang-Ya Agreement, Hume now wanted to eliminate the College of Arts and Sciences except for science courses and some instruction in Chinese, English, and history, which would be given in a pre-medical school, in order to turn greater attention to the medical school. The middle school would be turned over to the Chinese with an annual subsidy of \$10,000 gold, which would be given for a limited period of time. If the Trustees wished to cooperate in arts work, then several faculty members might be contributed to Yenching University.<sup>101</sup> Registered with the government, Hsiang-Ya was thought of by the Chinese as their own; it was far and away more important as a point of contact with the Chinese than Yali, which was viewed as a foreign institution.<sup>102</sup> Hume had not come from India



to preside over a college of arts and sciences, as he now made clear in his proposed plan. Although Hume had good reasons of his own for his change of venue, he was also influenced by remarks made at earlier dates by Roger Greene and W. J. Hail.

In 1923, Greene had expressed his attitude towards college work at Changsha done by Yale-in-China:

I do not see how you can expect to do real senior college work in the sciences, either in Changsha or in Wuchang, with the present staff and equipment. It is my understanding that you do not consider either staff or equipment adequate for the kind of junior college work you want to do. . . ."103

On one occasion Hail had, according to Hume, been remarkably candid in expressing his feelings about the quality of college work Yale-in-China was doing:

Dr. Hail considers academic work 'below the line of shame.' These are strong words and could only be used within the inner circle. They represent a conviction arising not out of any period of tension or any emotional pressure but out of a deep and lasting thought on the problem, that our work must be made better if it is to stand up against the challenges of the new day in China.104

The new day--where it was becoming harder and harder for the increasingly irritating presence of the foreign missionary enterprise in China to give of itself to the Chinese--to the extent it ever had done so--"graciously, helpfully, and acceptably."105

Hume and Greene's plan would necessitate an



increase in yearly receipts of \$10,000 gold. It was a desire to see "one unit of our work done well."<sup>106</sup> As he presented his new plan, Hume must have rued the day he advocated suspending the medical school.<sup>107</sup>

Dayton disapproved of Hume's plan for good reason: "[I]n our country, there is not a single medical school of repute which is not closely linked with a university."<sup>108</sup> He went on to say that maintaining pre-medical work as a sort of junior college endeavor would not attract the high-grade faculty that a junior and senior college could for the simple reason that junior college work could not offer the intellectual attraction of a more complete college course. Dayton pointed out that maintaining a junior college would entail only a little saving over the plan then in effect.<sup>109</sup>

Dayton laid his plan before the Governing Board and all the senior members of the Yale Mission. With the exception of one of the pre-medical teachers, President Hume was the only person who opposed it.<sup>110</sup> By now Hume was an isolated figure within Yale-in-China. In a confidential personnel report to the Trustees, Dayton wrote an extended and extremely critical appraisal of Dr. Hume:

President Hume's report will present his position so that I will not go into that in detail. His policy for Yali is definitely





cooperation in a large center [see above]. In this he stands almost alone. Whether it is because of this difference or because of other administrative difficulties I do not know, but there has developed in varying degrees a distrust and dislike for President Hume which cannot very well go on. Older members of the faculty charge him with suppressing everybody's opinion but his own and, if not with neglecting, at least with failing to help in the local administrative work. The younger members say, among other things, that there is lack of educational supervision and any real local leadership, and that there are too many compromises. They feel that President Hume is brilliant but is always changing his ideas and they have little confidence in him. . . . During my stay he led a pace that few men could survive. Both he and Mrs. Hume say that it is nothing but worry for the institution and that until this is over he cannot take a vacation. At first he insisted that he must go home to put his case in person. He feels that the Trustees have not backed up the President whom they have just chosen, that they lack confidence in him and that my coming out was nothing but a reflection of this. He apparently thought I had come out to accept his resignation. This was brought out by a talk that I had with him after I had been there a few days. It was in the small hours of the morning and bordered on hysteria. At another interview Mrs. Hume showed surprising agitation. She said that Dr. Hume had been repeatedly insulted by the Trustees, and in her agitated state she applied some very unpleasant terms to the Trustees. . . . As to the question of his returning to America, his insistence reached such a point that I feared we would have to tell him that it would probably mean his resignation.

[T]hroughout the organization there are serious difficulties which need wise handling. Instead of confidence in Dr. Hume, the majority feel distrust. I do not see how things can go on this way indefinitely. Several of our older members are seriously considering plans for leaving Yali. I do not think Dr. Hume fully realizes his position.<sup>111</sup>

Dayton considered that the idea of Chinese control of Yali



would give Hume a "graceful excuse" to resign:

On this basis I spoke to him, leaving him every opportunity to proceed along this line voluntarily, as if the idea originated with him. If he does not resign on this basis and if it is decided to keep the whole work at Changsha, then there probably will be a continuation of the difference between Dr. Hume's policies and those of the Trustees. Under these circumstances I think that he should be allowed to plead his own case before resigning. In any case it seems necessary to remove Dr. Hume.<sup>112</sup>

I feel that we the Trustees have made one mistake in appointing President Hume to his position. We cannot make another mistake without disastrous results.<sup>113</sup>

Despite any feeling the Trustees had about Hume, they were now being forced by the Dayton Report and the coming government regulation of private schools to join him and his cosmopolitan thinking even as they rejected his plan for Yali and Hsiang-Ya. Although the Trustees had always been nominally committed to the idea of Chinese control of Yale-in-China, Hume and his willingness to cooperate with the Chinese foreshadowed by almost twenty years the suggestion by Dayton that it was past time to yield the Academic Department. In November, 1925, the issue at hand lay in planning for the institution, but the fruit of years of ideological variance worked to divide the administration of Yale-in-China and forced Hume to reassess his usefulness to the organization. On December 10, 1925, Hume left Changsha, not to return for almost ten years.<sup>114</sup> He was officially to be on furlough



and, in fact, needed a rest. His doctor felt he was headed towards a "general nervous breakdown"; for three years he had been suffering from "low [gastric] acid content" and "persistent post-prandial epigastric discomfort."<sup>115</sup> Hume, his wife, and youngest daughter, as they left Changsha, were escorted to the train by crowds and fireworks. He had at least a Chinese following. Although the Governor of Hunan had ordered a private compartment for the Humes, the train was packed with troops travelling north to fight guerrillas. The Humes ended up having to spread their bedding ignominiously on top of mail sacks in the baggage car as they made their way to Hankow.<sup>116</sup> They travelled back to the States by way of the Near East and Europe, visiting educational institutions along the way. Hume would not officially retire as President of the Colleges of Yale-in-China until mid-1927 and would continue to "advise" the Trustees and raise funds in the United States for the institution during 1926-1927. Yet his work in the field was finished. He would not return to Changsha until 1934--and then in a wholly different capacity.



## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>C. H. Kelsey to Hume, December 30, 1920, Yale-in-China Archives.

<sup>2</sup>"Rev. G. W. Judson to Take Up Yale in China Work," newspaper clipping from Biddeford Daily Journal, n.d., n. pag., YCA.

<sup>3</sup>George W. Judson, "Reasons Why So Many Yale Graduates Will Not Give to Yale in China," July 5, 1924, YCA.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Judson to (?Lauren) Arnold, November 6, 192?, YCA.

<sup>7</sup>See text, Part II, at note 77.

<sup>8</sup>"Yale in China" is the subtitle of the chapter on Edward Hume in Jonathan Spence, The China Helpers: Western Advisers in China, 1620-1960.

<sup>9</sup>"Securities Aug. 31, 1921," YCA; James Bronson Reynolds, "Last Will and Testament," May 9, 1922, YCA.

<sup>10</sup>"Campaign Survey, Interchurch World Movement," completed by Brownell Gage, n.d., YCA. Associated documents would indicate a date of 1919 or 1920.

<sup>11</sup>Vreeland to Board of Trustees, August 30, 1923, YCA.

<sup>12</sup>Hume to Board of Trustees, July 11, 1924, YCA.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.





<sup>17</sup>The Trustees had gone against the recommendations of the Governing Board, Chinese graduates of Yale, and Yali alumni in their decision not to push union work. In December of 1923 Roger Greene had criticized Yale-in-China after a visit to Changsha: "I do not see how you can expect to do real senior college work in the sciences, either in Changsha or in Wuchang, with the present staff and equipment. It is my understanding that you do not consider either staff or equipment adequate for the kind of junior college work you want to do" (Greene to ?Hume, December 6, 1923, quoted in Hume to Board of Trustees, July 11, 1924, YCA).

<sup>18</sup>Hume to Board of Trustees, July 11, 1924, YCA.

<sup>19</sup>Hume to F. Wells Williams, July 21, 1924, YCA.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Hume to Board of Trustees, July 11, 1924, YCA. This letter is remarkable for the way Hume weaves rhetorical indignance at the Trustees' vote of February 24, 1924, with a seemingly objective evaluation of the situation facing Yali and Hsiang-Ya.

<sup>23</sup>Hume outlined the method by which Hsiang-Ya received its provincial funds: "Hunan grants for educational purposes are at present derived entirely from salt surtax revenues. From the point of view of the Central Government, these are illegal taxes. Only yesterday, the Salt Commissioner for Hunan, Mr. Reiss, (acting under the direction of the Salt Gabelle in Peking), told me that the Central Government and the Salt Gabelle did not recognize these taxes. Hunan, however, has declared . . . a sort of autonomy. Under this autonomy it proceeds to charge a surtax on imported salt and assigns to the educational institutions of the Province the funds thus received. Furthermore, the Government does not collect this tax itself, but has permitted the creation of a salt surtax collecting committee of Hunan educators. The chairman of this committee is Mr. T. K. Tsao, who is also chairman of the Hsiang-Ya Board of Managers. This committee is given authority to collect the surtax throughout the Province of Hunan, and to make such distribution as it desires among the institutions deserving aid. The Hsiang-Ya Medical College has been receiving for the past five years, its



educational grant entirely through this fund and the sum has averaged something like \$30,000 Silver a year, until July 1, 1924. Since that time, there has been a definite reduction, due only in small part, so Dr. Yen tells us, to the fact that we had no signed agreement. The main reason for the reduction has been the tremendous increase of militarism and the constant stealing of salt funds in various scattered parts of the Province by the local military chieftains. The Governor of the Province disapproves of this, but stands helpless. He cannot call upon the moral support of the Peking Government because Hunan claims a sort of autonomy and because it has chosen to impose an unrecognized surtax." Hume to Williams, June 11, 1925, YCA.

<sup>24</sup>Rockefeller Foundation, Annual Report (1924), p. 272. The provincial government continued to allow the collection of revenue for Hunan in the absence of a new agreement.

<sup>25</sup>Roger Greene to Barry C. Smith, Sept. 30, 1924, Commonwealth Fund Archives, CFA.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid. Despite what members of the China Medical Board might say, Smith never understood "upon what basis the determination of a satisfactory level of standards is to be reached." (Smith to Dayton, Feb. 3, 1925, CFA.) It is a fact that the terms "grade A" and "grade B" were used by Hume and Yen to mean "excellent"; and "mediocre" or "provincial," respectively. China Medical Association requirements for registration did not distinguish grades. (See "China Medical Association Requirements for the Registration of Approved Medical Schools.") By 1926 Hsiang-Ya was provisionally registered as an approved institution by the China Medical Association (Yen, "The Hsiang-Ya Medical College").

<sup>27</sup>Bevis sent to Smith the following documents: Treasurer's Report (1924); draft of Hsiang-Ya Agreement; Hume to Trustees, Oct. 29, 1924; Hume to Trustees, Oct. 31, 1924; Leavens to Hume, Oct. 29, 1924; Hume to Smith, Oct. 29, 1924 (extract). The Yale-in-China Archives do not, to the author's knowledge, contain the originals of all these materials, which were sent to Smith under cover of Bevis to Smith, December 15, 1924, CFA.

<sup>28</sup>Smith to Edward S. Harkness, December 16, 1924, CFA.



<sup>29</sup>Barry C. Smith, "Memorandum: Hunan-Yale College of Medicine," December 16, 1924, CFA.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>Barry C. Smith, "Hunan Yale Medical School: Topics for discussion at conference with Mr. Stokes, Mr. Cogswell and Dr. Dayton," CFA.

<sup>32</sup>Barry C. Smith, "[Vote] #1581: Hunan Yale College of Medicine," CFA.

<sup>33</sup>"Proposal (for continuation of the medical school with present staff) submitted by Drs. Atwater, Farnam, and Foster of the Hunan-Yale Medical School," CFA.

<sup>34</sup>Hume's pessimism about the future of Hsiang-Ya may have contributed to the final action of the Commonwealth Fund, as an excerpt from Hume to Smith, March 20, 1924, will point out: It is impossible for me to write this letter in the spirit of my previous one to you. Just today I have had the opportunity of a long discussion with the American vice-Consul who is stationed at Hankow and found him exceedingly concerned, not with fear of anti-foreign outbreaks or violence, but about the future outcome of all the restlessness in the land. He assures me there is nothing in government promises, that chambers of commerce are not in a position to guarantee pledges, that individuals dare not stake their reputation on the outcome of present militaristic plans. In view of such a situation, which shows no tendency to improve, and about which I am compelled to be honest with you, I can only repeat that patience alone will endure. The Chinese are far from being ready to take over the burdens of a modern medical school. While I feel distressed even at the thought of seeing our medical school discontinued, I must make it clear that if it does on, its maintenance will have to be borne, in major part, by the Foundations that have helped us recently. . . . (Hume to Smith, March 20, 1924, CFA.)

<sup>35</sup>Smith, "Memorandum: Hunan-Yale College of Medicine," Dec. 16, 1924, CFA. These figures were later reduced somewhat but not to a convincing level.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.





<sup>37</sup>Hume to Barry Smith, Oct. 29, 1924, CFA.

The Yale-in-China Archives contain the unsigned carbon copy of this letter, for which it was crucial to know the author. Hume's claim cannot be substantiated (cf. above, Part III at note 58 and ff.). The section referred to in the text was actually excerpted and sent to Smith along with the other material Bevis sent on December 15, 1924. The original had already been filed in CFA.

<sup>38</sup>Smith, op. cit.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>Smith, "Hunan Yale College of Medicine: Interview with Professor Williams, Dr. Dayton, Mr. Bevis and Miss Dowd, January 6, 1925," CFA.

<sup>41</sup>The Commonwealth Fund, "Excerpts from Minutes of meetings of the Board of Directors, June 26, 1920," CFA.

<sup>42</sup>(?Rachel Dowd), "Cost of Operation for Yale in China for 1922-1923 showing sources of support," "Cost of Operation for Yale in China 1923-1924 showing sources of support," "Budget for Yale in China for 1925-1926 showing anticipated sources of support," CFA. It appears that the New Haven office was able to juggle the books in 1925 in order to take the pre-medical item off the operations drawing on the Commonwealth Fund grant for 1922-1923. See Smith, "Hunan Yale College of Medicine: Conference with Mr. Stokes, Mr. Cogswell and Dr. Dayton," February 3, 1925, CFA. This action left a number of unauthorized items, however. In the third and fifth annual reports of the Commonwealth Fund, there are brief summaries of progress made at Changsha during the period of the Fund's assistance. Although there is mention of an increase in the size of the nursing staff in both instances, it is not apparent that the Fund realized that its money was being used to provide this increase. See Third Annual Report (1920-21), pp. 22-23; and Fifth Annual Report (1922-23), pp. 68-69.

<sup>43</sup>Hume to Yen, June 20, 1923, YCA.

<sup>44</sup>Smith, "Hunan Yale Medical School: Topics for discussion at conference with Mr. Stokes, Mr. Cogswell, and Dr. Dayton," January 30, 1925, CFA.

<sup>45</sup>Smith, "Hunan Yale Medical School: Conference . . ." February 3, 1925, CFA.





<sup>46</sup>Hume, Doctors East Doctors West, p. 177.

<sup>47</sup>Bevis to Smith, March 30, 1925, CFA.

<sup>48</sup>Smith to A. B. Dayton, February 3, 1925, CFA.

<sup>49</sup>Smith, "[Vote] #1581 . . ." CFA.

<sup>50</sup>Smith to Bevis, December 2, 1924, CFA.

<sup>51</sup>Smith, "[Vote] #1581 . . ." CFA.

<sup>52</sup>The Commonwealth Fund, "Appeal No. 1581," April 22, 1925, CFA.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid.

<sup>54</sup>William E. Birdsall, "Yale University: Foreign Missionary Society or Yale-in-China," [1945], CFA. This document is a lengthy review of the Fund's involvement with Yale-in-China. It was written on the occasion of a subsequent application by Yale-in-China to the Fund after much of the Changsha plant had been destroyed by the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45). Of interest in this document is mention of a \$50,000 gift by Harkness to Yale-in-China in 1917 for the purchase of land adjoining the hospital. In 1933 Harkness authorized holding as endowment the unspent balance and accumulated interest on his gift, which amounted to \$42,631.28. The original gift is referred to in the Yale-in-China Archives as the "Harkness Land Fund."

Yale-in-China's subsequent application to the Fund in 1945 was turned down. Barry Smith's letter is of interest: "The original appropriation [to Yale-in-China] . . . was made at a time when the Commonwealth Fund had but recently been organized and had not developed its program and the situation is of course entirely different in that regard, today. It all comes down to this: the initial appropriation was intended to enable the medical school to extend its work and it was not expected that any requests for further support would be made. Furthermore, the money was not utilized for the purpose for which it was granted and that caused considerable feeling on the part of our Board of Directors." (Barry Smith to Sidney Lovett, April 5, 1945, CFA.) Thus the mistakes of the twenties were visited on Yale-in-China in the forties.

<sup>55</sup>Hume to Yen, March 20, 1923, YCA.



<sup>56</sup>The China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture, Fourth Report (December, 1929), frontispiece. "Extracts from Letter of Mr. Roger Greene (written from Peking July 2, 1925, after conference with Dr. Hume)," contained in Dayton to Trustees, November 19, 1925, YCA. Dr. Dayton's report is in the form of a letter.

<sup>57</sup>Hume to Williams, November 25, 1925, YCA.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>Hume to Stokes, July 27, 1926, YCA.

<sup>60</sup>A. B. Dayton, "Report of Year 1922-1923 Spent at Yale in China," p. 11, YCA.

<sup>61</sup>Wilder to Leavens, April 30, 1918, DHL P.

<sup>62</sup>Harvey to F. W. Williams, November 25, 1924, YCA.

<sup>63</sup>F. C. Yen, quoted in Hume to Williams, September 20, 1924, YCA.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid.

<sup>65</sup>"Copy of Hsiang-Ya Agreement," p. 1, YCA.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 2. See note 26 for comment on "Grade A."

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>74</sup>Yen to Hume, June 5, 1924, YCA.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid. There was one source of trouble which gave the hospital administration constant grief and



contributed much to any real bad feelings towards the hospital which the Hunanese might have borne: the character of nurse/patient interaction. The following is an excerpt from the "Annual Report of the Hunan-Yale Hospital for the Year Ending April 30, 1924," YCA: "The greatest source of dissatisfaction on the part of the patients arises from a misconception as to the relationship of the patients with the nurses. Most hospitals in China, and especially in Changsha, engage nurses who come from a class not much higher than the servants, and many patients are apt to look upon our nurses as attendants who are there to wait on them for their comfort and convenience. On the other hand, all our nurses come from the student class and during the four years of nursing training they receive, an extensive course in class rooms and laboratories. With a class of students who are mostly young, they will naturally retaliate, even up to the point of treating the patients with hostility, when they feel that their dignity has been slighted. . . . The student nurses are therefore repeatedly told that their first duty is toward the patient and that they must be regarded as our guests . . ."

<sup>76</sup>Hail to Hume, June 28, 1924, YCA. It is worth mentioning here that in the first Hsiang-Ya Agreement, Article II, paragraph 2, the total amount to be provided by the Hunanese was not to exceed \$50,000 silver a year. Both sides, however, took the agreement to mean that the Educational Association would in fact undertake to provide exactly that amount every year.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid. There were ten doctors in Hsiang-Ya's first graduating class in 1921. Of these, according to Hume, five were from Hunan, two each from Kiangsu and Chekiang, and one each from Kiangsi and Anhui. (Note the mistake in the total.) Information from other classes is lacking but if the class of 1921 indicates a trend, then native opposition to the number of non-Hunanese is understandable. See Hume, "First Graduation Exercises at Yale in China," p. 373.

<sup>78</sup>"Copy of Hsiang-Ya Agreement," pp. 4-5, YCA.

<sup>79</sup>Hume to Palmer Bevis, May 17, 1925, YCA.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid.

<sup>81</sup>Hume to Trustees, October 31, 1924, YCA.



<sup>82</sup>Yen to Hume, July 5, 1924, YCA.

<sup>83</sup>Hume to Bevis, May 17, 1925, YCA.

<sup>84</sup>Hume to Williams, March 18, 1925, YCA.

<sup>85</sup>C. D. Meinhardt, American Vice Consul in Charge, "Report on the Purely Chinese Political Situation in Hunan," March 6, 1924, Department of State, Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1910-1929, 893.00/5394.

<sup>86</sup>Reginald Atwater, M.D., to A. B. Dayton, March 3, 1925, CFA.

<sup>87</sup>Hume to Bevis, April 17, 1925, YCA.

<sup>88</sup>"Extracts from the Report of the Chairman of the Governing Board, 1925-1926," YCA.

<sup>89</sup>Hume to Williams, March 3, 1925, YCA.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid.

<sup>91</sup>"Governing Board Minutes, May 5, 1925, (Special Meeting)," YCA. The Agreement was retroactive to July 1, 1924.

<sup>92</sup>Hume to Yen, March 16, 1922, YCA. Chinese on the Board of Managers admitted in 1922 that the prospect of getting more than \$30,000 silver per year for the years ahead was not encouraging.

<sup>93</sup>The Rockefeller Foundation, Annual Report (1925), p. 358.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., p. 347.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid.,

<sup>96</sup>Yen, "The Hsiang-Ya Medical College," p. 753.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid., p. 752.

<sup>98</sup>Bevis made his report in the form of a diary. He was not a very earnest Sinophile and it is most unfortunate that his report is not to be found in the Yale-in-China Archives. His correspondence with F. C. Yen through the years reveals an antipathy both to Yen and to the medical work.





<sup>99</sup>Hume to Yen, September 13, 1922, YCA.

<sup>100</sup>Dayton to Trustees, November 19, 1925, YCA.

<sup>101</sup>Hume's plan was presented by Dayton in his report.

<sup>102</sup>Hume to Trustees, October 29, 1924, YCA.

<sup>103</sup>Roger S. Greene to Hume, December 6, 1923, quoted in Hume to Trustees, July 11, 1924, YCA.

<sup>104</sup>W. J. Hail, quoted in Hume to Bevis, March 30, 1925, YCA.

<sup>105</sup>Hume to Williams, January 13, 1925, YCA.

<sup>106</sup>Hume to Bevis, March 30, 1925, YCA.

<sup>107</sup>Hume to Williams, March 3, 1925, YCA.

<sup>108</sup>Dayton to Trustees, November 19, 1925, YCA.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid.

<sup>111</sup>"Personnel Report (Confidential)," appended to Dayton to Trustees, November 19, 1925, YCA.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid.

<sup>114</sup>In her anecdotal history of her husband's experience in China, Lotta Carswell Hume states that she and her husband left Changsha in 1927 (Drama at the Doctor's Gate, pp. 147, 150). Hume himself, in Doctors East Doctors West (pp. 268-275), implies that he was in Changsha when the Nationalists took the city in the summer of 1926. Inaccuracy on the part of both Hume and his wife led to a great deal of confusion in trying to piece together the last years of his involvement on an active basis with Yale-in-China. This was compounded by the fact that later historians of Yale-in-China have accepted the above accounts as true. In point of fact, Mrs. Hume's dating is inaccurate. Her account makes it look as if Hume resigned in 1927 and left immediately afterwards. Hume says that he resigned in the summer of 1926, having



been able to "turn the leadership over to our Chinese colleagues as soon as they were ready" (Doctors, p. 271). In his story of the Nationalist take-over of the city and the meetings with Chiang Kai-shek and T'an Yen-k'ai, Hume never says that he was actually there. The story is recounted in the first-person plural; this is in contrast to the rest of the book, where Hume rather consistently uses a first-person singular narrative. He states that he resigned late in the summer of 1926. The correct sequence of events is as follows: After the Trustees approved the Dayton plan, Hume, for reasons of health and in order to put his case before the Trustees in person, went on furlough. In December, 1925, he and his wife and their daughter Joy (about 7 years of age) left Changsha (Leavens, "Staff List corrected to 1928," YCA). Letters of Hume to F. W. Williams, Palmer Bevis, and Rachel Dowd indicate that he and his family travelled to Nanking, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Manila while in the Far East. Via a slow German freighter the Humes made a five-week or so voyage to Europe, visiting Cairo, Beirut, Smyrna, Constantinople, and probably disembarking at Naples. Joy was left either with friends or relatives in Geneva. Hume and his wife proceeded to Paris to visit their son Theodore, Yale '25, who was studying at the Sorbonne and who would study at Oxford in 1925-26 as a Rhodes Scholar at large (Yale Daily News, December 1, 1926). The Humes spent some time in London and were back in the States by mid-June, 1926. While Nationalist forces were moving into Hunan, Hume was in New York City. On June 24, 1926, Hume tendered his resignation (Hume to Trustees, June 24, 1926, YCA). The Trustees chose not to act on this immediately. Hume remained in the New York area, trying to raise funds for Yale-in-China. Letters written by him to Harkness at this time are interesting in that Hume felt obliged to promise Harkness that he would not ask for money if Harkness would allow him the courtesy of an interview for the purpose of bringing him up to date on the hospital/medical school situation and how much Harkness had helped in the upgrading of health in Hunan. Early in 1927 Hume accepted the position of Director of the New York Post-Graduate Medical School of Columbia University and was formally released from his position as President of the Colleges of Yale-in-China in late spring, 1927. Upon final acceptance of his resignation, Hume was made a Trustee.



in-China, March 20, 1925, YCA.

<sup>116</sup>Hume, Doctors East Doctors West, pp. 271-73.



PART VII

THE LAST YEAR: REVOLUTION AND CLOSURE





## PART VII

### THE LAST YEAR: REVOLUTION AND CLOSURE

In 1926-27 medical work went on without Hume. The China Medical Board, pleased with the signing of the second Hsiang-Ya Agreement, appropriated \$80,000 silver per year to maintain the College of Medicine for the five-year period 1926-31, on the very important condition that the Yale Foreign Missionary Society provide \$30,000 silver per year for the same period "for the same purpose."<sup>1</sup> The China Foundation, to which Hsiang-Ya applied under the terms of the second agreement, awarded \$30,000 silver a year for the years 1926-29 and for 1926-27 made a one-time grant of \$15,000 for building purposes.<sup>2</sup> It is significant that the China Foundation gave Hsiang-Ya less than the minimum amount predicted by Roger Greene in 1925.<sup>3</sup> Hsiang-Ya now stood for its support on the Hunan provincial government, the national government, the China Foundation, the China Medical Board, and the Yale Foreign Missionary Society.

In February, 1926, with Hume incommunicado somewhere in the Indian Ocean on a slow German steamer headed for Europe, the Trustees made a significant move. They



voted that the Y. F. M. S. contribute \$75,000 silver to the medical work for the year 1926-27 only if the rest of the total projected budget of \$240,000 silver were met from other sources.<sup>4</sup> Given that Hunan would be unlikely to contribute more than \$30,000 per year even with central government support, this action on the part of the Trustees was a way of getting out of the 1925 agreement under the provisions of Article III, which stated that either party (and this actually applies exclusively to the Y. F. M. S.) might withdraw from the contract if the "educational standards of the Medical College are shown to be endangered."<sup>5</sup> At meetings in Harrison, N. Y., and New Haven in May and June, with Hume present, the Trustees relented somewhat and waived the conditional clause of their February vote. Although they voted to honor the Dayton Plan for one more year, it is apparent that they were looking for a way out. Leavens was stunned by the Trustees' cable of June 26 when the mission was notified that the Y. F. M. S. would no longer be able to carry out its obligations.<sup>6</sup> Instead of the \$50,000 gold called for in the agreement, the Trustees promised \$75,000 silver, as called for in the Dayton Report (\$30,000 for the medical school; \$30,000 for the hospital; \$15,000 for the nursing schools).<sup>7</sup> It must be pointed out that by accepting the Dayton Plan



for funding of the medical work, the Trustees had already begun to abandon the agreement. As the price of silver decreased in the mid-twenties, the exchange rate approached (and even exceeded) two to one.<sup>8</sup> Thus the \$50,000 gold would be worth considerably more than the \$75,000 silver. The fact that it was even proposed to give the hospital to the Chinese "under satisfactory agreement for its support" serves to underline the Trustees' determination to orphan the medical school.<sup>9</sup> As for the future, the Trustees guaranteed to contribute \$30,000 silver to the medical school at least through 1927-28 in order that Hsiang-Ya might hold the grant from the China Medical Board, thinking that a modification of the 1925 agreement might be drawn up by Hume and Yen in the autumn of 1926.<sup>10</sup> For their part the Chinese went along with the proposed reductions and hoped that they would still be able to hold on to funds from the C. M. B. and the China Foundation.<sup>11</sup>

The Society had a good idea of what it now wanted to do with the medical work. There were a number of reasons cited to justify reducing or discontinuing commitments to Hsiang-Ya: 1) the Commonwealth Fund had discontinued its grants after 1925; 2) Edward S. Harkness would provide neither endowment nor assurance of continuing gifts; 3) Yale University was planning a



\$20,000,000 fund raising drive which would cut into Yale-in-China's constituency; 4) Some contributors to the Society felt that it was easier to "influence character and inculcate Christian principles" through the college and middle school of Yale-in-China, not realizing that to run the hospital well without the medical school (which was supported to such an extent by foundations) would not represent a substantial saving; 5) Other contributors would be hard to interest in an institution under Chinese control; 6) Political conditions in China were at best uncertain.<sup>12</sup>

The Trustees' action took the mission by surprise for it was thought in the field that the Trustees' action in February had been based on a real assurance of funds. Leavens wrote the home office that to "have the Y. F. M. S. withdraw largely from support of the medical work makes its future very uncertain, as it removes one of the four legs. Of course, three legs are sufficient for equilibrium, but hardly so when one of them is Hunan. . . . The suggestion of turning over the hospital to them is a gracious gesture, but the hospital is money consuming, not money producing, and won't do them any good for support."<sup>13</sup> It was felt that the China Medical Board and the China Foundation would both discontinue their grants if the Y. F. M. S. withdrew.<sup>14</sup>





Hume, now in the States, clearly felt that his usefulness as President of the Colleges of Yale-in-China was over; on June 24, 1926, in a confidential letter to the Trustees via Williams, Hume tendered his resignation. In what this bland letter does not say, one can sense the bittersweet experience Hsiang-Ya had been for Hume. In an uncharacteristically simple style Hume wrote his letter of resignation (here reproduced in toto).

The turning over of the Hunan-Yale Medical College to a Chinese board of directors marks the completion of the task for which I left India in 1905. It was my hope, at that time, to take part in building up medical education under Chinese auspices. Today, the community, the directors, the alumni and students think of the college as theirs. Before many years they should be able to carry the whole financial burden.

The College of Arts and Sciences, to whose problems I have given constant thought during the past three years, will become deep-rooted in the Chinese environment in proportion as it follows much the same course that has proved successful in the Medical College. One of the first essentials is the early election of a Chinese president to whom large powers should be given.

In view of the gratifying development of the Medical College and in order that the Trustees may be free the sooner to secure the needed Chinese president for the Arts College, I desire to present through you my resignation to the board. I take this step not only after the most careful and prolonged thought, and with the utmost regret. The sense of comradeship with you and of active participation in the life of Yale-in-China has bound me to the enterprise with bonds that are very personal and very strong.

I venture to request that you as chairman of the board name a small committee with power



to discuss the date at which this shall become effective and other details.

You will believe me when I express my gratitude for your constant devotion to Yali and my personal and affectionate regard for you and for the board.<sup>15</sup>

In an accompanying statement, Hume was somewhat more direct:

It has become increasingly apparent to me that my position on many issues, educational and administrative, differs seriously from the position the Trustees desire to take. It seems to me absolutely essential that the board should be free to carry out such policies as appear wise to it and that the president of the college should be a man who can accept and execute those policies. In order that they may thus be free, and that they may also be free all the sooner to secure a Chinese president, a step that will be found necessary to Yali's continued well-being, I have presented my resignation to the Board.<sup>16</sup>

Hume was undoubtedly disappointed and bitter that the best years of his life had been spent in the service of an institution which had been only a partial fulfillment of his ambitions for himself and for the Chinese. He had gone to Changsha at 29 full of hope; he resigned at 50, full of the knowledge that the institution he had sweated blood to build could be toppled at any moment by finances or politics. But Roger Greene, whose association with Peking Union gave him the true Johns Hopkins of China with which to compare Hsiang-Ya, could give Hsiang-Ya excellent reviews by the summer of 1926. In a letter to Stokes he wrote,



Really the record made by the medical school is extraordinary. Judged by the fairest possible standard, the character and ability of its graduates, its work has been excellent. The Siangya men who have joined the junior staff of the P. U. M. C. have had no difficulty in holding their own with the P. U. M. C. graduates and with the internes and assistant residents whom we have imported from the United States and Canada. No doubt the instruction they have received has been in some respects defective, but they become useful house officers, and what is equally important nearly all of them have a keen desire to learn more and are willing to forego the larger salaries that they might get in ordinary hospital positions or in private practice, in order to secure the further training that they need. Such men may go far. The development of the Chinese board of trustees of the medical school is also very encouraging. It now includes several men who know their jobs as well as many college trustees at home. Perhaps you will consider this faint praise, but it still means a good deal when you think of the state of the Chinese community at Changsha when your pioneers entered the city.<sup>17</sup>

Greene was also well aware of the criticism which surrounded Hume and quite deftly assessed where a large part of the problem lay. He wrote to Stokes,

I can quite understand what you say, both as to his exceptional usefulness and as to the difficulties which have arisen in some personal relationships. Possibly these difficulties would have been less if Dr. Hume had not been subjected to a very heavy strain through being obliged to make bricks with an insufficient amount of straw.<sup>18</sup>

While Hume was contemplating the Trustees' decisions of 1926, events in China were shaping up in a way that would force Hsiang-Ya to close its doors.

On September 10, 1926, all departments of Yale-



in-China opened without incident. Total enrollment was larger than the year before. But, after the summer of 1926, Changsha was a changed city; the faculty of Yale-in-China returned from summer vacation to find the city firmly under Nationalist control.

T'ang Sheng-chih, allied to the Nationalist Government operating out of Canton and commander of its Eighth Army, had driven his troops up through southern Hunan and taken Changsha on July 11, 1926, without firing a shot.<sup>19</sup> Chao Heng-t'i, Governor of Hunan from 1921-26, allied to Wu P'ei-fu, had fallen back with Wu's forces to Wuhan.<sup>20</sup> Chiang Kai-shek was given a hero's welcome when he entered Changsha and set up an administration which was "a model of law and order" [sic].<sup>21</sup> After Changsha came under Nationalist control, T'an Yen-k'ai, Hsiang-Ya's old friend and now Chairman of the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang, ordered recognition of the Hsiang-Ya Agreement and the regular payment of appropriations.<sup>22</sup> Chiang's stay in Changsha was only temporary; it was symbolically important for Chiang and the Nationalists to take Wuhan by the Double Tenth. His departure from Changsha allowed left-wing elements of the K. M. T. to come to power. According to Yale-in-China sources

The Committee System taught by the Russian, Borodin, was introduced. Student agitators,





many of them trained in Russia, were given free rein. The trades became highly unionized. Even the servants were organized. "Down with Imperialism" became the universal cry. Foreign schools, American, English, Swedish, the Y M C A, Christian churches, many of them owned, controlled, and manned by native Christians, became targets of abuse. All were there as the personification of special privilege, the product of unequal treaties; all were financed and operated with some ulterior motive by the governments of the various nationalities involved. Chinese teachers in foreign schools, or Chinese in any way associated with foreigners were called "Foreign Slaves", "Running Dogs", and in some cases actually forced to leave the Province.<sup>23</sup>

All departments of Yale-in-China ran smoothly until October 28, when the middle school students, boys of high school age, egged on by a trio of students in their own midst and by one of the middle school faculty members, presented a set of eleven demands to the faculty.<sup>24</sup> A few of the demands--for instance, that there be no required Sunday or weekday chapel, that religious education be made an elective course, that the Monday morning memorial to Dr. Sun Yat-sen follow the Ministry of Education's program exactly--were able to be met by acquiescence. Other demands, however--that the students elect a member to the Governing Board, that the student union should be consulted whenever students were to be dropped from school--clearly struck at the heart of faculty power and were answered by deferring to the government.



The middle school students accepted Dean Hail's answers and for the most part seemed satisfied except for those who had "gained ascendancy over the whole middle school."<sup>25</sup>

On December 1, 1926, after a month in which classes had been interrupted for endless parades and demonstrations, the middle school student union presented a set of twelve demands regarding some matters not satisfactorily met by the first set of replies and some outrageous new demands. This second set generally concerned financial matters (reduction of tuition, construction of a model gymnasium, subsidy for the student union), internal administration (as before), and changes in the curriculum (addition of a K. M. T. member to teach social science, forced registration of the school with the Nationalist Government). All teachers were to be compelled to join in street parades. One or two small concessions were yielded but the Governing Board had by this time decided that it and it alone would run the Yale Mission. Upon receipt of the Governing Board's reply, eighteen more demands were brought forth by the middle school students. "Saturday morning [December 4, 1926] at the compulsory assembly, two students appeared. The strike had been declared."<sup>26</sup> The college students, "very much against their will," then presented a set of "half-hearted demands" and went out on sympathy strike



with the middle school students.<sup>27</sup>

Trouble had been brewing in the Hsiang-Ya Hospital for some time, but Dr. Yen had managed with patience to keep hospital workers at their jobs. On December 4, the nursing school students, unionized jointly with the hospital workers, presented their own set of demands to the nursing school administration, most of the trouble being initiated by the male nurses.<sup>28</sup> One of the American senior staff nurses wrote of the event.

They ask for the re-instatement of the four pupils [who showed no talent sufficient to justify their enrollment], for free speech and all that, and for the right to attend patriotic meetings and parades. They demand the resignation of . . . the resident in medicine, because he is imperialistic, they ask for added amahs on the womens wards, and for increases in their allowances. They want their books and uniforms to be furnished by the hospital, outside of their allowances, and that they do not have to pay for things that they have broken. They expect to graduate in three years, with no time counted out for unexpected leaves of absence to attend funerals and weddings, or on account of sickness. . . . [O]ne more was that there was to be a student representative on the faculty, and that no student is to be discharged without the consent of the Students' Union.<sup>29</sup>

The committee which answered the students' demands expressed its concern that the students be patriotic, provided that they neglected neither their studies nor the patients in the hospital, who were in their care. On the matter of student representation on the faculty, the nursing school deferred to the government, saying



that the matter had never been approved by government educational regulations. The question about the resident in medicine and questions involving finance were referred to the hospital administration. The committee stated that students might take less time to graduate if they were willing to forego registration as nurses under the Nurses' Association of China. The students would not be charged for breakage. As for the issue that had ignited the school, that was already settled--the probationers would not be reinstated.<sup>30</sup>

On Sunday, December 5, another set of demands was presented. In the second set the nursing students demanded that the Dean of the school, Nina Gage, be dismissed, along with the proctor. Among other things the students required that the nurses who were then seniors be graduated in two months and be kept on at the Hsiang-Ya Hospital for a year at a salary of \$60 silver a month (as opposed to \$20 per month, the then-current rate).

They ask for more servants in the hospital, for higher allowance for the nurses, and that no time be taken off their course on account of the present storm, and that no student be 'revenged' on for the present agitation.<sup>31</sup>

The situation in the nursing school was truly of critical proportions because the nurses, as well as being students, were also probationers in the hospital, intimately





involved in the care of patients. How the nurses' demands were met would seriously affect the hospital and its remaining open. The second set of demands was answered "carefully" but not a single demand was granted.<sup>32</sup> Preparations were made for a strike in the nursing school; patients were discharged from the hospital as soon as they could reasonably go.

In the medical school things were different. Although the medical students had been threatened, they "repudiated the efforts of their radicals in unmistakable terms," "declared their loyalty to the institution and their intention of staying by."<sup>33</sup> Six students were within one semester of graduating.<sup>34</sup> Yet, everything depended on the nurses and, to a great extent, on the hospital amahs and coolies, over whom the medical students had no control. On December 9, while the hospital board was meeting to try to figure out a way to muddle through the situation, a new set of demands was presented by the student unions in the form of an ultimatum which had to be answered by noon. According to the minutes of the Governing Board, since

it would have been impossible to consider the very serious and far-reaching demands of the unions, an answer was sent saying that the matters were under advisement and that answer would be sent as soon as the meeting had reached decisions. A further note had come saying that unless the answer were in on time the nurses would strike. They struck.<sup>35</sup>



Hospital workers went out with them. Agitation against the medical school administration became so severe that F. C. Yen and H. C. Tsao, Business Manager, were forced to leave Changsha.<sup>36</sup> An American was installed to temporarily fill Yen's position. John Carter Vincent, American Vice Consul in Changsha, was relieved that Yen had departed; he felt that Yen had been too conciliatory and that the new American head of the hospital would "strengthen the policy of resistance."<sup>37</sup>

In the hospital a curious situation developed. The nurses were told by their union that their first duty "lay toward the poor sick and suffering."<sup>38</sup> After going on strike, the students took it upon themselves to decide who would be on and who would be off duty. Thus the hospital came into the virtual possession of student nurses who refused to obey the orders of the senior staff.<sup>39</sup> Nina Gage irately described to Palmer Bevis the manner in which it was proposed to take care of patients:

To show you how much they know about nursing education, and what their real ideas are as to management of a nursing school--two weeks ago, as we wrote you, Mr. [Ts'ao Tzu-ku], for years the Chairman of the Hsiang-Ya Board (but under Dr. Yen's tutelage), and heretofore our loyal friend, took over the nursing school, saying that he could make the nurses behave, and would transmit to them any of my orders. We tried it out, just to let them all see how impossible it would be--the scheme I outlined



in my last letter, by which we were to appoint pupils to duty, and give instructions, or make corrections, by telling the new proctor--a K M T appointee of Mr. [Ts'ao's], he to transmit them to Mr. [Ts'ao], who would tell the President of the Student Union, who would call a meeting of students to consider them. Meanwhile neither Mr. [Ts'ao] nor the proctor lived here. Can you imagine such a procedure with a sick patient? The only result has been that more pupils have left, seeing the condition was hopeless, and the patients have been even worse taken care of . . . The pupils have gone on trips to [the nearby mountains] in on duty hours, leaving word that they had asked So and So to substitute, instead of saying anything to us who might have been supposed to know. They have made cookies and candy from hospital materials, over hospital fires, and had spreads in the hospital kitchens. They have appointed probationers to the operating room. Imagine what sort of care we could give patients. . . .

Furthermore, the hospital, under this sort of shillyshallying for a month, has been unable to take in patients . . .40

The hospital, in this predicament, was losing about \$1000 per week; it was, however, socially impossible to close in because the striking nursing students and workers could not be dislodged.

Rumors flew that the nurses intended to call in outside help to assist them in "taking over" the hospital.<sup>41</sup> Vice Consul Vincent was determined that this course of action should not take place. As Vice Consul, Vincent had the duty of seeing to the protection of American life and property in the consular district of Changsha. By the winter of 1926-27, he was finding his position vis-a-vis the missionaries in Hunan a difficult



one. On the one hand, with regard to Yale-in-China, there had been a movement to turn the hospital building over to the Chinese. (The medical school had, of course, been turned over in name to the Chinese in 1925 although in fact American administrative power remained quite extensive.) On the other hand, as Vincent noted, missionaries in Hunan, with their "avowed purpose of handing over their property to the Chinese as soon as such action could be accomplished conveniently," were "being forced to do what they planned to do voluntarily and they find that it is not so easy as they had expected."<sup>42</sup> Vincent was in the position of having to protect property that would at a later date be turned over to the Chinese.

It is clear from records of the U. S. State Department that in the case of the Hsiang-Ya Hospital Vincent wished to impress upon the Chinese authorities the fact that if they were not willing to protect American property then Americans themselves would protect their rights and property in the treaty port of Changsha--by force if necessary. Threatening to bring in sailors from the gunboat U. S. S. Pigeon, Vincent convinced the Hunan Commissioner of Foreign Affairs to send eleven Chinese policemen to guard the hospital. Vincent wrote that "[f]ortunately the guard was not needed but their





presence had a sobering effect on the nurses and was evidence of the government's willingness to give protection to Americans in the city."<sup>43</sup> For Vincent, protecting the hospital functioned as a test case. If it could be kept out of Chinese hands, so could American property elsewhere in Kuomintang-controlled territory. In closing his December, 1926, despatch to Peking, Vincent, having described the situation at Yale-in-China in detail, summed up the significance of the hospital's difficulties:

The troubles of Yale have been given in detail because it is believed that they are the forerunner of what may be expected to occur not only in this city and province but in the rest of the territory under control of the Koumintang [sic]. Yale has been chosed because it is a large and well known institution. Statements have frequently appeared in the local papers outlining the Koumin [sic] party's plan of gaining control of all mission institutions in the province. So far there has been no serious trouble outside of Changsha and I have every reason to believe that agitators in other places are awaiting the outcome of the struggle at Yale before proceeding. They are anxious to make an example of Yale and I am equally anxious to make of it an example but needless to say an entirely different example. It is my belief that if the institution can be kept open on our terms or closed and kept so for a while a severe blow will be dealt the agitators. If it is closed for a time, I am convinced that there will be an urgent request for both the college and the hospital to reopen on the foreigners own terms. The people need both institutions and will be brought to a realization of their needs after they are closed for a time.<sup>44</sup>

As the strike at Yale-in-China dragged on and it became apparent that the opening of school for the



semester would not take place, more and more Yale-in-China faculty left Changsha. The evacuation of British nationals from Changsha had provoked an incident at the docks between British sailors and Chinese pickets.<sup>45</sup> It had proved impossible to evacuate British women and children by steam launch in the face of a seamen's strike. When the British proposed to remove women and children on the H. M. S. Woodcock, the Chinese threatened force to prevent the Woodcock from leaving. Although the Woodcock finally sailed from Changsha without incident and safely delivered her passengers to steam launches waiting at Tungting Lake, Vincent was beginning to fear for Americans in the city. Despite his decision to recommend the evacuation of American women and children and all those having furloughs in 1927, it is not clear that American lives in Hunan were in danger. It is clear, however, that American property was in danger.<sup>46</sup> What Vincent feared was that increasing anti-British agitation along the Yangtze would inevitably come to involve the American military--with a concomitant outburst of anti-American violence. Then it would be too late to act.<sup>47</sup>

On January 12, 1927, Vincent circulated a letter advising Americans in certain categories (cf. above) to leave Hunan. In late January, Vincent received word from



the American Legation in Peking that he should expedite the evacuation of all Americans in his district as quietly and as rapidly as possible.<sup>48</sup> As the faculty of the Hsiang-Ya Medical College departed by boat and train, medical instruction faded away and with it fourteen years of Sino-American cooperation. The hospital was able to plod along under the direction of some of the Chinese staff and the few Americans who stayed to close up.

On January 27, 1927, W. J. Hail, along with the acting superintendent of the hospital and Vice-Consul Vincent, met with the military governor of Hunan, who would neither order the hospital closed nor provide funds to keep it open. Leavens, exasperated, wrote to New Haven that

the simplest way out of the whole mess would be if we were ordered out and the place confiscated or looted beyond any possibility of reopening ever. It is hard to see how any other development would get anywhere.<sup>49</sup>

By the end of the month, it looked as if the hospital workers could be bought off with three month's pay but the central labor union intervened and forbade them to quit, insisting that they remain until new management took over.<sup>50</sup> By the beginning of April the loyal members of the Chinese staff had gotten all the patients out of the hospital; the coolies were willing



to leave if only their union would permit.<sup>51</sup> Yale Foreign Missionary Society and China Medical Board funds allowed Leavens to close out the books for the year and pay off the staff. Earlier Leavens had made arrangements with Roger Greene in Peking to have the C. M. B. grant paid in monthly installments; he did not want to have a large amount of cash on hand in case left-wing elements came to power on the Hsiang-Ya Board, whose orders with regard to use of funds he could hardly refuse to honor.<sup>52</sup>

The great experiment was over: Hsiang-Ya, after all the years of discussions and plans, was closed not, as one might have thought would happen, by financial problems, but by the forces of Chinese nationalism. It was a hard defeat for those who had given the most productive years of their lives to the service of the institution. Many Yali and Hsiang-Ya faculty must have felt like one of the senior staff nurses, who wrote that

[t]here has been a bit of hell let loose . . . and by that I do not mean fire and brimstone and shovelling of coal, but the more subtle kind wherein one sees one's efforts of years gradually coming to nothing, and a structure which has taken a life-time of hard work to build up toppling on its foundations.<sup>53</sup>

Whether or not one may agree with Bertrand Russell and his characterization of the American missionary as a representative of American hygiene and tidiness, athletics and industriousness, Protestant morality and





bustling practical philanthropy, it is hard not to sense the emptiness which must have gripped the Yali and Hsiang-Ya faculty as they left China and their complex motives for being there.<sup>54</sup> Leavens was relieved that the struggles and the debates, the anxiety and the rancor were over:

I am inclined to feel that this order [for the general evacuation of Americans from Changsha] really is the best thing that could have happened to Yale in China and to Mission work in general. We have been discussing plans and policies for the last five years without getting anywhere; financial prospects are poor, and it had become quite evident that the character of work must be considerably changed. And yet there were such difficulties in the way of changes that we had no agreement. Neither the Board of Trustees nor the Governing Board were willing to take really drastic steps. Now Uncle Sam [sic] has taken the decision from us: Our staff is sent home, we must close down. . . . [T]he withdrawal of staff and organization leaves the property, provided it can be protected, for the use of a new organization when conditions are peaceful here and the time is ripe for it. I don't think the time is ripe now; but if we can guard the property, the time will come when some Chinese body can use it to advantage. It will not be tied down by any of the precedents of the old organization and personnel, it will be Chinese, and if it makes good, it can probably get some Yale support America and some foreign staff, such as it may select.<sup>55</sup>



## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Margery Eggleston to Palmer Bevis, April 30, 1926, YCA. The China Medical Board insisted that Yale-in-China pay at least \$30,000 of its appropriation to medical work in general to the medical school.

<sup>2</sup>The China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture, Fourth Report (December, 1929), "Table of Subsidized Institutions," between pp. 44 and 45.

<sup>3</sup>Greene had estimated that the minimum grant would be \$35,000 silver and had gone so far as to say that it would probably be \$75,000. Greene to ?Bevis, July 2, 1925, quoted in Dayton to Trustees, Nov. 19, 1925, YCA.

<sup>4</sup>Stokes to Eggleston, July 6, 1926, YCA.

<sup>5</sup>Article III, "Copy of Hsiang-Ya Agreement," YCA, p. 1.

<sup>6</sup>Leavens to Bevis, July 9, 1926, YCA.

<sup>7</sup>Bevis to Eggleston, March 30, 1926, YCA; Stokes to Eggleston, July 6, 1926, YCA. Stokes hoped that the grant of \$30,000 to the hospital might be reduced to \$20,000.

<sup>8</sup>Hume to My Dear Friends, July 21, 1926, YCA.

<sup>9</sup>Stokes to Eggleston, July 6, 1926, YCA.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Hume to Dowd, Nov. 7, 1925, YCA.

<sup>12</sup>Stokes to Eggleston, July 6, 1926, YCA. It must be mentioned here that a great deal of fantasy surrounded the figure of Edward Harkness and his money.

<sup>13</sup>Leavens to Bevis, July 9, 1926, YCA.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.



<sup>15</sup>Hume to F. W. Williams, June 24, 1926, YCA.

<sup>16</sup>Hume, "A Statement to Accompany Dr. Hume's letter of June 24, 1926," YCA.

<sup>17</sup>Greene to Stokes, August 14, 1926, YCA.

<sup>18</sup>Greene to Stokes, March 12, 1926, YCA.

<sup>19</sup>John Carter Vincent, American Vice Consul in Changsha, to J. V. A. MacMurray, American Ambassador to China, July 19, 1926, U. S. Department of State, Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1910-29, 893.00/7579.

<sup>20</sup>Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the CCP (1921-1927), pp. 523, 535; Boorman, ed., Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, I, p. 144.

<sup>21</sup>"The Kaleidoscope in China," YCA. This document appears to be a draft for an article in the Yali Quarterly.

<sup>22</sup>Bevis to Yen, December 6, 1926, YCA.

<sup>23</sup>"The Kaleidoscope in China," YCA. Vice Consul Vincent detailed the extent of union organizing in the city of Changsha, noting in what is most likely not an exhaustive list that wharf coolies, wheelbarrow coolies, ricksha, shop, carrying coolies, students, teachers, butchers, weavers, clerks, merchants, foreign servants; Hunan-Yale Hospital coolies, nurses, teachers, and students were all organized. See Vincent to MacMurray, December 13, 1926, Department of State, 893.00/8034.

<sup>24</sup>"The Kaleidoscope in China." W. J. Hail, "Yali and the Chinese Revolution," p. 4.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., pp. 5-7; "Yale University News Statement," Jan. 17, 1927, YCA.

<sup>26</sup>"Extracts from a Letter Dated December 6, 1926 from a Junior Member of the Staff," YCA.

<sup>27</sup>"The Kaleidoscope in China," YCA.

<sup>28</sup>K. Y. Wang to Leavens, December 25, 1927, YCA. The male nurses had also proved to be something of a problem for Hume, who ended up recommending that the nursing school for men be discontinued. He was quite



disconcerted that "the men who had been with us for many years, as well as men who had recently joined the ranks of the profession, admitted that they had come into the nursing profession as a means of acquiring medical knowledge. They thought the course was simpler and that they could practice medicine after a briefer training than was required by the arduous curriculum of the Medical School" (Hume to Nina Gage, April 18, 1925, YCA). When Hume returned to Changsha in the mid-thirties, he found, ostensibly to his surprise, that the hospital was using only women nurses (Hume, Doctors East Doctors West, p. 274).

<sup>29</sup>(American senior staff nurse) to -----, December 7, 1926, YCA. This is one of the many unsigned carbons in the Yale-in-China Archives. The fact that the author is a senior staff nurse may be inferred. This letter is the only document which gives a detailed account of the events leading up to the nurses' strike.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.; Hail, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

<sup>31</sup>(American senior staff nurse) to -----, December 7, 1926.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Hail, op. cit., p. 9; (American senior staff nurse) to -----, December 7, 1926.

<sup>34</sup>Minutes of the Governing Board, June 3, 1927, YCA.

<sup>35</sup>"Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Governing Board," December 9, 1926, YCA.

<sup>36</sup>Hail, op. cit., p. 9. Tsao was in fact banned from Hunan in perpetuity by the Hunan Provincial Assembly.

<sup>37</sup>J. C. Vincent to MacMurray, December 13, 1926, Department of State, 893.00/8034.

<sup>38</sup>(American senior staff nurse) to -----, December 7, 1926, YCA.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>Nina Gage to Palmer Bevis, December 31, 1926, YCA.





<sup>41</sup>Vincent to J. V. A. MacMurray, December 13, 1926, Department of State, 893.00/8034.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid. The Department of State felt that Vincent's proposed solution to the problem of guarding the hospital might provoke the Chinese more than it might protect the hospital. In reply to Vincent's despatch of December, the Secretary of State indicated that "American owned property that has been vacated by American citizens and closed should be placed formally under the protection of the authorities in control, with the statement that the latter will be held responsible for the prevention of unauthorized entrance and the inflicting of damage." Leland Harrison ("For the Secretary of State") to J. V. A. MacMurray, January 25, 1927, Department of State, 893.00/8034.

<sup>45</sup>Hail, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>46</sup>As late as February 1, 1927, an official of the Standard Oil Company wrote to the State Department that "We do not feel that American or other foreign lives are in particular danger . . ." There was, however, concern for American property in Hunan. See H. E. Cole to N. T. Johnson, Feb. 1, 1927, Department of State, 893.00/8218. The Yale-in-China faculty had in fact no difficulty leaving the province.

<sup>47</sup>There had been active fighting in Szechuan Province in August and September, 1926, between British gunboats and the troops of General Yang Sen over a British refusal to transport General Yang's forces on the Yangtze. The town of Wanhsien had suffered considerable damage from British fire. The "Wanhsien Incident" had provoked considerable anti-British feeling in the Yangtze valley. See Walter A. Adams, American Consul at Chungking, to J. V. A. MacMurray, American Ambassador to China, Sept. 6, 1926, Department of State, 893.00/7768.

<sup>48</sup>C IN C to OPNAV, January 29, 1927, Department of State, 893.00/8172.

<sup>49</sup>Leavens to Bevis, January 27, 1927, YCA.

<sup>50</sup>Leavens to Bevis, February 2, 1927, YCA.



<sup>51</sup>Leavens to Bevis, April 2, 1927, YCA.

<sup>52</sup>Leavens to Greene, December 14, 1926, YCA.

<sup>53</sup>(American senior staff nurse) to -----,  
Dec. 7, 1926.

<sup>54</sup>Bertrand Russell, The Problem of China,  
pp. 167 ff.

<sup>55</sup>Leavens to Bevis, Feb. 2, 1927.



PART VIII

AFTERMATH



## PART VIII

### AFTERMATH

The dissolution of the medical school left the students without a place to continue their education. Yen gave special attention to this problem and worked out a cooperative plan with the China Foundation, the China Medical Board, and St. John's Medical School in Shanghai for the transfer of the Hsiang-Ya students to St. John's at least for the 1927-28 academic year.<sup>1</sup> The China Medical Board voted \$20,000 silver for expenses in connection with this venture, under the condition that the Yale Foreign Missionary Society provide not less than \$16,500 silver and St. John's not less than \$37,500 silver for the general support of the union school in Shanghai.<sup>2</sup> The Trustees, however, would not support this idea since they were now working under an accumulated deficit of \$45,000 gold, "incurred," according to Palmer Bevis, "almost entirely by participation in a medical program far beyond their means."<sup>3</sup> In two letters to Anson Phelps Stokes, Roger Greene expressed his disappointment and outrage at the Trustees' response.

Dr. Yen . . . has shown me a telegram . . . reporting that the Yale-in-China trustees for financial





reasons are unable to make the proposed contribution to Dr. Yen's plan of medical instruction in Shanghai for students of Hsiang-Ya and St. John's. I wonder whether the trustees fully considered their share of responsibility towards the students whose education was begun at Changsha. True, it was not the fault of the trustees in New Haven that the school had to be closed. At the same time I should think that you and your colleagues would want to exhaust every possible resource before declining to make the relatively trifling contribution that Dr. Yen asked . . . I am profoundly depressed over the effect of this decision on the prestige of Yale-in-China, which has done such good work in the past, and have therefore ventured to cable my views to you quite frankly.<sup>4</sup>

Greene communicated again with Stokes in September:

I have just received your letter of August 9th further explaining the action of the Yale-in-China Trustees in relation to the Shanghai Medical School project. I was not surprised at the financial difficulties which naturally governed the action of the Board, but the tone of indifference which I noted in some of the correspondence from New Haven rather disappointed me and made me question the probability of any significant resuscitation of the Ya-li enterprise itself, to say nothing of the medical school.<sup>5</sup>

Not to provide for their students when the chips were down shows a lack of concern that fails to harmonize with the Society's guiding principles. Everyone knew that the medical school could not be continued as before--that much was obvious before the disturbances began. The Trustees feared for their credit and, responsibility to their students aside, they would not support any further schemes which threatened to bog them down again in an expensive undertaking in medicine. In the face of the Trustees' action, the China Medical Board declined to



vouch for the Hsiang-Ya students. And that was that.

Yen, on his own, was able to locate positions in China where members of the class of 1927 might complete their internships; several members of Hsiang-Ya's class of 1929 were admitted to Peking Union to complete their work.<sup>6</sup> It is not known what happened to the rest of the Hsiang-Ya students after the Trustees defaulted. Early on Yen gave attention to the matter of reorganizing Hunan-Yale as a "good provincial school which has the prospect of becoming the best of its kind in China. Such a school will best adapt to the local needs and finance. With a staff made up of Chinese, with Hunanese in the majority, the budget will not be very great."<sup>7</sup> But such a school was for the future, not for 1927. Yen himself served as Vice Director of Peking Union during 1927-28 and later as Dean of the National Medical College of Shanghai and Director of the Shanghai Medical Center.<sup>8</sup>

The Hsiang-Ya plant--hospital and medical school building--were borrowed from May through August by the Board of Trustees of Changsha Union Hospital under the urging of Dr. K. Y. Wang of Changsha Union, who had not been previously associated with Yale-in-China.<sup>9</sup> His idea was to keep unions and "other radical organizations" from usurping the fine plant for their own headquarters and to give Changsha Union a more extensive plant.<sup>10</sup>



Former employees were kept on, with the exception of the male nurses, who were almost wholly discharged. The Hunan government promised \$4,000 silver a month but in characteristic fashion was unable to supply this longer than one month and thenceforth contributed a few hundred dollars. This had the effect of depleting the hospital of doctors and nurses, who then left for work in military hospitals, leaving Wang, two or three other Chinese doctors, and a reduced nursing staff. During the summer of 1927 the medical college building was used as an infectious disease hospital and during the winter as a military hospital.<sup>11</sup> By May, 1928, the government was providing \$7,000 per month for the hospital and \$1,000 per month for a school of midwifery, started largely by Wang to keep the medical college building occupied. Wang, of course, wanted the Yale Mission and the foundations to resume Hsiang-Ya in a big way but Leavens and the members of the Yale-in-China Continuation Committee in Shanghai assured him that this was "quite out of the question"--although the Yale Mission would not object to a responsible organization using the hospital.<sup>12</sup>

Yen returned to Changsha in January, 1929, and called a meeting of the Yü-ch'ün Educational Association. The Hsiang-Ya Board was reorganized, Dr. Wang elected Dean of the Medical School and the government approached



for \$85,000 silver to cover costs of the medical school, nursing school, and hospital; midwifery was discontinued.<sup>13</sup>

The Yale Foreign Missionary Society agreed to provide the salary of Dr. Wang as Superintendent of the Hsiang-Ya Hospital, and of Louise Farnam, M.D., and Jessie Norelius, R.N., both of whom had served at Hsiang-Ya prior to 1927.<sup>14</sup> Thus a limited cooperation continued, the Yale Mission only providing a few salaries and use of the hospital.

The middle school reopened on the Yali campus. Since Yale-in-China had over the years rather gained its reputation in science work, the college department was reorganized in Wuchang as "The Yale-in-China School of Science in Hua Chung College."<sup>15</sup> Thus the dreaded cooperation in non-medical education came to pass.

Hume expressed little outward feeling about the failure of the medical school. He (and Yen) had, of course, made Hsiang-Ya. Hume's farsightedness and penchant for skipping the details had given him the vision to dare to build up from scratch a Johns Hopkins in China. He was limited by the very real restrictions of finance and by the chronic indecision that kept a too-ambitious, too-comprehensive program of education from ever functioning at a high level of excellence in any one department. There were always too many plans and too few realists--even on the Yale-in-China Board of Trustees. That Hume





could not make bricks without straw in an observation that perhaps sets the perspective for evaluating his role in the Hsiang-Ya enterprise.

If Hume made Hsiang-Ya, it is no less true that Hsiang-Ya made Hume. In his last few years of work as an officer in field for the Y.F.M.S., Hume became more and more involved in administrative work. After his twenty-two-year tenure with Yale-in-China, he served as Director of the New York Post-Graduate Medical School of Columbia University and in a number of administrative positions in various organizations until his retirement in 1946. From 1934-37 he served as a special member of the National Health Administration in China. From 1937-39, he surveyed hospitals in India, Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. He finished his career as Secretary of the Christian Medical Council for Overseas Work.<sup>16</sup> It is doubtful that he ever practiced medicine after 1925.

The Hsiang-Ya Agreements gave Hume an opportunity to try to give "the best in the Christian West to the Chinese people."<sup>17</sup> His goal was to "launch a univeristy medical school"--to father a Johns Hopkins in China. In this he failed--but not utterly. This ability of Hsiang-Ya's graduates showed what could be done in the face of less than optimal conditions. The years of the Hsiang-Ya Agreements were an attempt to demonstrate Western standards and ideals. The ultimate realization and integration



of these into the matrix of Chinese medical practice would take place, however, in the absence of Hsiang-Ya's American advisers.

Seen in retrospect, the first Hsiang-Ya Agreement provided the Yale Mission with an opportunity to enlarge the scope of its medical work without sacrificing its evangelical calling. Cooperation with the Chinese gentry legitimized the Yale presence in Changsha. Involvement of the government through the Yü-ch'ün Educational Association effectively prevented the establishment of a low-grade medical school by Chinese doctors educated in Japan, who vigorously protested both Hsiang-Ya agreements. Although the organizational structure of the hospital, medical school, and nursing schools under the first Hsiang-Ya Agreement was touted to involve the Chinese in a truly cooperative venture, in essence the Yale Mission ran Hsiang-Ya, as has been pointed out. The Y.F.M.S. offered the Chinese gentry an opportunity to participate in establishing a medical school that would eventually be supported and managed by the Chinese themselves. To the extent that the gentry were unable to organize a medical school on their own or (and this is not known) preferred Hume's medicine to that



of doctors returned from Japan, they were virtually forced to cooperate or be shut out entirely. From the point of view of the gentry, Hsiang-Ya cooperation provided an outlet for the expression of the traditional benevolent role of the gentry in Chinese society, a means of strengthening Hunan against western intrusion by meeting the foreigners half way, and a way of establishing a precedence for excellence in medical work. The Yale success in medical work from 1908-13 could be turned to gentry advantage by an agreement to cooperate in establishing a jointly run hospital and medical school. Though the gentry tried to manage their portion of the financial responsibility, they fell short. Yet the hospital and medical school remained a visibly cooperative enterprise--if only in name. As Hume and the Y.F.M.S. desperately cast around for foundation support, the cooperative endeavor was in fact prompted as a willingness to work together--a desired but largely unrealized mutual goal to contribute money, personnel, and equipment.

Under the second agreement, control of the medical school lay ostensibly in the hands of the Chinese. Yet Yen's tutelage of the other Chinese administrators implied a great deal of Yale Mission control, as did the infusion of money from Yale Mission sources. Hume frankly admitted that if the Mission could not run the medical school through



the Joint Administrative Council, then the Y.F.M.S. should withdraw from cooperative work with the gentry. "Cooperation with the Chinese" was a nice slogan. But in the eyes of Hsiang-Ya's western tutors, true cooperation was still for the future, even when the second Hsiang-Ya Agreement was signed. The oft-mentioned goal of Chinese management eventually became a double-edged sword as the Chinese were forced by the threat of the China Medical Board's financial withdrawal to assume in the second Hsiang-Ya Agreement a degree of support which they were by their own admission in no way prepared to bear.

Many of Hsiang-Ya's problems stem from the fact that this was no modest experiment. From the time of Harkness's donation of the hospital, the idea of establishing a first-rate medical complex modeled on "the best in the Christian West" seems to have taken on a life of its own in Hume's mind, independent of warlords, the price of silver, provincial prostration, or standoffishness in New Haven. Edward S. Harkness's good intentions spurred a too-rapid expansion of medical work; the hospital became a "white elephant," difficult to supply, maintain, and staff.<sup>18</sup> Although early medical work took place in an atmosphere of constant solitation in New Haven, one does not read of financial problems during the Yale Court of Medicine-period of Yale-in-China's hospital work (1908 - 1913).





Without a promise of endowment or current support of the hospital by Harkness, the Y.F.M.S. and the Chinese were overtaken by the evils of warlordism and inflation, not to mention ambivalence about the medical work on the part of the Yale-in-China Trustees. Plans were made, revised, scrapped, remade, re-revised, and scrapped anew. One of Yale-in-China's critics at the Commonwealth Fund commented that the Fund's file on Hsiang-Ya was "the most voluminous documentation of confused and uncertain plans I have read in a long time."<sup>19</sup> Yet, despite all problems, the medical school earned high marks from the China Medical Board--an agency surely in a position to know and judge quality medical education. The medical work's high marks were borrowed to enhance the status of the Academic Department of Yale-in-China, seen by the Chinese as a foreign element in an enterprise of which one side had the tremendous moral support of the Chinese--even if the Chinese were unable to meet their contracted financial obligations.

As for Edward Hume, it is hard to separate what he wanted for himself from what he wanted for Hsiang-Ya. One remains ambivalent about Hume; for to evaluate his role in Hsiang-Ya one must tread into "that indefinable realm where altruism and exploitation meet."<sup>20</sup> As the researcher approaches Hume through his often cogent and earnest prose,



it is difficult to remain above Hume's battles and easy to be beguiled and led astray by this fascinating man. Yet it is vital to see Hume in all his complexity. His leap to accept Harlan Beach's visionary offer after his disappointment in India and the dangers to which he subjected his family in going to China show his determination to enhance his own professional reputation as a medical educator and to act for Yale-in-China as Daniel Coit Gilman had done for the fledgling Johns Hopkins University. Hume was continually stymied, however, in playing the role of Gilman to Edward Harkness's Johns Hopkins for Harkness refused to play Hopkins to Hsiang-Ya. Given the prevailing conditions in China, Harkness would not act out Hume's and the Trustee's fantasies of being rescued by him.

Hume was the most energetic member of the Yale Mission. His enthusiasm and constructive ability prolonged the life of Hsiang-Ya until its demise in 1927. Hume was determined to make his medical school succeed. The medical advisory board and its intimidating composition show the extent to which he tried to marshal support for Hsiang-Ya as he jousting with the Yale-in-China Board of Trustees over finances and the very continuation of the school itself. Hume's expectations and ambitions found it hard to meet the cruel reality of China in



turmoil and a board of Trustees in New Haven committed more and more to influencing young Chinese through the Academic Department of Yale-in-China than to establishing a first-rate medical school modeled on Johns Hopkins. For the trustees the medical school and hospital did not provide a stage for attaining their narrower goals. The Nationalist Revolution and John Carter Vincent (Dickson Leavens's "Uncle Sam") conveniently saved the Y.F.M.S. from a potentially embarrassing situation as the Trustees attempted to withdraw from Hsiang-Ya and to continue as the primary focus the Academic Department.

Hsiang-Ya cooperation in medical education was maintained for fourteen years in the face of considerable odds against its continuation. Neither party to the agreement can be said to have realized its real or implied goals. The Chinese gentry succeeded in maintaining the appearance of meeting the foreigners half way; they did not succeed in taking over the medical school while the agreements were in effect. Although the Y.F.M.S. educated Hsiang-Ya medical students to a sense of community service, evangelical work flagged in the medical school. In fact, the missionary aspect of Yale-in-China medical school work was called into question by Hume himself as the Hsiang-Ya experiment progressed. As several Yali students proudly noted, what the two groups did succeed in establishing



for a time was what "[n]ext to Peking Union Medical College . . . might be said to be the best medical college in China."<sup>21</sup> And that, in the confused circumstances in which Hsiang-Ya grew, developed, and fell, had perhaps been achievement enough.





## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Yen to Bevis, June 17, 1927, Yale-in-China Archives (YCA).

<sup>2</sup>Norma S. Thompson to Bevis, June 11, 1927, YCA.

<sup>3</sup>Bevis to Yen, July 23, 1927, YCA.

<sup>4</sup>Greene to Stokes, June 27, 1927, YCA.

<sup>5</sup>Greene to Stokes, September 5, 1927, YCA.

<sup>6</sup>"Continuation Committee Vote 16: Medical Degrees," July 1, 1928, YCA.

<sup>7</sup>Yen to Leavens (winter/spring, 1927), YCA.

<sup>8</sup>Ferguson, China Medical Board and Peking Union Medical College, pp. 61, 127. The following information about F. C. Yen's fortunes after the fall of Hsiang-Ya was made available to the author by AnElissa Lucas of the East Asian Research Center at Harvard: From 1928-38 he was head of the Red Cross Hospital in Shanghai; from 1938-41, Director of the National Health Administration; from 1953-?, Vice President of Shanghai First Medical College; from 1959-?, President of Shanghai Medical College. In late 1966 he was criticized by the Red Guards and in early 1967 by Chiang Ching. It is not known whether he was rehabilitated after the Cultural Revolution. If he is still alive, he is in his mid-nineties.

<sup>9</sup>K. Y. Wang to Leavens, December 25, 1927, YCA. The Union Hospital occupation of Hsiang-Ya continued after the original period for which the building was borrowed; Wang was the only doctor to move to Hsiang-Ya. Changsha Union was used for teaching purposes by Hsiang-Ya.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>This building was originally conceived of as being only temporary. It was certainly not a very adequate housing for laboratories or wards since it had wooden floors. The Hsiang-Ya Hospital had floors of reinforced concrete.



<sup>12</sup>Leavens, comments in "Yale in China Continuation Committee, May 5, 1928," YCA. The Continuation Committee was the remnant of the Governing Board and carried out such business as was necessary until Yale-in-China reopened.

<sup>13</sup>Francis S. Hutchins, "Annual Report of Yale-in-China, 1928-29," p. 5.

<sup>14</sup>Francis S. Hutchins, "The Progress of Yale-in-China to June, 1930," p. 6.

<sup>15</sup>Holden, Yale-in-China: The Mainland, p. 186.

<sup>16</sup>Nathan A. Smyth, ed., Half-Century Record: Class of 1897, Yale College, pp. 170-71. Hume died in 1957.

<sup>17</sup>Hume to F. Wells Williams, January 13, 1925, YCA.

<sup>18</sup>Leavens to Bevis, July 9, 1926, Yale-in-China Archives (YCA).

<sup>19</sup>A. E. Shimer to Barry Smith, April 12, 1945, Archives of the Commonwealth Fund.

<sup>20</sup>Jonathan Spence, "Introduction" to The China Helpers, n. p.


<sup>21</sup>C. N. Li, C. C. Lao, N. T. Wen to Trustees, March 26, 1925, YCA.



APPENDIX I

ADMINISTRATION OF YALE-IN-CHINA AND HSIANG-YA  
DURING THE PERIOD OF THE FIRST HSIANG-YA  
AGREEMENT: AN ORGANIZATIONAL  
DIAGRAM










APPENDIX II

ADMINISTRATION OF YALE-IN-CHINA AND HSIANG-YA  
DURING THE PERIOD OF THE SECOND HSIANG-YA  
AGREEMENT: AN ORGANIZATIONAL  
DIAGRAM







### APPENDIX III

#### TEXT OF THE FIRST HSIANG-YA AGREEMENT (ENGLISH)

Source: China Mission Year Book 1916, pp. 528-530

[Archival copy not extant]



### APPENDIX III

#### III. DRAFT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE HUNAN GENTRY AND THE YALE MISSION FOR CO-OPERATION IN MEDICAL SCHOOL AND HOSPITAL WORK

THIS AGREEMENT IS MADE between the Hunan Ru-Chun Educational Association 湖南育羣學會 and the Yale Mission for the purpose of providing treatment for disease, promoting medical education and investigating the cause of disease.

Article I. The contracting parties agree to conduct the following matters in co-operation:--

1. To maintain at Changsha a hospital for the treatment of disease and one or more dispensaries for out-patients.

2. To maintain a medical school whose curriculum shall be determined after careful study of the regulations of the Board of Education; and to request the Board of Education to depute inspectors to examine the standards adopted.

3. To maintain a School of Nursing for instruction in the art of nursing; and in connection therewith, to maintain a department of Obstetrics.

4. To maintain a laboratory for the investigation of the cause of disease.

Article II. The Hunan Ru-Chun Educational Association undertakes the following responsibilities:--

1. To erect a Medical School Building and a Nursing School Building at a total cost of about \$156,000 Mexican. Half this amount is to be expended in the first place, i.e. about \$78,000 Mexican. \$30,000 Mexican is to be paid within the current year and the balance of \$40,000 before the expiration of two years. The other half of the whole sum is to be paid in full within four years. In case a suitable official building can be set apart for the use of the schools, the erection of new school buildings may be avoided.

2. The annual running expenses for the two schools, up to a total of two hundred students, will be provided, according to an annual budget, by this educational association; but the total amount shall not exceed





\$50,000 Mexican a year. Moreover, the salaries of teachers who are graduates of Western Universities are not included in this allowance.

3. The expenses connected with the opening of the School of Medicine and the School of Nursing.

Article III. The Yale Mission undertakes the following responsibilities:--

1. To erect a hospital at a cost of about \$180,000 Mexican.

2. To provide the salaries and expenses of teachers, physicians, and nurses who are graduates of Western Universities. But the total number thus provided is not required to exceed fifteen persons.

3. The expenses connected with the opening of the hospital.

Article IV. In connection with the matters to be conducted co-operatively, the medical school and hospital buildings mentioned in the two preceding articles are for the common use of both parties. But the buildings' equipment, pictures, and books and scientific instruments, and all similar articles associated with their use, shall be the property of the original owner, and may not be indiscriminately claimed.

Article V. The activities enumerated shall be commenced directly after the ratification of this agreement. But during the interval preceding the completion of the medical school and hospital buildings, the matters to be conducted co-operatively are as follows:--

1. To maintain a medical preparatory school with a two years course before graduation.

2. To maintain two schools for nursing (male and female).

3. To carry on the Yale Hospital at Si Pai Lou (西牌樓).

Article VI. With reference to the expenses incurred in connection with responsibilities undertaken in the preceding article, the Yale Mission undertakes to provide the salaries and expenses of the teachers and physicians who are graduates of Western Universities; all other expenses shall be provided by the Hunan Ru-Chun Educational Association, but the total expenses thus provided shall not exceed \$50,000 Mexican for the two years.

Article VII. The contracting parties shall each appoint ten men, who, together, shall form the Board of Managers, which Board shall have the powers enumerated below:--

1. To vote on co-operative issues and on matters relating to the progress of the co-operation.



2. To appoint and dismiss employees. But in the case of a teacher, if he be found not doing his duty, he may be removed by a three-quarters vote of the Board.

3. To supervise matters that are co-operatively conducted.

Article VIII. If any one of the Board of Managers fails to do his duty or hinders progress, he may be requested to resign by a three-quarters vote of the Board of Managers. The vacancy shall be filled by appointment from that party to which the resigned member belonged; but at the time of appointment there must be a confirmatory vote of three-quarters of the Board of Managers.

Article IX. An Executive Committee numbering seven shall be elected from among the Board of Managers. Of this number one shall be chairman; two shall be secretaries; and two, treasurers. There shall be one Chinese and one American secretary; and one Chinese and one American treasurer. The remaining two members shall be physicians, who shall have the management of the hospital, and shall recommend physicians (for appointment). Members of this executive committee who receive no salary from either party may receive an allowance for expenses.

Article X. Since physicians have a very intimate relationship with society, the teachers engaged shall, in addition to giving instruction in the principles of medicine, lay stress on moral character. Moreover they may, outside of the required curriculum, explain and lecture on the principles of religion. But respect shall be paid to everyone's individual liberty of belief.

Article XI. This co-operation has as its sole object the advancement of medical education, and has no relation whatever to governmental spheres of education or sanitation.

Article XII. This co-operation is entered into with the idea of permanence, but the first ten years shall be a period of probation. If at the end of that time it is found to be successful, the co-operation may be continued. But if either party desires to withdraw, the co-operation may be terminated, but notice must be given one year in advance.

Article XIII. After the signing of this agreement by the contracting parties, the Hunan Ru-Chun Educational Association shall petition the Civil Governor of Hunan to sanction and register it, and the Yale Mission shall forward it to its Home Society for confirmation. After such sanction it shall be regarded as ratified.



Article XIV. Three copies of this agreement shall be prepared. The Hunan Ru-Chun Educational Association shall forward one to the Civil Governor of Hunan to be filed with him. The Hunan Ru-Chun Educational Association and the Yale Mission shall each retain one of the remaining copies as a permanent evidence of their contract.

Signed by

顏梅章朱任貝聶王張湯李向向王周朱向陳陳楊胡  
福遠廷福允其隆式鐵鑑瑞瑞時宏啓瑞仲元  
慶馨駿利黎昕琨中恭樵鑑琨琮澤業鎔彝虹揚度侯

On behalf of the Hunan Ru-Chun Educational Association.

And by

Brownell Gage, 蓋葆耐.  
E.D. Harvey, 赫汝輝.

E.H. Hume, 胡美  
A.C. Reed, 茅愛理.

W.J. Hail, 解維廉.

On behalf of the Yale Mission.

This Twenty-first day of the Seventh month of the Third year of the Republic of China.



APPENDIX IV

TEXT OF THE SECOND HSIANG-YA AGREEMENT (ENGLISH)

[Courtesy Yale-in-China Archives]





## APPENDIX IV

### COPY OF HSIANG-YA AGREEMENT

[Retyped without correction from manuscript]

#### PREAMBLE:

An Agreement was made between the HUNAN YUCHUN EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATION and the YALE MISSION in 1914 for cooperation in Medical Education. That Agreement has been continued, as originally arranged, during the ten years from 1914 to 1924. The original contracting parties now believe that the time has come for increasing still further the administrative and financial control of Chinese institutions by Chinese Organizations, and, therefore, agree upon the basis of procedure set down in the following Articles:

#### ARTICLE I. The Contracting Parties.

This new Agreement is made between the HUNAN YUCHUN EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATION and the YALE MISSION for the promotion of modern medical education, providing treatment for the sick, and investigating diseases peculiar to China.

#### ARTICLE II. Purpose.

The purpose of this Agreement is to work towards the building up of a Chinese Medical College of Grade A for Central China.

Since the science of medicine knows no national boundaries, the contracting parties agree that, while the direction of the Medical College shall be in the hands of a strong Chinese board, the directors shall be free to include in its teaching faculty both the best Chinese medical teachers available, and the best Western medical teachers whose services can be secured.

Similarly, the contracting parties agree that, while the major support of the institution must come, before long, from Chinese sources, local and national, the directors shall be free at all times to appeal for funds outside of China.



### ARTICLE III. Length of Agreement.

This Agreement shall continue for a period of ten years, from July 1, 1924 to June 30, 1934.

During the contract period, the Agreement may not be terminated unless the educational standards of the Medical College are shown to be endangered by continued reduction in staff or resources, in which case either party may withdraw from the Agreement after giving one year's notice.

At the end of the fourth year, the contracting parties shall meet to reconsider whether they can continue the Agreement during the unexpired portion of the contract period. At that time, one year's notice may be given that the Agreement will not continue after the end of the fifth year:

1. If either party finds itself unable to continue to secure its share of the funds.
2. If it has become possible for the H.Y.E.A. to secure a competent Chinese faculty and the assurance of funds sufficient for the independent maintenance of a Medical College of Grade A.

### ARTICLE IV. Name.

During the period of this Agreement, the institutions shall be known as

THE HSIANG-YA COLLEGE OF MEDICINE  
THE HSIANG-YA HOSPITAL  
THE HSIANG-YA SCHOOL OF NURSING

### ARTICLE V. Hospital Facilities.

Since medical education requires clinical as well as classroom instruction, the Yale Mission agrees, during the period of this Agreement, to place its Hospital at the disposal of the Medical College as the clinical training ground for its undergraduate and post-graduate students.

### ARTICLE VI. Administrative Control.

During the period of this Agreement, the contracting



parties agree to divide the administrative control as follows:

1. Medical College Board. The Medical college and its Postgraduate Department shall be under the direction of a Board elected by the H.Y.E.A., to be called hereinafter the Medical College Board.

The members of this Board shall be men of character and educational experience, drawn from any of the provinces.

The Medical College Board shall elect from its own membership an Executive Committee which shall conduct such duties as may be delegated to it by the Board.

The Medical College Board shall elect the Director and the Dean of the Medical College. In the Choice of teachers, it shall be governed by Article VIII.

If requested by the Medical College Board, the Yale Mission will nominate an Advisory Committee to sit with the Medical College Board or its Executive Committee, but without vote.

2. Hospital Board. The Hospital and School of Nursing shall be under the direction of a Board of Directors, elected jointly by the H.Y.E.A. and the Y.M. to be called hereinafter the Hospital Board.

Each of the contracting parties shall nominate six members and these shall be considered to have been elected when approved by the other contracting party.

The Hospital Board shall elect the Superintendent of the Hospital and the Dean of the School of Nursing. In respect to clinical opportunities in the Hospital, it shall be governed by Article VIII.



ARTICLE VII. Land and Buildings.

The contracting parties agree:

1. To continue to retain equal shares of the equity in the land jointly purchases in 1913.

2. That the Medical College and such other buildings as may be erected with the funds of the Hunan Yuchun Educational Association shall belong to the H.Y.E.A., the Hospital and such other buildings as may be erected with the funds of the Y.M. shall belong to the Y.M.

3. That in case the Agreement is discontinued, either party shall have the right to purchase from the other its share of the equity in the land, as well as the buildings erected by it, the amount of payment to be determined by a committee of five, two to be elected by each of the contracting parties, the four thus chosen to elect the fifth member.

ARTICLE VIII. Teaching Policy.

Since this Agreement is made for the purpose of promoting medical education, the contracting parties agree upon the following teaching policy to last during the period of this Agreement:

1. The H.Y.E.A. agrees:

- a. To appoint to its faculty such medical teachers as are approved by the Joint Administrative Committee, whether their salaries are provided by the H.Y.E.A. or the Y.M.
- b. To encourage all of its teachers who have clinical ability to take part in the clinical work of the Hospital, provided such teachers shall be acceptable to the Hospital Board.

2. The Y.M. agrees:

- a. To place its Hospital clinical staff at the disposal of the Medical College as teachers of clinical subjects.





- b. To offer clinical facilities in the Hospital to such teachers of the Medical College as shall be acceptable to the Hospital Board.

3. The H.Y.E.A. and the Y.M. jointly agree that matters of instruction and educational discipline shall be in the hands of a Medical Faculty whose members shall have equal voice, under whichever of the contracting parties they hold appointment.

4. The contracting parties agree that, since the science of medicine knows no national boundaries, the graduates of the Medical College may, in addition to the official Government diploma conferred by the Medical College itself, and contingent upon their fulfilling requirements that would entitle them to a medical degree in America, receive from the Yale Mission such degree or diploma as it has authority to confer by reason of its American incorporation, thus securing for the graduates of the Medical College a medical degree which shall have recognition abroad as well as in China.

#### ARTICLE IX. Financial Responsibility.

During the period of this Agreement, the contracting parties, while agreeing that they are cooperating for the promotion of modern medical education, providing treatment for the sick, and investigating diseases peculiar to China, agree, for administrative convenience, to divide their financial responsibilities as follows:

##### 1. The H.Y.E.A. agrees:

- a. To provide all the expenses of the Medical College and its Postgraduate Department, including salaries of staff, scientific equipment, maintenance of plant, and endowment funds.

- b. To secure funds for the increasing needs of the Medical College from all possible sources, as follows:

- (1) Beginning with the use of the grants already promised, of \$50,000 from the Hunan Government and \$30,000 from the Central Government, to increase from this total of \$80,000 annually in 1924 to \$115,000 annually in 1929.



- (2) To increase still further from \$115,000 annually in 1929 to \$150,000 annually by 1934.

2. The Y.M. agrees:

To provide an annual sum of G\$50,000 to be distributed as follows:

- a. G\$40,000 annually for the maintenance of the Hospital and School of Nursing, including the salaries of the Hospital and Nursing staff.
- b. G\$10,000 annually for the salaries of professors in the Medical College.

3. The H.Y.E.A. and the Y.M. both agree that any responsibilities undertaken by either party as outlined in Articles II and III of the Agreement of 1914 and which have not yet been fulfilled, shall be regarded as an additional liability to be discharged within the period of this new Agreement.

4. The H.Y.E.A. and the Y.M. both agree that, as contracting parties, they shall be separately responsible for the securing of the funds promised in Sections 1 to 3 above, and shall be separately in entire custody of the funds thus raised.

5. The H.Y.E.A. and the Y.M. both agree that all accounts shall be regularly audited by an Auditing Board to be designated by the Joint Administrative Committee.

ARTICLE X. Joint Administrative Committee.

The Medical College Board and the Hospital Board shall each elect two from their own membership to form a Joint Administrative Committee, and these four shall elect a fifth to complete the number.

This J.A.C. of five members shall act as a liaison committee which shall consider, from time to time, all matters of relationship between the Medical College Board and the Hospital Board. It shall endeavor to adjust causes of friction and in every way to promote the smooth working of the present Agreement. Its findings shall be referred to the Medical College Board and the Hospital Board for final approval.



ARTICLE XI. The Function of the Medical College.

The Medical College shall be a private institution, serving as a university medical college for Central China. It shall maintain a standard of work equal to a Grade A school in Europe and America, and its curriculum shall correspond to the regulations of the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education, the Provincial Board of Education, and recognized medical Associations of high standing in the country shall have the right to send inspectors to examine its work.

ARTICLE XII. The Function of the Hospital and School of Nursing.

The Hospital, being a philanthropic institution as well as an adjunct to the Medical College, shall place its clinical facilities at the service of the community to the fullest possible extent.

The School of Nursing shall train selected students for the profession of nursing. Its standards shall not fall below that of a Senior Middle School.

ARTICLE XIII. Religious Freedom.

Since physicians have very intimate relationships with society, all teachers engaged shall be persons who, in addition to possessing skill in the principles of medicine, are individuals of strong moral character. Respect shall be paid to everyone's liberty or belief.

ARTICLE XIV. Approval of the Agreement.

After this Agreement has been approved by the Civil Governor of Hunan, it shall be signed by the H.Y.E.A. After it has been approved by the Board of Trustees of the Yale Foreign Missionary Society in America, it shall be signed by the Y.M. Thereafter it shall be considered in effect.

Nine copies of the ratified Agreement shall be made, one to be filed in each of the following offices:

1. The Peking Cabinet
2. The Ministry of Education
3. The Ministry of Finance
4. The Civil Governor of Hunan
5. The Provincial Board of Education



6. The Provincial Board of Finance
7. The Hunan Yuchun Educational Association
8. The Trustees of the Yale Foreign Missionary Society
9. The Yale Mission

ARTICLE XV. Authoritative Text.

This Agreement shall be translated into English but in case of doubt, the Chinese text shall be taken as final.

(Signed) \_\_\_\_\_

Representative of the Hunan  
Yuchun Educational Association

(Signed) \_\_\_\_\_

Representative of the Yale  
Mission

Insining the Agreement the Yale Mission reserves the right, if circumstances make it necessary, to withdraw from the Agreement at the expiry of two years, namely on June 30th, 1926.

\_\_\_\_\_  
1924.





APPENDIX V

TEXT OF THE SECOND HSIANG-YA AGREEMENT (CHINESE)

[Courtesy Yale-in-China Archives]



## 湘雅續訂新約

湖南育羣學會與美國雅禮會於民國三年訂立合約雙方照約履行至民國十三年十年期滿茲以中國教育事業應由中國加負管理及經濟之責雙方認為時機已至經同意續訂合約如左

### 第一款 原起

本合約為育羣學會與美國雅禮會續訂之新約以發達醫學診治疾病並研究中國之特種病源

### 第二款 宗旨

本續約之宗旨為中華中部各省區建設甲等程度之中國醫科大學校該校由強有力之中國校董會掌理一切除聘請中國合格之醫學教授外得延聘西國名醫擔任教授該校經濟之大部分應由中國國家及地方經費補助外亦得隨時向國外籌募以符科學無分國界之意



### 第三款 期限

本續約以十年為期自民國十三年即一九二四年七月一日起至民國二十三年即一九三四年六月三十日止

本續約期內雙方不得分離但如醫校之教員人數漸少或經費來源漸減以致教科程度降低時則無論何方得於一年以前宣告退約

本約之第四年底即民國十七年六月三十日雙方須合議本約之應否繼續其時

(一)如有一方不能照約籌集經費或(二)育羣學會能以合格之中國教職員及充分經濟之擔保獨立自辦甲等醫科大學時則以一年之預期宣告至第五

年度底(即民國十八年六月三十日)本續約即行取消

### 第四款 名稱

在本續約期內仍稱

湘雅醫科大學校





湘雅醫院

湘雅護病學校

### 第五款 醫院

雅禮會願於本續約期內以醫院全部設備供給醫校之已未畢業學生臨診臨床實習之用

### 第六款 權限

本續約期內雙方分任主管下列事項

(甲)校董會 醫科大學校及研究院由育羣學會選舉校董會主管之該校董會以道德高尚富有教育經驗者組織之不分省域

校董會得互選執行委員會以執行校董會所規定之一切任務

醫校總理及校長由校董會選任之至於聘任教員以第八款規定之

(乙)院董會 醫院及護病學校由雅禮會與育羣學會合組院董會主管之雙





方各推院董二人方可推之人以得彼方之同意為當選

院董會得互選執行委員會以執行院董會所規定之一切任務

醫院院長護病學校校長由院董會選任之至於臨診臨床事宜以第

八款規定之

## 第七款 房地產

(甲) 民國二年合購之地皮仍繼續由雙方共同掌管

(乙) 醫學校舍及其他育羣學會所建房屋歸育羣學會所有醫院及其他雅禮會所建之房屋歸雅禮會所有

(丙) 倘有退約分離之時雙方得照公估價值備價收受地皮房產其公估委員會以五人組織之每方各舉二人再由此四人另舉第五人

## 第八款 教授方針

本續約期內雙方同意規定教授方針如下以符本約發達醫學之宗旨



(甲) 育羣學會擔任

(一) 聘任醫學教員無論其薪水由育羣學會或雅禮會擔任須得聯合委員會之同意

(二) 鼓勵能任醫務之教員至醫院臨診臨床但以取得院董會之同意為限

(乙) 雅禮會擔任

(一) 凡院內醫士得由醫校選任為醫校教員(不另支薪)

(二) 供給經院董會同意之醫校教員以院內一切臨診臨床之便利

(丙) 雙方同意凡醫校一切教授課程及訓育事宜由醫校教員會管理之該教員會由雙方所聘之合格教員組織之

(丁) 醫校畢業生除經政府考驗及格由醫校給予證書外得由雅禮會以美國政府賦予之特權考驗其成績合得美國學位時授予學位證書俾該畢業生同得中外之承認而符科學無分國界之本旨



## 第九款

## 經費

本續約原為合辦醫學治病及研究事業今為各部組織便利起見雙方同意分任經費之責如下

## (甲) 育羣學會擔任

(一) 醫校及研究院之全部經常薪修設備建築基金各費

(二) 盡力籌集經費以擴充醫校分期如下

(1) 自民國十三年(一九二四年)以呈准中央撥給之常年經費三萬元及湘省政府撥給之常年經費五萬元每年共銀洋八萬元至民國十八年(一九二九年)須增至常年經費拾壹萬五千元

(2) 自民國十八年(一九二九年)每年銀洋拾壹萬五千元至民國二十三年(一九三四年)每年增至銀洋十五萬元

## (乙) 雅禮會擔任





每年金洋五萬元其支配如下

(一)以金洋四萬元為醫院及護病學校一切經常及薪水之用

(二)以金洋壹萬元為醫校教員薪水之用

(丙)雙方同意所有民國三年所訂第一次合約第二款內未經履行之條件在本續約期內仍為有效並須切實履行

(丁)雙方同意照本約(甲)(乙)(丙)三條內各方所擔負之經費由各原方負責籌集保管以清界限

(戊)雙方同意所有校院各種賬目須由聯合委員會推舉查賬員稽核之

## 第十款

### 聯合委員會

聯合委員會由校董會及院董會各選舉董事二人再由此四人另舉第五人組織之





聯合委員會為校董會及院董會之聯合機關凡校院兩部相關之事如疏通意見實行本約所規定之事項等皆為聯合委員會之職責其議定事項仍交校董會及院董會決議施行

### 第十一款

#### 醫學校

醫科大學為全國中區私立之醫學教育機關得遵照部章並參攷歐美甲等醫科大學課程辦理隨時受教育部教育司及全國最高醫學會之考查

### 第十二款

#### 醫院及護校

醫院為慈善事業並為醫學校附屬機關以盡力服務社會為職責護病學校為造就護病職業之專材其程度不得低於高級中學

### 第十三款

#### 信仰自由

醫士與社會有密切之關係所聘教員除教授學生醫學上之智



識外尤須注重道德並尊重個人信仰之自由

# 第十四款

## 訂約手續

本續約由育羣學會呈請湖南省長核准後即由育羣學會簽字並由雅禮會請得美國總會同意後由雅禮會簽字再行呈請省長署及國務院教育財政各部備案

本續約計立九份一份呈國務院二份呈教育財政兩部一份呈省長署二份呈教育財政二司餘存雅禮會及育羣學會永執為據

# 第十五款


## 標準約文

本合約另譯英文如有疑義時以中文為準



育羣學會代表

曹典球



雅禮會代表 胡美



雅禮會簽定本約但在本約  
首二年期滿時即一九二五年  
六月三十日如因事實之困難  
雅禮會保留有退出本約  
之權

Handwritten signature in cursive script.

Handwritten signature in cursive script.



中華民國十四

西曆一九二五

年五月八

日

1925

May

8



## BIBLIOGRAPHY





## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Primary Sources

- Archives of the Commonwealth Fund. The Commonwealth Fund, 1 East 75th Street, New York, New York 10021.
- Dickson H. Leavens Papers. Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520.
- Yale-in-China Archives. Sterling Memorial Library.
- Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1910-1929. U. S. Department of State. National Archives Microfilm 329.
- Consular Despatches: Hankow, 1861-1906. U. S. Department of State. National Archives Microfilm 107.

### Secondary Sources

- Bacon, Leonard. Semi-Centennial: Some of the Life and Part of the Opinions of Leonard Bacon. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1939.
- Bainton, Roland. Yale and the Ministry. New York: Harper, 1957.
- Beers, Henry A. The Ways of Yale in the Consulship of Plancus. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1895.
- Boorman, Howard, ed., and Howard, Richard C., associate ed. Biographical Dictionary of Republican China. 4 Vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967-71.
- Bowers, John. Western Medicine in a Chinese Palace: Peking Union Medical College 1917-1951. Philadelphia: The Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation, 1972.
- Brown, Williams Adams. A Teacher and His Times: A Story of Two Worlds. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940.



- Canby, Henry Seidel. Alma Mater: The Gothic Age of the American College. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1936.
- Chamberlain, Joshua L. Universities and Their Sons: Yale University. Boston: R. Herndon Co., 1900.
- Chang, Kuo-t'ao. The Rise of the CCP (1921-1927). Lawrence, Manhattan, and Wichita: University Press of Kansas, 1971.
- China Educational Commission. Christian Education in China: The Report of the China Educational Commission of 1921-1922. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1922.
- The China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture. Fourth Report (December, 1929). Peiping: The China Foundation, 1929.
- "China Medical Association Requirements for the Registration of Approved Medical Schools." China Medical Journal, XL (1926), pp. 724-726.
- China Medical Board. First Annual Report (1915). New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1916.
- China Medical Board. Second Annual Report (1916). New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1917.
- China Medical Commission of the Rockefeller Foundation. Medicine in China. New York: Printed by the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1914.
- Cochrane, T. "Medical Education in China." China Mission Year Book 1913, pp. 293-297.
- Cohen, Paul. China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Anti-foreignism, 1860-70. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963.
- The Commonwealth Fund. The Commonwealth Fund: Historical Sketch (1918-1962). New York: Harkness House, 1963.
- The Commonwealth Fund. Third Annual Report (1920-1921). New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1922.



The Commonwealth Fund. Fifth Annual Report (1922-1923).  
New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1924.

Cross, Wilbur. Connecticut Yankee: An Autobiography.  
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943.

"Draft of Agreement between the Hunan Gentry and the  
Yale Mission for Co-operation in Medical School  
and Hospital Work." China Mission Year Book 1916,  
pp. 528-530.

Dwight, Timothy. "What a Yale Student Ought to Be."  
New Haven: Stafford Printing Co., 1887.

Fairbank, J. K., Reischauer, E. O., and Craig, A. M.  
East Asia: The Modern Transformation. Boston:  
Houghton Mifflin, 1965.

Ferguson, Mary E. China Medical Board and Peking Union  
Medical College: A Chronicle of Fruitful Collabor-  
ation 1914-1951. New York: China Medical Board  
of New York, 1970.

Flexner, Abraham. Medical Education in the United States  
and Canada. New York: Carnegie Foundation for  
the Advancement of Teaching, 1910.

Franke, Wolfgang. A Century of Chinese Revolution,  
1851-1949. Columbia: University of South Caro-  
lina Press, 1970.

French, John C. A History of the University Founded by  
Johns Hopkins. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins  
University Press, 1946.

Gage, Nina. "The Nurse Enters College." Educational  
Review (Shanghai), XVIII, No. 3 (July, 1926),  
pp. 388-391.

Gilman, Daniel Coit. The Launching of a University.  
New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1906.

Greene, Roger S. "The China Medical Board." China  
Mission Year Book 1917, pp. 430-437.

Greene, Roger S. "The China Medical Board of the Rocke-  
feller Foundation." China Mission Year Book 1916,  
pp. 320-323.



- Greene, Roger S. "The Work of the C. M. B. in 1917-18." China Mission Year Book 1918, pp. 202-207.
- Holden, Reuben. Yale in China: The Mainland 1901-1951. New Haven: The Yale-in-China Association, Inc., 1964.
- Hu, Shih. "The Present Crisis in Christian Education." Educational Review (Shanghai), XVII, No. 3 (July, 1925), pp. 209-215.
- Hume, Edward. The Chinese Way in Medicine. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1940.
- Hume, Edward. "Developments at the Hunan-Yale College of Medicine." China Mission Year Book 1916, pp. 324-325.
- Hume, Edward. Doctors East Doctors West: An American Physician's Life in China. New York: W. W. Norton, 1946.
- Hume, Edward. "Facing the Future of the Missionary Movement." Honolulu: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1927.
- Hume, Edward. "First Graduation Exercises at Yale in China." Educational Review (Shanghai), XIII, No. 4 (October, 1921), pp. 372-374.
- Hume, Edward. "The Inaugural Address." Yali Quarterly, VIII, No. 2 (December, 1924), pp. 5-6.
- Hume, Edward. "Medical Education in China, Today." China Mission Year Book 1925, pp. 318-321.
- Hume, Edward. "Medical Missionary Work in China." China Mission Year Book 1915, pp. 292-302.
- Hume, Edward. "Opening of the Yale Mission Hospital." China Medical Journal, XXII, No. 3 (May, 1908), pp. 183-185.
- Hume, Edward. "Present Movements in Medical Education." China Mission Year Book 1923, pp. 191-204.
- Hume, Edward. "Present Problems of Typhoid Fever, Clinical and Scientific." China Medical Journal, XXII, No. 1 (January, 1908), pp. 1-12.





- Hume, Edward. "The Progress of Christianity." Current History, XXVI, No. 3 (June, 1927), pp. 412-416.
- Hume, Edward. "Report on the Health of Changsha for the Year Ending September 30th, 1909." China Imperial Maritime Customs Medical Reports, 1911 (68th-80th issues), pp. 69-70.
- Hume, Edward. "Report on the Health of Changsha for the Six Months Ended 30th Sept., 1910." China Imperial Maritime Customs Medical Reports, 1911 (68th-80th issues), pp. 90-91.
- Hume, Edward. "Young China." Foreign Affairs, V, Nos. 1-4 (Oct., 1926-July, 1927), pp. 446-458.
- Hume, Lotta Carswell. Drama at the Doctor's Gate: The Story of Doctor Edward Hume of Yale-in-China. New Haven: Yale-in-China Association, 1961.
- Hutchins, Francis. "Annual Report of Yale-in-China, 1928-29." Yali Quarterly, XIII, No. 1 (September, 1929), pp. 2-6.
- Hutchins, Francis. "The Progress of Yale-in-China to June, 1930." Yali Quarterly, XIV, No. 1 (September, 1930), pp. 5-6.
- "Improvement of Medical Conditions in China." Journal of the American Medical Association, LXIV, No. 14 (April 13, 1915), p. 1163.
- Jen, Yu-wen. The Taiping Revolutionary Movement. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973.
- Kelley, Brooks. Yale: A History. New Haven: Yale University, 1974.
- Ketler, Isaac. The Tragedy of Paotingfu. New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1902.
- Leavens, Dickson, H. "The War and Silver." Yale-in-China Occasional Bulletin, No. 2 (March, 1919), pp. 15-18.
- Lewis, Charlton Miner. "The Hunanese Elite and the Reform Movement 1895-1898." Journal of Asian Studies, XXIX, No. 1 (November, 1969), pp. 35-42.



- Lewis, Charlton Miner. "The Opening of Hunan: Reform and Revolution in a Chinese Province 1895-1907." Ph. D. Dissertation, U. C. at Berkeley, 1965.
- Logan, O. T. "First Hospital for Hunan." China Medical Missionary Journal, XVII (1903), p. 128.
- Lutz, Jessie. China and the Christian Colleges, 1850-1950. Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1971.
- Malone, Dumas, ed. Dictionary of American Biography. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943.
- "Medical Education in China." Journal of the American Medical Association, LXIV, No. 17 (April 24, 1915), p. 1426.
- Michie, Alexander. China and Christianity. Boston: Knight and Millet, 1900.
- Parker, George L., and Newton, Edward, P. The Yale Class Book '97. New Haven: Press of the O. A. Dorman Co., 1897.
- Phelps, William Lyon. Autobiography with Letters. New York: Oxford, 1939.
- Pierson, George. Yale College: An Educational History 1871-1921. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952.
- Powell, Ralph. The Rise of Chinese Military Power 1895-1912. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955.
- Reeves, William. "Sino-American Cooperation in Medicine: The Origins of Hsiang-Ya (1902-1914)," in Liu Kwang-ching, ed., Papers on China (Vol. 14), Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Center, 1960.
- Reynolds, James B., ed. Two Centuries of Christian Activity at Yale. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1901.
- The Rockefeller Foundation. Annual Report (1917). New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1918.
- The Rockefeller Foundation. Annual Report (1919). New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1920.



- The Rockefeller Foundation. Annual Report (1920). New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1921.
- The Rockefeller Foundation. Annual Report (1921). New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1922.
- The Rockefeller Foundation. Annual Report (1924). New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1925.
- The Rockefeller Foundation. Annual Report (1925). New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1926.
- Russell, Bertrand. The Problem of China. New York: The Century Company, 1922.
- Schurmann, Franz, and Schell, Orville. Imperial China. New York: Vintage Books, 1967.
- Sharman, Lyon. Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning. John Day Company, 1934; rpt. Stanford University Press, 1968.
- Sheridan, James E. Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yü-hsiang. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968.
- Shryock, Richard H. The Unique Influence of the Johns Hopkins University on American Medicine. Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard, 1953.
- Smyth, Nathan A., ed. Half-Century Record: Class of 1897, Yale College. New Haven: "Published with the assistance of the Printing-Office of the Yale University Press," 1948.
- Spence, Jonathan. The China Helpers: Western Advisers in China 1620-1960. London: Bodley Head, 1969.
- Stokes, Anson Phelps. "A Visit to Yale-in-China"-- (June, 1920). New Haven: Yale Foreign Missionary Society, 1920.
- Taylor, Mrs. Howard (sic). Borden of Yale '09: "The Life That Counts." London: China Inland Mission, 1926.
- Twain, Mark. "To My Missionary Critics." North American Review, DXXXI (1901), pp. 520-534.



- Twain, Mark. "To a Person Sitting in Darkness." North American Review, DXXXI (1901), pp. 161-176.
- "Under the Nationalist Government: The Situation in Hunan." Educational Review (Shanghai), XIX, No. 2 (April, 1927), pp. 164-168.
- Varg, Paul. The Making of a Myth: The United States and China 1879-1917. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968.
- Welch, Lewis Sheldon, and Camp, Walter. Yale: Her Campus, Classrooms, and Athletics. Boston: L. C. Page and Co., 1899.
- Whitehead, John. "A Steady Hand at the Helm: A Plan and Purpose for the American College 1828-70." Yale College Senior Essay, 1967.
- (?Wilder, Amos.) "The Dreadful Silver Exchange." Yali Quarterly, n. v., No. 15 (January, 1920), p. 1.
- (?Wilder, Amos.) "Dr. Yen Does Peking Business." Yali Quarterly, n. v., No. 14 (October, 1919), p. 4.
- (?Wilder, Amos.) "The late Dr. Shen, Yali's Pathologist." Yali Quarterly, n. v., No. 13 (July, 1919), n. p. (p. 3).
- Williams, F. Wells. "For a Yale in China." Yale Alumni Weekly, XII, No. 39 (Summer Vacation, 1903), pp. 387-388.
- Williams, F. Wells. "Yale's Foreign Mission." Yale Alumni Weekly, XI, No. 39 (Summer Vacation, 1902), pp. 429-430.
- Wingate, Alfred W. S. A Short Report on the Province of Hunan. Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, 1900.
- Wooster, James W. Edward S. Harkness (1874-1940). New York: Printed by W. E. Rudge's Sons, 1949.
- Wright, Henry P., compiler. History of the Class of 1868, 1868-1914. New Haven: The Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor Press, 1914.
- Yen, F. C. "The Hsiang-Ya Medical College." China Medical Journal, XL (1926), pp. 748-753.





- Yen, F. C. "An Example of Cooperation with the Chinese in Medical Education." Journal of the American Medical Association, LXIV, No. 17 (April 24, 1915), pp. 1385-1387.
- Yen, F. C. "What the Medical School Expects of the Pre-medical School" (abstract). Educational Review (Shanghai), XVI, No. 4 (October, 1924), pp. 445-446.
- Young, Marilyn Blatt. The Rhetoric of Empire: American China Policy, 1895-1901. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968.







# YALE MEDICAL LIBRARY

## Manuscript Theses

Unpublished theses submitted for the Master's and Doctor's degrees and deposited in the Yale Medical Library are to be used only with due regard to the rights of the authors. Bibliographical references may be noted, but passages must not be copied without permission of the authors, and without proper credit being given in subsequent written or published work.

This thesis by \_\_\_\_\_ has been used by the following persons, whose signatures attest their acceptance of the above restrictions.

NAME AND ADDRESS

DATE

Ellie Lachman	1500th ST.	NEW HAVEN CT.	6/25/89
Thos Peter K. New	Yale Divinity School	New Haven	12/26/79
Peter K. New	Penzance Road,	Rockport, MA	12/26/79
John Wright	Lat Med	L.A.M.C.	4/1/80
Wm C. Summers	MBB	Yale Med School.	2/27/84
James Chang	YMS		5/89

